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Abstract 
  
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on corporate diversification. 
Researchers have both theoretically and empirically studied the value consequences, the 
costs and benefits of corporate diversification, but evidence so far has been inconclusive. 
This thesis investigates the implications of diversification from a number of 
perspectives that are under-explored in the literature. 
Chapter 2 examines the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the value of corporate cash holdings. We find that coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities has a double-edged sword effect on the marginal 
value of cash. Specifically, empirical results indicate that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities, on the one hand, decreases marginal value of cash in poorly 
governed firms and financially constrained firms; and on the other hand, increases the 
marginal value of cash in diversified firms with efficient internal markets. We also find 
that the agency channel dominates the other two in explaining the effect of coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities on the marginal value of cash. On average, 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the marginal value of an 
extra dollar in a diversified firm by 21 cents.  
Chapter 3 examines the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on merger outcomes. We find that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is also value-reducing, owing to agency problems. It leads to a 
reduction of 0.30% in announcement returns, and a reduction of 1.53% in post-merger 
operating performance. Poorly-governed firms are more likely to engage in a merger if 
the merger will induce an increase in the coinsurance across divisional investment 
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opportunities. Acquiring firms, on average, pay $6.1 million more in premiums for an 
increase in the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after the merger. 
Good corporate governance mitigates the negative impact of coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. The evidence suggests a dark side of corporate 
diversification. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of product market competition on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and the cost of debt financing. The study finds that 
that product market competition amplifies the cost-reduction benefits of diversification 
in financially constrained firms and firms with efficient internal capital markets, but it 
can reduce the diversification benefits for firms with a high level of multimarket 
contacts. The average borrowing cost of diversified firms operating in competitive (less-
competitive) industries is 60.8 (16.3) basis points lower than that of their single-
segment rivals, which corresponds to a cost saving of $1,264,640 ($339,040) for every 
bond issued by an average firm. Evidence suggests that the diversification benefits in 
the debt market, to some extent, alleviate the negative effect of diversification in the 
equity market. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
  
The “diversification discount” describes a phenomenon where a diversified firm is, 
as a whole, worth less than the sum of its parts if sold separately. First documented by 
Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), this phenomenon has been the 
subject of debate over two decades. At the core of the debate lies the question of 
whether “diversification discount” is a real phenomenon. In other words, is 
diversification value-enhancing or value-reducing?  
Three main strands of theories have provided relevant explanations for this question. 
First, in his coinsurance hypothesis, Lewellen (1971) argues that pooling together 
imperfectly-correlated cash flows across segments increases debt capacity and is thus 
value-enhancing. Stein (2003) labels this as the “more-money” effect. Secondly, in his 
internal capital market (ICM) hypothesis, Stein (1997) argues that conglomerate 
headquarters can redistribute internal funds to more productive divisions, thereby 
creating value. Stein (2003) describes this as the “smarter-money” effect. Thirdly, 
through their agency theory, Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue 
that diversification destroys value in the form of cross-subsidization. 
As theories produce opposite predictions, a large number of empirical papers have 
explored the value consequences of diversification from the perspectives of the above-
mentioned theories. Regarding the “more-money” effect, researchers show that 
diversified firms outperform single-segment firms in recessions (Dimitrov and Tice, 
2006), in industry distress (Gopalan and Xie, 2011), and in financial crises 
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(Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Matvos and Seru, 2012), and they have less cash 
holdings (Duchin, 2010), more bank lines of credits (Tong, 2012), and a lower cost of 
capital (Hann et al., 2013). Regarding the “smarter money” effect, diversified firms 
have the ability to abandon unpromising projects early (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004) 
and respond to competition more efficiently (Khanna and Tice, 2001). In relation to the 
agency problem, researchers find that the diversified firms which show more socialism 
behaviours are discounted further (Rajan et al., 2000), have a lower marginal value of 
cash (Tong, 2011), innovate less (Seru, 2013), and overinvest in segments run by 
powerful managers (Glaser et al., 2013). In summary, despite the large body of 
empirical evidence, the overall value consequence of diversification remains unclear. 
Empirically, a further understanding of the costs and benefits of diversification from 
different perspectives is helpful. 
Chapter 2, “Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value 
of Cash Holdings”, is a joint work with Dr. Zhenxu Tong. The effect of coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities stems from the imperfect correlation among 
segment investment opportunities. We estimate the impact of the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities on the value of corporate cash holdings. We develop 
three hypotheses to investigate various channels through which the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities can increase or decrease the marginal value of cash 
holdings: the agency problem hypothesis which highlights the potential mismanagement 
of cash holdings; the financial constraints hypothesis which suggests that less correlated 
divisional investment opportunities reduces the precautionary demand for cash holdings; 
and the efficient internal capital market hypothesis which suggests that coinsurance in 
investment opportunities facilitates inter-segment transfers, resulting in more efficient 
use of cash holdings. Consist with all three hypotheses, we find that the coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it 
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is negatively associated with the marginal value of cash in poorly governed firms and 
financially constrained firms; on the other hand, it is positively associated with the 
marginal value of cash in diversified firms with efficient internal markets. We also find 
that the agency problem hypothesis dominates the other two in explaining the effect of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities, producing an overall negative 
impact on the marginal value of cash. 
Chapter 3, “Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and Corporate 
Mergers” is a joint work with Dr. Zhenxu Tong. Using event study techniques, we 
examine the market’s response to changes in the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities induced by mergers. We find that the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities is negatively associated with abnormal 
announcement returns and post-merger operating performance. We demonstrate that 
poorly-governed firms are more likely to engage in mergers when they expect a higher 
post-merger coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities, thereby destroying 
the firm value.  
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, as is the case with most empirical papers in the 
conglomerate literature, investigate the value consequences of diversification from the 
perspective of shareholders. Nonetheless, it is equally important to learn how 
bondholders perceive the economic impacts of diversification because bond financing 
accounts for a substantial proportion of external financing in firms’ balance sheet. 
Moreover, no firm can isolate itself from its rivals; thus, investigating the implications 
of product market competition on the cost of debt financing for diversified firms is 
important to understand the costs and benefits of diversification.  
Chapter 4, “Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Debt: The Role of Product 
Market Competition”, is a single-authored essay. Researchers have identified a negative 
link between diversification and the cost of borrowing. I examine whether product 
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market competition affects the negative relationship between diversification and the cost 
of borrowing. I demonstrate that bondholders are aware of the interactions between 
competition and the potential benefits and costs of diversification, and respond 
accordingly. I find that product market competition amplifies the negative relationship 
between diversification and the cost of borrowing. And the impact of competition on the 
“diversification-cost of borrowing” relationship is stronger in firms that are financially 
constrained or engage in efficient cross-divisional transfers. However, the impact of 
competition is not significant in diversified firms with a high number of multimarket 
contacts.  
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute to the literature on diversification by identifying 
an inefficient link between the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
and the firm value because coinsurance can be associated with agency problems. Early 
researchers focused on the positive effect of coinsurance in cash flows and investment 
opportunities, from the perspective of alleviating financial constraints; however, the 
nature of investment opportunity implies that coinsurance in investment opportunities 
can also interact with a firm’s resource allocation policy, leading to value creation 
driven by efficient internal capital markets or value destruction driven by agency 
problems. Therefore, we contribute to the “diversification discount” debate by revealing 
negative value consequences of the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities. Chapter 2 uses cross-sectional studies, and investigates the link between 
the effect of coinsurance in investment opportunities and corporate cash holdings. 
Chapter 3 employs an event study approach to examine the stock market response to the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Chapter 3 also 
contributes to a relatively under-explored area: the implication of diversification on 
corporate takeovers. Unlike the well-documented “diversification discount” in cross-
sectional studies, evidence on the market’s response to diversifying mergers is much 
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less and mixed. Chapter 3 contributes to the field by providing a new piece of evidence 
that diversification induces negative merger outcomes through coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. Chapter 4 contributes to a growing body of 
research on the cost of debt financing for diversified firms. The impact of product 
market competition on the cost of borrowing for diversified firms has not been 
examined before. This chapter reveals that product market competition can moderate the 
relationship between diversification and cost of borrowing through different channels. 
Chapter 4 adds to the debate over the value consequences of diversification from the 
perspective of bond investors, as well as to the under-explored area of the multimarket 
contacts in diversified firms.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
are the empirical studies, and Chapter 5 discusses the limitations and future work, and 
concludes the chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Coinsurance across Divisional 
Investment Opportunities and the Value 
of Cash Holdings 
  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Coinsurance across divisional cash flows has been well examined in the literature on 
corporate diversification. The concept of ‘coinsurance’ comes from Lewellen (1971), 
who demonstrates that the aggregation of imperfect correlated segment cash flows 
reduces a conglomerate’s default risk, thereby increasing the firm’s debt capacity. 
Dimitrov and Tice (2006) document that, during recessions, conglomerate segments 
relying on banks suffer a lower drop in the growth rate of both inventory and sales than 
rival single-segment firms which are also relying on banks. They therefore conclude 
that diversification facilitates better access to external financing. Tong (2012) finds that 
coinsurance of cash flows allows diversified firms to obtain more credit lines. 
 However, coinsurance is not confined to imperfect correlations across divisional 
cash flows. Since normally the investment opportunities in the different divisions of a 
conglomerate do not arrive simultaneously, this creates another type of coinsurance that 
stems from the imperfect correlation across divisional investment opportunities. To our 
knowledge, this is an under-researched area, and there is little evidence in the literature 
on how corporate diversification can affect the firm value through coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities.  
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In this chapter, we examine how coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities affects the value of corporate cash holdings. We select corporate cash 
holdings as our research setting for a number of reasons. First, cash holdings are 
particularly vulnerable to managerial expropriation, and thus are closely associated with 
agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Pinkowitz et al., 2006). Myers and Rajan (1998) 
suggest that greater asset liquidity allows managers to misappropriate assets for their 
own benefit. Tong (2011) reveals that the value of cash is lower in conglomerates owing 
to agency problems. Secondly, cash holdings facilitate a comparative analysis between 
conglomerates and stand-alone firms. The cash holdings built up by a segment of a 
conglomerate are substantially similar to the cash holdings accrued in a stand-alone firm. 
This can alleviate the concern over comparability between conglomerate segments and 
focused firms in the literature on diversification (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham 
et al., 2002). Thirdly, corporate cash holdings account for a considerable part of a firm’s 
total assets. Bates et al. (2009) demonstrate that cash balances climbed from 10.5% to 
23.2% of book assets from 1980 to 2006 in US firms. This indicates that corporate 
diversification can influence the firm value greatly through cash holdings.  
To study the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities and the value of cash holdings, we propose three hypotheses based on 
financial constraints, the efficient internal capital market, and agency problems. First, 
the financial constraints hypothesis suggests that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities reduces the value of cash in financially constrained firms 
because the imperfect correlation across the segment investment opportunities reduces 
the amount of resources needed at some point to finance all investment opportunities. 
Secondly, the efficient internal capital market hypothesis suggests that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities increases the value of cash for financially 
constrained firms because the imperfectly-correlated investment opportu-nities across 
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segments reduce the opportunity costs of the efficient transfers of the resources in the 
internal capital market. Thirdly, the agency problem hypothesis predicts that 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the value of cash 
because the imperfect correlation across segment investment opportunities magnifies 
the losses created by inefficient cross-subsidization in a multi-segment firm.  
Our sample consists of 10,510 US firms, with 77,090 firm-year observations from 
1986 to 2010. In line with Duchin (2010), we construct a measure of coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. We examine the impact of coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash based on the empirical model in 
Faulkender and Wang (2006). This methodology evaluates the marginal value of cash 
by investigating how the firm value changes with an alteration in the firm’s cash 
holdings. 
We find that, overall, coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces 
the value of corporate cash holdings for diversified firms by 21 cents, compared with 
stand-alone firms. We split the sample into two groups, based on firms’ financial status, 
and discover that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the 
value of cash for both financially constrained and less-constrained firms. We examine 
the impact of corporate governance, and find that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is associated with a lower value of cash in poorly-governed 
firms. We use the methodology employed by Rajan et al. (2000), and construct a 
measure of the efficiency of internal transfers. We find that coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities reduces the value of cash in conglomerates that 
engage in cross-subsidization, but increases the value of cash in conglomerates that 
have an efficient internal capital market. We also examine the impact of economic 
recessions, and find a positive impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the value of cash during recessions. For a robustness check, we use a 
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difference proxy for unexpected changes in cash holdings. Additionally, we employ the 
fixed effect estimation and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation to address the 
potential endogeneity of diversification. We continue to find similar results. 
Our results support the hypothesis that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the value of cash owing to agency problems, and reduces the 
value of cash for financially constrained firms, but it increases the value of cash through 
the efficient internal capital market. We conclude that the results are consistent with all 
of our three hypotheses, and that we disclose a specific channel through which corporate 
diversification can have value consequences. 
This study contributes to the literature by identifying a dark side of coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities owing to agency problems. Coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is an under-researched area in the literature. 
To our knowledge, only Duchin (2010) examines how coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities affects the level of corporate cash holdings. He focuses on the 
positive effect of investment-opportunity coinsurance from the perspective of 
alleviating financial constraints and reducing the precautionary demand for cash. This 
study differs from Duchin’s (2010) paper in that we identify an inefficient link between 
diversification and corporate liquidity through coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities.  
Moreover, we add to the literature by extending the research on the coinsurance 
effect associated with corporate diversification. While previous papers have focused on 
coinsurance across divisional cash flows, we concentrate on coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. The mechanism is different between these two 
types of coinsurance regarding how they can have value consequences. Previous papers 
in the literature suggest that coinsurance across divisional cash flows can affect the firm 
value through financial constraints (e.g., Lewellen, 1971; Dimitrov and Tice, 2006) and 
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through limited liability (e.g., Leland, 2007). However, investment opportunities can 
also interact with a firm’s resource allocation policy, leading to value creation driven by 
efficient internal capital market transfers or value destruction driven by agency 
problems. Therefore, the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can 
affect the firm value through financial constraints, the efficient internal capital markets, 
and agency problems. The difference in the mechanism between these two types of 
coinsurance implies that we disclose a negative value consequence of the coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities, and this has not been documented in the 
literature. 
More broadly, our study adds to the debate over the costs and benefits of corporate 
diversification. The debate has focused on two crucial issues: first, whether corporate 
diversification causes a ‘diversification discount’ (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang 
and Stulz, 1994; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002). Secondly, what are the 
channels through which the internal capital market can affect the firm value (e.g., Shin 
and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000; Stein, 1997; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Hoechle et al., 
2012). This study contributes to this literature by providing a new piece of evidence on 
how corporate diversification affects the firm value through coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. 
The study is structured as follows: Section 2.2 proposes the hypotheses, Section 2.3 
describes the data and the empirical methodology, Section 2.4 presents the results 
regarding the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities and the value of corporate cash holdings, and Section 2.5 concludes the 
essay. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
In this section, we propose three hypotheses on how coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities can affect the value of corporate cash holdings. 
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2.2.1 The Financial Constraints Hypothesis 
Cash holdings are essential for financially constrained firms when external financing 
is costly in an imperfect capital market. Diversification can influence the firms’ cash 
value through an imperfect correlation across segment investment opportunities. When 
investment opportunities across divisions are more correlated with each other, 
diversified firms are more likely to encounter multiple simultaneous investment 
opportunities in different segments. If the firm cannot generate sufficient internal cash 
flows or tap external financing, it has to abandon some positive NPV investment 
projects. This idea is in the spirit of Duchin (2010), who argues that the imperfect 
correlation across divisional investment opportunities decreases the precautionary 
motive for saving cash, and thus relaxes a firm’s financial constraints. Since the value 
of cash increases with financial constraints (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Faulkender 
and Wang, 2006), we expect that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
reduces the value of cash. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the value 
of cash for financially constrained firms. 
2.2.2 The Efficient Internal Capital Market Hypothesis 
Stein (1997) formalizes the argument that when a diversified firm is financially 
constrained and cannot finance all investment opportunities, the conglomerates’ 
headquarters, which have information that is superior to that available to outside 
investors, can do a better job of project selection by redirecting internal resources to 
segments with better prospects through the internal capital market. We argue that the 
cross-segment correlation in investment opportunities affects a diversified firm’s 
resource allocation decisions and therefore affects the opportunity costs of the internal 
funds. A lower (higher) coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is 
associated with higher (lower) opportunity costs. This can impact the value of cash.  
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For example, consider a financially constrained conglomerate with two segments: A 
and B. On the one hand, suppose there is a perfect correlation across the investment 
opportunities in the two segments. When good investment opportunities arise in 
Segment A, good investment opportunities also arise in Segment B, at the same time. 
Let us assume that the investment opportunities in Segment A are better than the ones in 
Segment B. According to Stein (1997), the headquarters would move the resources from 
Segment B to Segment A. This implies that the investment projects in Segment B are 
abandoned. This corresponds to the situation of higher opportunity costs. 
On the other hand, suppose there is an imperfect correlation across the investment 
opportunities in the two segments (A and B). This implies that the investment 
opportunities in the two segments will not always occur simultaneously. Then, it is 
possible that, when good investment opportunities arise in Segment A, Segment B has 
low or zero investment opportunities, at the same time. Similarly, the headquarters 
would shift resources away from Segment B towards Segment A. This corresponds to 
the situation of lower opportunity costs, because the resources, had they been kept in 
Segment B, would not have generated high returns, since there were no good investment 
opportunities in the original segment. 
Taken together, coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities increases 
the efficiency of inter-segment transfers by reducing the opportunity costs of internal 
funds, and shareholders will raise the value of cash for multi-segment firms. Thus, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities increases the 
value of cash through an efficient internal capital market for financially constrained 
firms.  
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2.2.3 The Agency Problem Hypothesis 
Another strand in the literature on diversification suggests that allocation in 
conglomerates is not efficient, and diversification reduces firm value owing to 
inefficient cross-subsidization, with weaker segments being funded by the resources 
transferred from stronger segments.  
For example, Rajan et al. (2000) postulate that a manager of weaker segments can 
engage in rent-seeking behavior to share the surplus generated by stronger segments. 
Accordingly, stronger segments tend to make ‘defensive’ investments so that the profits 
are lower but harder to poach by weaker segments, leading to overall underperformance. 
As a suboptimal solution, senior management will distribute internal resources in a 
“socialism” way and allocate to weaker segments more capital than is required. The 
mechanism is such that with more equal capital budget, divisional managers will obtain 
more benefit from efficient investment in their own divisions than rent-seeking. In this 
situation, capital allocation deviates from optimal decisions and is thus inefficient.  
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) assume that there are two levels of agency problems. In 
the first level, senior management are agents themselves and act in their own interest 
rather than making the shareholders’ interest the priority. In the second level, divisional 
managers are also agents. Managers of weaker segments focus on their outside 
opportunities and engage in rent-seeking behavior, applying pressure on the senior 
management to offer attractive compensation to retain or incentivize them. Since the 
senior managers are agents themselves and prefer to save the cash for private benefits, 
they tend to refrain from offering attractive compensation to the managers of weaker 
divisions in the form of cash and, instead, the senior management may choose to shift 
the internal funds away from stronger divisions towards weaker divisions during the 
budgeting process, leading to an overall inefficiency allocation of internal resources.  
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These agency theories on the dark side of the internal capital market explain why 
capital allocation in diversified firms can be systematically inefficient. Based on agency 
theories, we argue that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities magnifies 
the losses caused by cross-subsidization in diversified firms. Lower (higher) 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is associated with fewer (or 
more) losses. This can affect the value of cash.  
For example, consider a diversified firm with two segments A and B. Suppose there 
is a perfect correlation across the investment opportunities in the two segments. When 
Segment A has low investment opportunities, Segment B also has low investment 
opportunities, at the same time. Let us assume that the investment opportunities in 
Segment A are even lower than the ones in Segment B. According to theories on the 
dark side of the internal capital market, resources will be shifted away from Segment B 
towards Segment A. This corresponds to the situation of fewer losses, because Segment 
B is also in a poor state.  
On the other hand, suppose there is an imperfect correlation across the investment 
opportunities in the two segments A and B. This implies that the investment 
opportunities in the two segments will not always occur simultaneously. Then, it is 
possible that, when Segment A has low investment opportunities, Segment B, at the 
same time, has high investment opportunities. Similarly, the resources will be 
transferred from Segment B to Segment A. However, this corresponds to a situation of 
greater losses because the high investment opportunities in Segment B are not financed 
owing to inefficient cross-subsidization. 
This analysis suggests that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
amplifies the losses from “corporate socialism”, thereby aggravating agency problems. 
Thus, if agency problems are negatively associated with the value of cash holdings, we 
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expect that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can have great 
implication on the value of corporate cash holdings as well.  
The agency costs of cash holdings have been extensively discussed in the literature 
on corporate liquidity. Theoretically, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) influential paper on 
agency costs suggests that managers who have discretion over internal resources can 
directly expropriate wealth from shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that free cash flows 
are associated with great agency costs. Accumulation of excess cash reserves, combined 
with managers’ empire-building preferences, can lead to arbitrary overinvestment 
decisions that are usually value reducing. Myers and Rajan (1998) posits that liquid 
assets are transferable and anonymous, and therefore facilitate the expropriation of 
assets by management for private benefits at lower costs. Cash holdings, being the most 
liquid asset of internal resources, can be more easily poached by management with less 
scrutiny. The analysis suggests that agency problems have negative implications on 
cash holdings. A dollar may not be worth a dollar if shareholders expect it to be wasted. 
Empirically, there is sufficient evidence that associates agency costs with cash holdings. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that the marginal value of cash holdings is 
significantly lower in poorly-governed firms. Harford (1999) and Harford et al. (2008) 
show that cash-rich firms and firms with poor shareholder rights are more likely to 
attempt value-reducing acquisitions. These findings suggest that agency motives 
represent an important cost of cash holdings.  
Since the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can be associated 
with agency costs in conglomerates, we expect that the coinsurance in investment 
opportunities will also negatively affect the marginal value of cash in diversified firms 
as investors anticipate such mismanagement of cash holdings. Therefore, we have the 
following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can be associated 
with agency problems and thus reduces the marginal value of cash.  
2.2.4 Summary of Hypotheses 
The following table summarizes our three hypotheses: 
The impact of the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
on the value of cash 
Signs of predictions: Less Constrained Constrained 
Financial constraints 0  
Efficient internal capital market 0  
Agency problems   
Predictions on marginal value of cash: Less Constrained Constrained 
Financial constraints =1 >1 
Efficient internal capital market =1 >1 
Agency problems <1 <1 
 
A ‘’ (‘’) sign corresponds to a positive (negative) association between coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and the value of cash holdings. A ‘0’ sign 
suggests that coinsurance in investment opportunities does not affect the value of cash. 
We also summarize the predictions of the marginal value of cash accordingly. The 
financial constraints hypothesis suggests that the marginal value of cash is above $1 
because cash is more important for firms facing costly external financing. The efficient 
internal capital market hypothesis predicts that the marginal value of cash is above $1 
because cash holdings are more productive when they are managed more carefully. The 
agency problem hypothesis predicts that the marginal value of cash is below $1 owing 
to the poor use of internal funds.  
2.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we describe the data and the empirical methodology. 
32 
 
2.3.1 Data 
We use the Compustat Segment file to collect segment-level data, including segment 
assets and sales and the industry of each segment (at 3-digit SIC level). We retrieve 
firm-level data from the Compustat Industrial Annual file. We use CRSP to collect data 
on stocks. We gather business cycle data from the website of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and the real gross domestic product data from the website 
of the Federal Reserve Bank. The sample period spans the period from 1986 to 2010. 
We merge the data collected and drop firms with missing data. We follow the 
diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995) and employ the following screen 
criteria: We exclude firm-year observations, if a firm’s assets are less than $5 million. 
We remove firms and segments that operate in the financial industry (SIC code 6000-
6999). We require that the difference between the sum of segment sales from the 
Compustat Segment file and the firm’s total annual sales from the Compustat Industrial 
Annual file does not exceed 1%. A firm with more than one business segment at the 
three-digit SIC code level is classified as a diversified firm. We winsorize the data to 
reduce the impact of outliers. Our final sample consists of 77,090 firm-year 
observations for 10,510 firms, of which 17,367 (59,723) firm-year observations belong 
to diversified (focused) firms. 
2.3.2 Methodology 
2.3.2.1 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities  
In line with Duchin (2010), we construct a measure of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. The measure quantifies the reduction in investment 
opportunity volatility caused by the imperfect correlation in investment opportunities 
across segments. We use Tobin’s Q (book asset + market value of common equity ‒
deferred taxes) / (0.9×book asset + 0.1× market value of common equity) as a proxy for 
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investment opportunities. We employ the average Tobin’s Q of focused firms in an 
industry as a measure of industry-level investment opportunities. This measure is then 
utilized as a measure of the investment opportunities of a conglomerate’s segment 
operating in the same 3-digit SIC code industry. Next, we estimate industry-level 
investment opportunities volatility, which is computed as the standard deviation of 
industry-level investment opportunities over a period rolling from year t-10 to t-1. A 
diversified firm can be regarded as a portfolio of assets, with each division being 
equivalent to one unique asset in the portfolio. Thus, the volatility of investment 
opportunities in a conglomerate, denoted as tσ(Q)  in fiscal year t is defined as follows:  
            
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where N      is the number of segments in a diversified firm. 
  
tiQ ,)( ))(( ,tjQ   is the volatility of investment opportunities of industry i (industry j). 
We use the average series over the prior ten years [t-10, t-1] to calculate 
the rolling volatilities for year t. 
jiQ ,)(  is the correlation between the investment opportunities in industry i and 
industry j. 
iw )( jw  is the weighting of segment i (segment j) in a diversified firm, which is 
the ratio of the segment’s assets to the total assets of the firm.  
 
The measure of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities, denoted as 
Coinsurance_Q, is computed as the difference between the volatility tσ(Q) in equation (1) 
and a ‘no-diversification’ volatility by assuming a correlation of 1 (perfect correlation) 
across investment opportunities in all divisions. 
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The variable captures the reduction in the volatility of investment opportunities 
owing to the coinsurance effect. By construction, the variable Coinsurance_Q is zero 
for stand-alone firms, and positive for conglomerates. A higher value of Coinsurance_Q 
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indicates a higher coinsurance (or lower inter-segment correlation) across divisional 
investment opportunities.   
2.3.2.2 Coinsurance across Divisional Cash Flows  
We also construct a measure of coinsurance across divisional cash and include it in 
our regression analysis as a control variable. The cash flow coinsurance stems from the 
imperfect correlation across divisional cash flows. We define cash flows by earnings 
minus interest and taxes. The industry-level cash flow volatility in a diversified firm, 
denoted as tσ(CF) , in fiscal year t, is defined as follows: 
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where N      is the number of segments in a diversified firm. 
t,i)CF( ))CF(( t,j   is the volatility of cash flows of industry i (industry j). We use the 
average series over the prior ten years [t-10, t-1] to calculate the 
rolling volatilities for year t. 
j,i)CF(  is the correlation between the cash flows in industry i and industry j. 
iw )w( j  is the weighting of segment i (segment j) in a diversified firm, which 
is the ratio of the segment’s assets to the total assets of the firm.  
The coinsurance across divisional cash flows is computed as the difference between 
tσ(CF) in equation (3) and a ‘no-diversification’ volatility by assuming a correlation of 
1 (perfect correlation) across all segment cash flows. 
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The variable represents the reduction in the cash flow volatility owing to the 
coinsurance effect. The measure is always positive for conglomerates, and zero for 
stand-alone firms. A higher value of Coinsurance_CF indicates a higher cash flow 
coinsurance effect.   
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2.3.2.3 The Marginal Value of Corporate Cash Holdings 
We utilize the method based on the work by Faulkender and Wang (2006) to 
examine the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the 
marginal value of cash. This method is widely used in cash holdings studies (e.g., 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Tong, 2011; Chi and Su, 
2015). Specifically, we use the following equation: 
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where ti,X represents the change in the features of firm i during fiscal year t. ti,R is firm 
i’s stock return during fiscal year t. ti,RB is the return of the 25 size-and-B/M benchmark 
portfolio based on Fama and French (1993) during fiscal year t. ti,MV is the market value 
of equity (close price × shares outstanding). Coinsurance_Q and Coinsurance_CF are 
the constructed measure of the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
and cash flows. We also control a number of firm-specific characteristics, including 
changes in Cash (cash and marketable securities), Net Assets (total assets − cash 
holdings), Earnings (earnings before extraordinary items), R&D (research and 
development expenses), Interest Expenses, Dividends, Leverage (debt/ total assets), and 
Net Financing (equity issued – repurchases + debt issued – debt redemptions). In line 
with Faulkender and Wang (2006), we also include two interaction terms in the 
regressions: ΔCash × Casht–1 and ΔCash × Leverage. The former captures the effect of 
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changes in the marginal value of cash for different levels of cash holdings, and the latter 
captures the effect of leverage on the marginal value of cash.  
This model is, in spirit, similar to a long-term event study that assesses the impact of 
the event and unexpected changes in cash holdings on firm i’s excess returns over the 
one-year event window. The dependent variable, firm i’s cumulative excess return, is 
computed as the difference between the firm’s stock return and its benchmark return 
over fiscal year t. The breakpoints for the 25 Fama-French size-and-B/M benchmark 
portfolio and the portfolio’s monthly returns are collected from Professor Kenneth R. 
French’s webpage.1 For a given fiscal year t, firm i’s stock is assigned into one of the 25 
portfolios based on the firm’s size and B/M ratio rank. The benchmark return is the 
annual cumulative returns of the corresponding 25 Fama-French size-and-B/M portfolio.  
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), the variation in cash holdings over the 
fiscal year t is used as a proxy for unexpected changes in cash. Since all the independent 
variables (except leverage) on the right-hand side are divided by the lagged market 
value of equity, the specification allows us to estimate changes in stock value associated 
with a one-dollar change in firm characteristics, such as cash holdings. Thus, coefficient 
b1 on the change in cash holdings ΔCash represents the marginal value of cash.  
To determine the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities, 
we construct an interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q. We also construct an 
interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_CF to control the effect of coinsurance across 
divisional cash flows. We also control Coinsurance_Q and Coinsurance_CF in the 
model. The coefficient b2 on interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q represents the 
overall impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the 
marginal value of cash. To understand the channels through which coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities impacts the value of cash, we divide the entire 
                                                 
1
We thank Professor Kenneth R. French for providing the data. 
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sample into subsamples based on the level of financial constraints, efficiency of internal 
transfers, and corporate governance, and examine the coefficients on the interaction 
term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q across the subsamples.  
2.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we present our empirical findings. We begin by reporting the overall 
impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash. 
We then divide the sample into two groups based on whether a firm is financially 
constrained or less-constrained. Next, we examine the value consequence of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities for well-governed and poorly-
governed firms. We then examine the impact of the efficiency of internal transfers and 
economic recessions. Later, we conduct robustness checks.  
2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 describes the univariate statistics. We report the summary statistics of the 
coinsurance effects in diversified firms. The coinsurance in cash flows and investment 
opportunities are zero for stand-alone firms. The mean of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities, Coinsurance_Q, in diversified firms is 0.0338, and the mean 
of the firm-level volatility of investment opportunities in diversified firms, denoted as 
Industry Q Volatility, is 0.2497. Since the coinsurance measure quantifies the reduction 
in investment opportunity volatility owing to the imperfect cross-divisional correlation 
across investment opportunities, the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the volatility in investment opportunity by 13.5% (0.0338/0.2497). 
These findings are similar to the evidence provided by Duchin (2010).  
We find that the excess return over an average fiscal year in the sample has a mean 
of 2.78% and a median of −0.30%, consistent with the stylized fact that abnormal stock 
returns are positively skewed. The cash holdings have a median of 9.14% and a far 
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larger mean of 19.24%, which indicates that the cash holdings distribution is skewed to 
the right. On the other hand, the changes in cash have a median and a mean near zero, 
indicating a relatively symmetric distribution. Overall, the statistics are consistent with 
findings by Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
2.4.2 The Value of Cash Holdings 
First, we estimate the marginal value of cash holdings for the entire sample. In Table 
2.2, we present our results. In Panel A, Column 1, the coefficients on the independent 
variables represents the value change in excess return for a one-dollar change in the 
corresponding variables. Therefore, the impact of an additional dollar in cash holdings 
on a firm's equity value is reflected in the coefficients on the variable ΔCash and the 
interaction terms ΔCash × Casht–1 and ΔCash × Leverage. In our sample, an average 
firm has lagged cash holdings of 19.24%, and a leverage ratio of 22.99%. Thus, the 
marginal value of cash for an average firm with a mean level of cash and a mean 
leverage ratio is $1.00 (= $1.163 + (‒0.308 × 19.24%) + (‒0.439 × 22.99%). We 
conduct the F-test to test if the estimated value of cash is significantly different from the 
value of 1. Table 2.2 Panel B presents the marginal value of cash and the p-value from 
the F-test as reported in the brackets. We find that the estimated value of cash for an 
average firm in the whole sample is not significantly different from the value of 1 (p-
value = 0.75).  
In Panel A, Column 2, we examine the relationship between coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities and the value of cash. The coefficient on the 
interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is significant and negative, suggesting that 
the equity shareholders respond negatively to the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. We also calculate the marginal value for focused firms and 
conglomerates, respectively.  
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The marginal value of cash for single-segment firms is reflected in the coefficients 
on three terms: ΔCash, ΔCash × Casht–1, and ΔCash × Leverage. In our sample, the 
marginal value of an additional one dollar in cash is $1.08 (= $1.249 + (‒0.250 × 
19.24%) + (‒0.526 × 22.99%)) for stand-alone firms. The p-value is 0.01 from the F-test, 
suggesting that the estimated value of 1.08 is significantly different from the value of 1. 
The marginal value of cash for conglomerates is reflected in the coefficients on five 
terms: ΔCash, ΔCash × Casht–1, ΔCash × Leverage, ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q and 
ΔCash × Coinsurance_CF. We find that the marginal value of an additional one dollar 
in cash for multi-segment firms is $0.87 (= $1.249 + (‒6.892 × 0.0338) + (3.003 × 
0.0080) + (‒0.250 × 19.24%) + (‒0.526 × 22.99%)). The p-value is 0.01 from the F-test, 
suggesting that the estimated value of 0.87 is significantly different from the value of 1. 
Taken together, evidence indicates that an additional one dollar in conglomerates is 
evaluated as being worth 21 cents less than an additional one dollar in stand-alone firms. 
The negative coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q suggests a 
negative impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the firm 
value, thus supporting the financial constraints hypothesis and the agency hypothesis. 
Given that the marginal value of cash in multi-segment firms is $0.87 and the estimated 
value of 0.87 is significantly different from the value of 1, it is consistent with the 
agency hypothesis. 
2.4.3 Financial Constraints 
In this section, we split our sample into two groups based on a firm’s financial status. 
We compare the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q across the 
subsamples to study if coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities influences 
the firm value differently in financially constrained and less-constrained firms. We use 
two criteria to determine the level of financial constraints. 
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(i) Pay-out ratio: High pay-out ratio signals that a firm has easy access to internal 
financing to cover its investment needs, and firms with low pay-out ratios tend to be 
more financially constrained (Fazzari et al., 1988). Thus, we use the pay-out ratio as our 
first measure of financial constraints. We define pay-out ratio as the ratio of total 
dividends plus stock repurchases to book assets. For a given fiscal year t, we sort firms 
based on their pay-out ratios in year t-1, and a firm is classified as financially 
constrained (less constrained) if it has a pay-out ratio smaller (bigger or equal to) than 
the mean of the sample distribution per fiscal year.  
(ii) SA index: Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that firm size and age are powerful 
predictors of a firm’s financial strength. Young and small firms are usually more 
financially constrained in comparison to mature ones. We therefore follow Hann et al. 
(2013) and Chi and Su (2016) and use the SA index
2
 as our second measure of financial 
constraints. A higher SA index suggests that the firm is more financially constrained. 
We sort the observations into two subsamples using the median as a cutoff. We 
calculate the firm-year SA index and classify a firm as financially constrained (less 
constrained) if the firm has an above (equal to or below) median SA index in the sample 
distribution. 
Table 2.3 Panel A provides the coefficient estimates of equation (5) separately for 
constrained and less-constrained firms, and Panel B presents the marginal value of cash 
holdings. Using both criteria for financial constraints, the coefficients on the interaction 
term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q are negative and significant across the subsamples, 
which suggests that, as the level of investment-opportunity coinsurance increases, the 
value of an extra dollar in cash declines in both financially constrained and less-
constrained firms. This finding is consistent with the agency hypothesis, which predicts 
                                                 
2
 The SA index calculated as (−0.737 × Assets + 0.043 × Assets2 − 0.040 × Age), where Assets is the 
natural log of inflation-adjusted book assets that is capped at $4.5 billion, and Age is the number of years 
a firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat and is capped at 37 years. 
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that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the value of cash in 
conglomerates, regardless of their financial strengths.   
Within the subsample of less-constrained firms, we find that the marginal value of 
cash in stand-alone firms is not significantly different from one. On the other hand, an 
extra dollar in cash for conglomerates is evaluated at $0.83 ($0.79), based on the pay-
out ratio (SA Index) criteria. And the estimated values, 0.83 and 0.79, are significantly 
different from the value of 1 (p-value = 0.01). Evidence indicates that equity investors 
are concerned over the mismanagement of funds, so they reduce the valuation of extra 
cash in multi-segment firms. This evidence supports the agency hypothesis.  
Within the subsample of financially constrained firms, we report that the marginal 
value of cash is significantly larger than one in stand-alone firms, indicating that excess 
cash is valuable for financially-distressed firms. As for the multi-segment firms, 
although the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q are 
significantly negative at higher than 1%, the marginal value of an extra dollar in cash is 
found to be $0.91 ($0.92) using the pay-out ratio (SA Index) criteria. However, the 
estimated values, 0.91 and 0.92, are not significantly different from the value of (p-
value = 0.29 and 0.15, respectively).  
Our financial constraints hypothesis predicts that the marginal value of cash is 
greater than $1, while our agency problem hypothesis predicts that the marginal value of 
cash is smaller than $1. This indicates that, apart from corporate governance, the 
association between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the 
marginal value of cash is sensitive to a firm’s financial strength. The fact that cash 
holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms is well-documented in the 
literature on cash holdings (e.g., Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 
2010). Therefore, it is possible that the positive impact of financial constraints on the 
value of cash offset the negative impact of agency problems on the value of cash, and 
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thus the estimated value of cash in financially constrained conglomerates is not 
significantly different from the value of 1.   
2.4.4 Corporate Governance 
In this section, we conduct further analysis to investigate how the value of cash in 
conglomerates is influenced by agency problems. We predict that the negative impact of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities only exists in poorly-governed 
firms. We employ two measures of corporate governance:  
1. The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) G-index is based on charter provisions 
in a firm. It counts the number of charter provisions that restrict shareholder rights and 
strengthen takeover defenses; and thus, a higher G-index indicates greater managerial 
power and more agency costs. Therefore, a high G-index corresponds to poor corporate 
governance. We collect the G-index data from the “Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre” (IRRC) database. As the data are available for a subset of the firms in 
Compustat for every two years from 1990 to 2006, our sample size is reduced to 11,385 
firm-year observations.  
2. The presence of blockholders. A blockholder is a large shareholder who owns at 
least 5% or more of a firm’s common stock. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that 
block holders with substantial stakes and voting control rights have the incentives to 
monitor and pressure the management and therefore improve corporate governance.  
We assign a firm to the “good governance” group, if the firm’s G-index is in the 
bottom quartile of our sample distribution (G-index <7),
3
 or if the firm has at least one 
blockholder. We assign the rest of the firms to the “poor governance” group. We next 
run equation (5) separately for the two groups. Table 2.4 presents the coefficient 
estimates.  
                                                 
3
 This indicates fewer restrictions on shareholder rights. 
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In the subsample of good governance, we find that the coefficients on the interaction 
term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q are not significant, using both criteria for corporate 
governance. This suggests that governance mechanisms, such as takeover market and 
big shareholders, help mitigate agency problems in diversified firms.  
In the subsample of poor governance, the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash 
× Coinsurance_Q are both negative and significant at higher than 1%. For example, in 
Panel A, Column 2, the coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is –
6.268. Since the mean value of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
in our sample is 0.0358 in diversified firms and 0 in single-segment firms, it implies that 
an average single-segment firm will lose about 21 cents (–6.268*0.0358) in the 
marginal value of cash, when it chooses to diversify. Given that the marginal value of 
cash of an average focused firm in the entire sample is $1.08, it suggests a 19.4% drop 
in the value of cash owing to the agency problems associated with coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities.  
Table 2.4, Panel B, shows the marginal value of cash. Within the ‘good governance’ 
subsamples, the estimated value of cash is higher than $1 and significant in both stand-
alone firms and conglomerates, suggesting that shareholders put a high value on cash 
holdings in well-governed firms, irrespective of the firm’s organizational structure. On 
the other hand, within the ‘bad governance’ subsamples, the marginal value of cash in 
single-segment firms falls slightly below $1. The marginal value of cash in multi-
segment firms falls further to as low as $0.66 (£0.79) under the G-index (block holders) 
and the estimated values, 0.66 and 0.79, are significantly different from the value of 1, 
with p-value = 0.01 for both numbers. Evidence suggests a large discount in the 
marginal value of cash, owing to coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Taken together, these findings support the agency problem hypothesis.  
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2.4.5 Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance 
In this section, we first partition the entire sample into two groups depending on 
whether they are financially constrained or less-constrained. We then further divide 
each of the two groups depending on whether they are well-governed or poorly-
governed. We repeat the regression analysis separately for these four subsamples. We 
expect that the negative effect of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
prevails in poorly-governed firms within both financially constrained and less-
constrained firms. We provide the results in Table 2.5A-2.5D.  
In Table 2.5A, we split the entire sample into four subgroups based on the pay-out 
ratio and G-index. In Column 1-2, within the less-constrained and well-governed 
subsample, the coefficient on ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is –2.553 (p-value = 0.50). The 
marginal value of cash in single-segment firms is $1.08 (p-value = 0.48), while the 
marginal value of diversified firms is $1.01 (p-value = 0.93). In Column 3-4, within the 
less-constrained and poorly-governed subsample, the coefficient on ΔCash × 
Coinsurance_Q is –4.505 (p-value = 0.01). The marginal value of cash in single-
segment firms is $0.73 (p-value = 0.01). The marginal value of cash in diversified firms 
is $0.54 (p-value=0.01). The results indicate that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities has a negative (zero) impact on the value of cash in the poorly-
governed (well-governed) and less-constrained firms.  
In Column 5-6, within the financially constrained and well-governed subsample, 
the coefficient on ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is –8.598 (p-value = 0.62). The marginal 
value of cash in single-segment firms is $1.82 (p-value = 0.01), while the marginal 
value of diversified firms is $1.49 (p-value = 0.01). In Column 7-8, within the 
financially constrained and poorly-governed subgroup, the coefficient on ΔCash × 
Coinsurance_Q is –10.253 (p-value = 0.02). In Panel B, the marginal value of cash in 
single-segment firms is $0.93 (p-value = 0.47), while the marginal value of cash in 
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diversified firms is $0.63 (p-value = 0.08). The results suggest that coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities also decreases the value of cash in financially 
constrained firms that are poorly-governed. It is noteworthy that, in financially 
constrained firms, the value of cash is $1.49 in well-governed firms, while the value is 
$0.63 in poorly-governed firms. This implies that if we do not split the constrained firm 
sample by the level of governance, the overall value of cash for financially constrained 
firms can be close to $1, and this echoes the earlier findings in Table 2.2 that the 
estimated value of cash is not significantly different from the value of 1 for financially 
constrained conglomerates. Taken together, evidence suggests the agency problem 
hypothesis dominates the financial constraints and the efficient internal capital market 
hypothesis in explaining the effect of the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the marginal value of cash. 
In Table 2.5B, we divide the financially constrained and less-constrained firms 
based on the presence of blockholders. We continue to find that agency problems 
prevail in diversified firms that are poorly-governed, regardless of the firms’ financial 
strength. In Table 2.5C-2.5D, we use SA index to partition firms into financially 
constrained and less-constrained firms, and find similar results. Overall, we find strong 
evidence that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces the value 
of cash for both the financially constrained and less-constrained firms, which supports 
the agency hypothesis. 
2.4.6 Efficiency of Internal Transfers  
The findings so far indicate that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities leads to agency problems. In this section, we test whether coinsurance in 
investment opportunities is associated with cross-subsidizations through the internal 
capital market.  
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First, in line with Rajan et al. (2000), we compute a measure of cross-divisional 
transfers. The measure is widely used in the literature on diversification as a proxy for 
inter-segment transfers (e.g., Duchin, 2010; Tong, 2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). 
The internal transfers are calculated as follows:   
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where j =1 represents segment j, ss is single-segment firms, Ij is capital expenditure, wj 
is segment j’s proportion of the firm’s total assets, Assetj is the book value of segment j, 
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w addresses the fact that diversified firms, 
generally, have more funds than single-segments because the former have a lower cost 
of capital.    
After computing the level of internal transfers in a diversified firm, we continue to 
differentiate between inefficient and efficient transfers. We follow the method used by 
Duchin (2010). We first compute the asset-weighted average of the investment 
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opportunities in a diversified firm.
4
 We then assign a business segment to a ‘high-
productivity’ (‘low-productivity’) segment group, if the segment’s industry-level 
Tobin’s Q is higher (lower) than the conglomerate’s asset weighted-average Tobin’s Q. 
For each firm, we sum the internal transfers allocated to ‘high-productivity’ and ‘low-
productivity’ segments. We define two more variables: Inefficient (Efficient) Transfers 
is the sum of the transfers made to low (high) productivity divisions.
5
 We then construct 
two three-way interaction terms: ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q × Inefficient Transfers and 
ΔCash Coinsurance_Q × Efficient Transfers, and we include them in equation (5). The 
coefficients on these two three-way interaction terms capture the impact of coinsurance 
in investment opportunities on the marginal value of cash through efficient (inefficient) 
internal transfers.  
Table 2.6 presents the results. Panel A describes the summary statistics of efficient 
and inefficient transfers in diversified firms. On average, the magnitude of efficient 
transfers is very similar to that of inefficient transfers. We provide the regression results 
in Panel B. The coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q × 
Inefficient Transfers is 1.412 (p-value = 0.01), which indicates that coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities reduces the marginal value of cash in conglomerates 
that inefficiently make transfers to low-productivity divisions, which is consistent with 
the agency hypothesis. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × 
Coinsurance_Q × Efficient Transfers is 0.810 (p-value = 0.08), which suggests that 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities increases the marginal value of 
cash in conglomerates that efficiently transfer funds to high-productivity divisions. This 
evidence supports the efficient internal capital market hypothesis that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities can be value-enhancing for diversified firms 
                                                 
4
 As mentioned before in Section 2.3.2.1, we use the average Tobin’s Q across all single-segment firms in 
an industry as a measure of investment opportunities in the corresponding segment in a diversified firm.   
5
 A diversified firm can (i) make efficient transfers only, (ii) make inefficient transfers only, or (iii) make 
both efficient and efficient transfers.  
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with an efficient inter-segment allocation policy. This corroborates the “smarter money 
effect” of internal capital markets (Stein, 2003).  
Panel C of Table 2.6 presents the estimated marginal value of cash. We find that the 
estimated value of cash for single-segment firms is not significantly different from the 
value of 1, while the estimated value of cash for conglomerates is $0.80 and is 
significantly different from the value of 1. This implies that, collectively, the dark side 
of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities dominates the bright side of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities, which supports the agency 
hypothesis.  
In Table 2.7, we use the “value added” measure developed by Rajan et al. (2000) as 
an alternative proxy for the efficiency of internal transfers. It is calculated as follows:  
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where q is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s q for the firm, and jq is the 
asset-weighted Tobin’s q using single-segment firms only in segment j. This variable 
measures the overall efficiency of the firm’s inter-segment allocation policy. A higher 
value of the “value added” measure indicates greater efficiency of internal transfers. 
The measure is zero for focused firms. We next split the diversified firms into two 
subsamples based on whether the “value added” measure is greater or smaller than zero. 
We then compare the diversified firm subsamples separately with single-segment firms.  
In Panel A of Table 2.7, the coefficient on ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is –2.212 (p-
value = 0.01) within the subsample of inefficient transfers (value added by allocation < 
0), while the coefficient on ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is insignificant within the 
subsample of efficient transfers (value added by allocation > 0). In Panel B, the 
marginal value of cash for diversified firms is $0.85 (p-value = 0.01) within in the 
subsample of inefficient transfers, and $1.03 (p-value = 0.04) within the subsample of 
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efficient transfers. Taken together, the findings are consistent with the agency 
hypothesis and the efficient internal capital market hypothesis, which suggests that the 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is a double-edged sword that can 
either create or destroy the firm value.   
2.4.7 Economic Recessions 
Economic recession increases frictions in the capital market where firms face more 
severe credit rationing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Several studies show evidence that 
diversified firms are less vulnerable to financial shocks than single-segment firms 
because the coinsurance effect alleviates financial constraints or because the internal 
capital market becomes more efficient in economic downturns (e.g., Dimitrov and Tice, 
2006; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Gopalan and Xie, 2011). Therefore, we 
expect that the impact of coinsurance in investment opportunities on the marginal value 
of cash in economic recessions is more pronounced in financially constrained firms and 
firms with efficient internal capital markets. In this section, we investigate which 
channel dominates the value consequences of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities during economic recessions. 
We obtain business cycle data from the website of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). We then construct a dummy variable Recession, which 
takes the value of 1, if more than two months in a firm’s fiscal year are classified as 
being in a recession period, and zero otherwise. We add three terms, Recession, ΔCash 
× Recession and ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q × Recession to equation (5) and repeat the 
regression analysis. We are interested in the coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × 
Coinsurance_Q × Recession, which represents the difference in the impact of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the marginal value of cash 
between recession periods and non-recession periods. 
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Panel A of Table 2.8 presents the regression results. The coefficient on the 
interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q × Recession is 4.131 (p-value = 0.01), which 
suggests that diversified firms tend to allocate internal capital efficiently during 
economic recessions; therefore, we find a positive association between coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and the value of cash. Panel B reports the 
marginal value of cash for stand-alone firms and conglomerates during recession and 
non-recession periods. We find that the marginal value of cash for diversified firms is 
$1.26 (p-value = 0.01) during recessions and $0.83 (p-value = 0.01) during non-
recession periods. This implies that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities is value-creating because the internal capital allocation becomes more 
efficient in economic downturns, which is consistent with the efficient internal capital 
market hypothesis.  
2.5 Robustness Check 
2.5.1 Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash  
So far, we use the realized change in cash holdings over a fiscal year to proxy for 
the unexpected changes in cash holdings. The underlying assumption is that the 
expected level of cash does not change during the fiscal year. In this section, we use an 
alternative measure to proxy for the unexpected change in cash to capture the time trend 
in cash. Following Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Tong (2011), we calculate a “net 
change in cash holdings”, which is the difference between the realized change in cash 
and the average change in cash in the corresponding 25 Fama-French size and B/M 
benchmark portfolio during the same fiscal year.  
We repeat the analysis for the entire sample in Table 2.9A. In Panel A, the 
coefficient on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q is –5.594 (p-value = 0.01), 
which indicates that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities decreases 
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the marginal value of cash for diversified firms. In Panel B, we find that an extra one 
dollar in cash is valued at $1.06 ($0.83) for stand-alone firms (conglomerates), which is 
consistent with the agency hypothesis. Table 2.9B reports the regression results using 
the “net change in cash” separately for constrained and less constrained firms. We find 
that the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q are significant and 
negative within both financially constrained and less-constrained subsamples, which 
suggests that agency problems dominates in diversified firms, regardless of their 
financial strength. In Table 2.9C, we examine the impact of corporate governance. We 
find a negative (no) association between coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities and the marginal value of cash in poorly (well) governed firms. Overall, 
evidence corroborates our earlier findings and is consistent with the agency hypothesis. 
2.5.2 About Endogeneity 
As noted by Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b), the diversification 
decision is not random, and a firm can endogenously choose to diversify. Therefore, in 
this section, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation and fixed effect estimation 
to mitigate the potential endogeneity of diversification.  
First, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation to address the self-selection 
issue. In the first stage, we employ a probit model which predicts the probability of a 
firm’s diversification decision. The dependent variable is 1 for multi-segment firms and 
zero for stand-alone firms. Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that a firm’s diversification 
decision is affected by a number of factors, including firm-specific characteristics (size, 
EBIT, capital expenditures, whether the firm is in the S&P index, whether the firm is 
listed on AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ, and whether the firm is founded abroad), 
industry characteristics (the fraction of all conglomerates in the industry, the fraction of 
industry sales made by conglomerates, the number of mergers and acquisitions 
announcement in the fiscal year, the transaction value of these mergers and acquisitions), 
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and macroeconomic variables (GDP, the number of months in a year that is identified as 
in a recession). Table 2.10 presents the coefficient estimates from the probit regression. 
We also calculate the inverse Mills ratio (denoted as Lambda) in the probit regression 
and include it in the second stage analysis as an additional variable. 
Secondly, we use two-way fixed effect estimation to address the omitted variables 
issue. We employ year fixed effects and firm fixed effects in the regression to eliminate 
time invariant unobservable factors and to capture time series trends. In order to run the 
fixed effect regression, we drop the firms that have only one observation. This reduces 
our sample size to 75,705 firm-year observations.  
In Table 2.11, we report the coefficient estimates from the second stage of 
Heckman’s two-stage model and the two-way fixed effect model for the entire sample. 
In Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q are both 
negative and significant using both econometric methods. In Panel B, the marginal 
values of cash for diversified firms (stand-alone firms) is $0.85 ($1.08) using 
Heckman’s two-stage model, and the marginal values of cash for diversified firms 
(stand-alone firms) is $0.73 ($1.05) using the two-way fixed effect model. Evidence is 
consistent with prior findings that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the value of cash owing to agency problems.  
Table 2.12A shows the regression results for financially constrained and less-
constrained firms, based on Heckman’s two-stage estimation. Using both criteria for 
financial constraints, the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × Coinsurance_Q 
are negative and significant across the subsamples, which indicates that the investment-
opportunity coinsurance decreases the value of cash in both financially constrained and 
less-constrained firms. We find that the marginal value of cash of less-constrained 
conglomerates is at $0.79 ($0.83) using the pay-out ratio (SA Index) criteria, with a p-
value of 0.01. The value of cash of financially constrained conglomerates is $0.98 
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($0.92) using the pay-out ratio (SA Index) criteria. The estimated values, 0.98 and 0.92, 
are not significantly different from the value of 1. This implies that the positive impact 
of financial constraints offsets the negative impact of agency problems in financially 
constrained conglomerates. Table 2.12B reports the results for financially constrained 
and less-constrained firms, based on the two-way fixed effect estimation, and we find 
consistent results.  
In Table 2.13A, we test the impact of corporate governance using Heckman’s two-
stage estimation. We find that the coefficients on the interaction term ΔCash × 
Coinsurance_Q are only negative and significant in the ‘poor governance’ subsamples, 
and the marginal value of cash in multi-segment firms is as low as $0.69 ($0.78), based 
on the G-index (blockholders) governance measure, which suggests that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities has a negative (zero) impact on the value of 
cash in poorly (well) governed firms. Table 2.13B presents the results for constrained 
and less-constrained firms, based on the two-way fixed effect estimation. We continue 
to find consistent evidence. Taken together, the results corroborate our early findings 
and support the agency hypothesis after addressing the potential endogeneity concern.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the value of corporate cash holdings. We develop three hypotheses 
based on financial constraints, the efficient internal capital market and agency problems. 
We construct a measure of coinsurance based on the imperfect correlation across 
divisional investment opportunities. We employ Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) 
methodology, and find that the marginal value of cash in conglomerates (stand-alone 
firms) is $0.87 ($1.08), which indicates that an additional one dollar in conglomerates is 
valued at 21 cents less than in stand-alone firms.  
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We find that the agency channel dominates the financial constraints channel and the 
efficient internal capital market channel in explaining the impact of coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities on the marginal value of cash, resulting in an overall 
lower valuation of cash holdings. We find that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the value of cash in both financially constrained and less-
constrained firms, but the positive impact of financial constraints can offset the negative 
impact of agency problems in financially constrained firms. We find that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is associated with a lower value of cash in 
poorly-governed firms. We find evidence that the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities reduces the value of cash through inefficient cross-
subsidization, but increases the value of cash through the efficient internal capital 
market. We document a positive impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the value of cash in economic recessions, which suggests improved 
efficiency of internal transfers in recessions. We use an alternative measure of the 
unexpected change in cash holdings and employ Heckman’s two-stage model and two-
way fixed effects estimation to address potential endogeneity, and we continue to find 
similar evidence. 
Our results suggest that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is a 
double-edged sword. It decreases the value of cash in poorly governed firms, and 
reduces the value of cash in financially constrained firms, but increases the value of 
cash in firms with an efficient internal capital market. Additionally, we disclose a 
specific channel through which the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities can have value consequences.  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics. This sample consists of 10,510 firms with 77,090 firm-year 
observations over the period 1986-2010. Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus 
Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. Coinsurance_Q 
is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. It is computed as the difference between the 
volatility of segment-level investment opportunities in a conglomerate and the volatility that assumes a 
correlation of 1 between all segment-level investment opportunities in the conglomerate. Segment-level 
investment opportunities is the average Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms in a 3-digit SIC code industry over 
a prior 10-year period (see text for more details). Industry Q Volatility is the volatility that assumes a 
correlation of 1 between all segment-level investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across 
divisional cash flows. It is computed as the difference between the volatility of segment-level cash flows in a 
conglomerate and the volatility that assumes a correlation of 1 between all segment-level cash flows in the 
conglomerate. Segment-level cash flows is the average cash flows of single-segment firms in a 3-digit SIC 
code industry over a prior 10-year period (see text for more details). Industry Cash Flow Volatility is the 
volatility that assumes a correlation of 1 between all segment-level cash flows. ΔCash is the one-year change 
in cash holdings, standardized by the lagged market value of equity. ΔEarnings is the one-year change in 
earnings before extraordinary items, standardized by the lagged market value of equity. ΔNet Assets is the 
one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings, standardized by the lagged market value of equity. 
ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses, standardized by the lagged market 
value of equity. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses, standardized by the lagged 
market value of equity. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends, standardized by the lagged market 
value of equity. Cash is cash plus marketable securities, standardized by the lagged market value of equity. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption, standardized by the lagged market value of equity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable N Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
 Std.  
Dev. 
Excess Return 77,090 0.0278 -0.0030 -0.2843 0.2893 0.5970 
Coinsurance_Q (Diversified firms only) 17,367 0.0338 0.0227 0.0092 0.0468 0.0358 
Industry Q Volatility ( Diversified firms only) 17,367 0.2497 0.2275 0.1636 0.3078 0.1339 
Coinsurance_CF ( Diversified firms only ) 17,367 0.0080 0.0057 0.0023 0.0112 0.0083 
Industry Cash Flow Volatility ( Diversified firms only) 17,367 0.0482 0.0414 0.0290 0.0596 0.0344 
ΔCash 77,090 0.0111 0.0011 -0.0321 0.0402 0.1544 
ΔEarnings 77,090 -0.0017 0.0075 -0.0313 0.0439 2.4742 
ΔNet Asset 77,090 0.0687 0.0437 -0.0348 0.1700 0.5263 
ΔR&𝐷 77,090 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0294 
ΔInterest Expenses 77,090 0.0017 0.0000 -0.0023 0.0050 0.0327 
ΔDividends 77,090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0090 
Casht-1 77,090 0.1924 0.0914 0.0304 0.2183 0.7320 
Leverage 77,090 0.2299 0.1937 0.0293 0.3605 0.2165 
Net Financing 77,090 0.0450 0.0015 -0.0288 0.0696 0.2546 
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Table 2.2 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities 
and the Value of Cash  
 
This table tests the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the 
value of corporate cash holdings. Panel A shows the regression results. The dependent variable Excess 
Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M 
benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. 
Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is 
coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-
year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets 
minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest 
Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. 
Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the 
new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except 
Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market 
value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions 
 Excess Return 
        (1)           (2) 
Intercept -0.025*** -0.017*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.163*** 1.249*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q 
 
-6.892*** 
 
 
(0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.151 
  (0.24) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 
 
3.003 
 
 
(0.60) 
Coinsurance_CF 
 
0.312 
 
 
(0.57) 
ΔEarnings 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.414*** 0.409*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔR&D -0.760*** -0.959*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.479*** -1.536*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.701*** 1.696*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.264*** 0.270*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.185*** -0.194*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.308*** -0.250*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.439*** -0.526*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.064*** -0.034*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations   77,090       77,090 
Adjusted R2 0.12         0.12 
 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
Entire Sample     $1.00   (0.75)  
Single-segment Firms      $1.08   (0.01)***  
Diversified Firms      $0.87   (0.01) *** 
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Table 2.3 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints 
This table examines the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the value 
of cash for less-constrained and constrained firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into 
constrained and less-constrained groups based on two measures of financial constraints: Payout Ratio and SA 
index (see text for more details). The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal 
year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is 
the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings 
is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets 
minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is 
the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus 
marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus 
repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Regressions  
 Excess Return 
 Payout Ratio  SA Index 
 Less Constrained Constrained Less Constrained Constrained 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.026*** -0.029*** 0.023*** -0.085*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.158*** 1.393*** 1.116*** 1.263*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -1.279*** -8.747*** -5.105*** -5.856*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.084 -0.054 -0.037 -0.399 
 
(0.45) (0.83) (0.77) (0.11) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -10.167 1.834 -1.229 1.472 
 
(0.15) (0.92) (0.62) (0.72) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.607 0.034 -0.729 1.158 
 
(0.20) (0.97) (0.16) (0.29) 
ΔEarnings 0.342*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.290*** 0.435*** 0.327*** 0.441*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.097 -0.828*** -0.782*** -0.529*** 
 
(0.38) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.526*** -1.414*** -1.577*** -1.572*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.536*** 0.025 1.029*** 2.282*** 
 
(0.01) (0.96) (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.194*** 0.344*** 0.100*** 0.473*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.117*** -0.195*** -0.137*** -0.159*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.042*** -0.411*** 0.027*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.160*** -0.543*** -0.630*** -0.667*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.076*** -0.051*** -0.098*** 0.029** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Observations 36,862  40,228           38,545 38,545 
Adjusted R2  0.12 0.14              0.10  0.14 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
    Payout Ratio   SA Index 
 
Less Constrained Constrained   Less Constrained Constrained 
Single-segment Firms $0.96        (0.12)      $1.19*** (0.01)   $0.97        (0.20)  $1.10*** (0.01)  
Diversified Firms $0.83***  (0.01)      $0.91       (0.29) $0.79***    (0.01)  $0.92       (0.15) 
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Table 2.4 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Corporate Governance 
This table examines how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of cash. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into two 
subsamples based on a firm’s level of corporate governance. We use two criteria of corporate governance: G-index 
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) and the presence of Blockholders (see text for more details). The dependent 
variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-
B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. 
Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across 
divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before 
extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year 
change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. 
ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of 
debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt 
redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized 
by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 Excess Return 
 G-index  Block Holders 
 
Good Governance 
(1) 
Poor Governance 
(2) 
 Good Governance 
(3) 
Poor Governance 
(4) 
Intercept -0.008 0.005        -0.015***       -0.017*** 
 
(0.53) (0.55)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.355***        1.202***          1.424***        1.113*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -2.479       -6.268***  -0.540       -4.277*** 
 
(0.71) (0.01)  (0.44) (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.620 0.185  -0.187 0.104 
 
(0.13) (0.32)  (0.19) (0.69) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -9.480 -3.924    -3.161* -1.431 
 
(0.69) (0.62)  (0.08) (0.55) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.549 -0.984    0.398 0.391 
 
(0.79) (0.25)  (0.52) (0.72) 
ΔEarnings 0.359***        0.415***         0.006***        0.020*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.151***        0.158***         0.211***        0.164*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.143 0.086        -0.776***       -0.781*** 
 
(0.71) (0.71)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -2.370***        -2.990***        -2.014***       -1.485*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.598 -0.032         1.311***        2.914*** 
 
(0.13) (0.96)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.186***         0.136***         0.328***        0.241*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.035       -0.108***         -0.146***       -0.190*** 
 
(0.36) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.189       -0.330***        -0.328***       -0.200*** 
 
(0.28) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage 0.183       -1.043***        -0.571***       -0.549*** 
 
(0.63) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.113**        -0.094***        -0.046***        0.074*** 
 
(0.04) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations   3,677 7,708  50,811 26,279 
Adjusted R2 0.10           0.13    0.13             0.10 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 G-Index  Block Holders 
 
Good Governance Poor Governance  Good Governance Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms $1.36*** (0.01) $0.90*      (0.06)  $1.23***   (0.01)    $0.94*       (0.07) 
Diversified Firms $1.20 **  (0.02) $0.66***  (0.01)  $1.19***   (0.01)  $0.79 ***  (0.01) 
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Table 2.5A Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance 
‒ Regression analysis based on Pay-out Ratio and G-index 
 
This table tests how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of corporate cash holdings for less-constrained and constrained firms. 
Panel A report the regression results. Financial constraints are measured based on Pay-out Ratio (see text for 
more details). We use G-index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) as a measure for corporate governance (see 
text for more details) The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t 
minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the 
one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings 
is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets 
minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is 
the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus 
marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus 
repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is 
between 1990 and 2006. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Regression Results Based on Pay-out Ratio and G-index 
 Excess Return 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
            Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.002* (0.09)  0.007 (0.43)  -0.032 (     (0.23)  0.014 (0.44) 
ΔCash 1.437*** (0.01)  1.153*** (0.01)    1.891*** (0.01)  1.166*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -2.553 (0.50)  -4.505*** (0.01)  -8.598 (0.62)  -10.253** (0.02) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.353 (0.28)  0.155 (0.35)  -0.280 (0.82)  0.923 (0.16) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 1.462 (0.93)  -4.868 (0.59)  -5.327 (0.96)  5.980 (0.84) 
Coinsurance_CF 1.186 (0.50)  -1.096 (0.17)  -1.915 (0.70)  -1.484 (0.60) 
ΔEarnings 0.478*** (0.01)  0.448*** (0.01)  0.162*** (0.01)  0.302*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.168*** (0.01)  0.119*** (0.01)  0.217*** (0.01)  0.213*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.168 (0.74)  -0.439 (0.16)  0.053 (0.91)  0.011 (0.98) 
ΔInterest Expenses -4.221*** (0.01)  -2.771*** (0.01)  -1.555*** (0.01)  -2.764*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.798*** (0.01)  0.956* (0.08)  -0.530 (0.82)  -2.458 (0.12) 
Casht-1 0.168*** (0.01)  0.089*** (0.01)    0.425*** (0.01)  0.139*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.041 (0.32)  -0.111*** (0.01)  -0.033 (0.61)  -0.135*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.960 (0.14)  -0.584*** (0.01)  0.031 (0.13)  -0.201 (0.13) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.757 (0.11)  -1.358*** (0.01)  -0.329 (0.23)  -0.869*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.051 (0.41)  -0.077** (0.02)  -0.205** (0.02)  -0.120** (0.04) 
Observations   2,510    5,924   1,167      1,784 
Adjusted R2    0.09     0.08    0.15       0.16 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
 
Good Governance 
G-Index<7 
 
Poor Governance 
G-Index≥7 
 
Good Governance 
G-Index<7 
 
Poor Governance 
G-Index≥7 
Single-segment Firms 1.08 (0.48)  0.73*** (0.01)  1.82*** (0.01)  0.93 (0.47) 
Diversified Firms 1.01 (0.93)  0.54*** (0.01)  1.49** (0.05)  0.63* (0.08) 
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Table 2.5B Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance 
‒ Regression analysis based on Pay-out Ratio and the Presence of Block Holders 
 
This table tests how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of corporate cash holdings for less-constrained and constrained 
firms. Panel A report the regression results. Financial constraints are measured based on Pay-out Ratio 
(see text for more details). We use the presence of block holders as a measure for corporate governance 
(see text for more details) The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal 
year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. 
ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and 
text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet 
Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of 
research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. 
ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the 
ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt 
issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and 
Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 
2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regression Results Based on Pay-out Ratio and the Presence Of Blockholders 
 Excess Return 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
            Good Governance  Poor Governance      Good Governance  Poor Governance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.032*** (0.01)  -0.021** (0.02)  0.005 (0.44)  -0.029*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.495*** (0.01)  1.149*** (0.01)         1.379*** (0.01)  1.032*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q 0.037 (0.98)  -7.310** (0.05)    -0.825 (0.53)  -7.882*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.062 (0.63)  -0.124 (0.65)  -0.280 (0.42)  0.070 (0.87) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -4.255 (0.63)  1.591 (0.38)  -0.674 (0.81)  3.258 (0.55) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.441 (0.45)  0.631 (0.57)  0.445 (0.75)  0.322 (0.86) 
ΔEarnings 0.473*** (0.01)  0.245*** (0.01)     0.005*** (0.01)  0.023*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.127*** (0.01)  0.125*** (0.01)  0.218*** (0.01)  0.167*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.270* (0.07)  -0.136 (0.52)  -0.941*** (0.01)  -0.709*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses     -2.211*** (0.01)  -1.162*** (0.01)  -1.984*** (0.01)  -1.491*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.393*** (0.01)  3.434*** (0.01)  -0.732 (0.22)  1.593* (0.08) 
Casht-1 0.252*** (0.01)  0.172*** (0.01)  0.344*** (0.01)  0.297*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.085*** (0.01)  -0.119*** (0.01)  -0.192*** (0.01)  -0.205*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -2.265*** (0.01)  -0.319*** (0.01)  -0.343*** (0.01)  -0.201*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.087 (0.37)  -0.864*** (0.01)  0.023 (0.41)  -0.122*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.025 (0.12)  0.014 (0.59)  -0.044** (0.02)  0.092*** (0.01) 
Observations   26,735    10,127      24,076    16,152 
Adjusted R2        0.12      0.10           0.14      0.11 
 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
 Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms 1.06 (0.11)  0.89** (0.03)  1.32*** (0.01)  0.96 (0.34) 
Diversified Firms 1.02 (0.68)  0.66*** (0.01)  1.28*** (0.01)  0.73*** (0.01) 
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Table 2.5C Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance 
‒ Regression analysis based on SA Index and G-index 
 
This table tests how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of corporate cash holdings for less-constrained and constrained 
firms. Panel A report the regression results. Financial constraints are measured based on SA Index (see 
text for more details). We use G-index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) as a measure for corporate 
governance (see text for more details) The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock 
return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over 
the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see 
Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary 
items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year 
change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest 
expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period 
is between 1990 and 2006. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
      Panel A: Regression Results Based on SA Index and G-index 
 Excess Return 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
            Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.019 (0.27)  0.011 (0.35)  -0.042*** (0.01)  -0.025** (0.03) 
ΔCash 1.459*** (0.01)  1.519*** (0.01)  1.575*** (0.01)  1.227*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -8.191 (0.14)  -8.087*** (0.01)  -7.008 (0.12)  -10.575*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.144 (0.71)  0.168 (0.40)  -0.686 (0.31)  0.144 (0.68) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -10.333 (0.84)  1.110 (0.97)  -10.699 (0.61)  7.456 (0.71) 
Coinsurance_CF -0.875 (0.69)  -1.769* (0.09)  2.309 (0.42)  -0.091 (0.95) 
ΔEarnings 0.568*** (0.01)  0.675*** (0.01)  0.265*** (0.01)  0.416*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.171*** (0.01)  0.178*** (0.01)  0.192*** (0.01)  0.122*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 1.652*** (0.01)  -0.118 (0.75)  0.111 (0.80)  -0.075 (0.80) 
ΔInterest Expenses -4.181*** (0.01)  -3.892*** (0.01)  -1.977*** (0.01)  -2.275*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.524 (0.21)  -0.904 (0.22)  2.497 (0.08)  0.429 (0.62) 
Casht-1 0.056 (0.40)  0.280*** (0.01)  0.291*** (0.01)  0.245*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.092 (0.08)  -0.125*** (0.01)  0.005 (0.91)  -0.071** (0.03) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -1.058*** (0.01)  -2.419*** (0.01)  -0.142 (0.50)  -0.591*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.395 (0.48)  -1.020*** (0.01)  -0.271 (0.52)  -0.826*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.227*** (0.01)  -0.091** (0.02)  -0.075 (0.25)  -0.060 (0.17) 
Observations    1,552     4,141     2,125     3,567 
Adjusted R2    0.12     0.16     0.11     0.12 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
 Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms 1.17 (0.20)  0.84*** (0.01)  1.51*** (0.01)  $0.93 (0.35) 
Diversified Firms 1.03 (0.83)  0.73*** (0.01)  1.45*** (0.01)  $0.80*** (0.01) 
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Table 2.5D Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints and Corporate Governance 
‒ Regression analysis based on SA Index and the Presence of Block Holders 
 
This table tests how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of cash for less-constrained and constrained firms. Panel A report 
the regression results. Financial constraints are measured based on SA Index (see text for more details). 
We use the presence of block holders as a measure for corporate governance (see text for more details) 
The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and 
French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year 
change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). 
ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year 
change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development 
expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year 
change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. 
All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by 
the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported 
in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regression Results Based on SA Index and the Presence of Block Holders 
 Excess Return 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
 Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
        (1) (2)       (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.027*** (0.01)  0.026*** (0.01)  -0.034*** (0.01)  -0.047*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.178*** (0.01)  0.942*** (0.01)  1.564*** (0.01)  1.074*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -1.544 (0.26)  -6.843*** (0.01)  -1.507 (0.41)  -6.743*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.064 (0.65)  -0.005 (0.99)  -0.835** (0.02)  0.472 (0.27) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -2.051 (0.66)  4.423 (0.22)  0.167 (0.96)  3.159 (0.24) 
Coinsurance_CF -0.378 (0.53)  -0.189 (0.85)  1.892 (0.23)  1.621 (0.39) 
ΔEarnings 0.004*** (0.01)  1.425*** (0.01)  0.038*** (0.01)  0.021*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.334*** (0.01)  0.003 (0.12)  0.004*** (0.01)  0.020*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -1.117*** (0.01)  0.133 (0.26)  -0.198*** (0.01)  -0.083*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.899*** (0.01)  0.006 (0.51)  -0.017 (0.48)  -0.043 (0.14) 
ΔDividends 0.931*** (0.01)  -0.017 (0.78)  0.185*** (0.01)  0.017 (0.70) 
Casht-1 0.562*** (0.01)  0.149*** (0.01)  0.387*** (0.01)  0.326*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.080*** (0.01)  -0.216*** (0.01)  -0.231*** (0.01)  -0.150*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.010*** (0.01)  -0.233*** (0.01)  -0.827*** (0.01)  -0.276*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.626*** (0.01)  -0.300*** (0.01)  -0.462*** (0.01)  0.001 (0.97) 
Net Financing -0.098*** (0.01)  0.003 (0.63)  0.005 (0.58)  0.004 (0.51) 
Observations     29,468           9,077             21,343      17,202 
Adjusted R2     0.11           0.14                0.11      0.08 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Less Constrained  Constrained 
 Good Governance  Poor Governance  Good Governance  Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms  $1.03 (0.13)  0.83*** (0.01)  $1.30*** (0.01)  $1.02 (0.51) 
Diversified Firms $0.96 (0.22)  0.64*** (0.01)  $1.25*** (0.01)  $0.82*** (0.01) 
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Table 2.6 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Efficient and Inefficient Internal Transfers 
This table tests how coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities affects the value of cash through 
efficient (or inefficient) internal transfers. Panel A shows the univariate statistics of Inefficient Transfers and 
Efficient Transfers for diversified firms. Inefficient (Efficient) Transfers is the sum of the transfers made to low 
(high) productivity divisions in a diversified firm. Transfers are measured as in Rajan et al. (2000): 
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where j =1 represents segment j, ss is single-segment firms, Ij is capital expenditure, wj is segment j’s proportion 
of the firm’s total assets, Assetj is the book value of segment j. We follow Duchin (2010) and sum the internal 
transfers distributed to ‘high-productivity’ and ‘low-productivity’ segments, where a segment is classified as 
high (low) productivity if its average industry Tobin’s Q is higher (lower) than the firm weighted Tobin’s Q (see 
text for more details). Panel B shows the regression results. The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s 
annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio 
return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see 
Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. 
ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research 
and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the 
one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All 
variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged 
market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Univariate Statistics 
Variable Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile Std. Dev. N 
Ineffcient Transfers 0.0325 0.0030 0.0000 0.0222 0.1158 17,367 
Efficient Transfers 0.0382 0.0029 0.0000 0.0236 0.1354 17,367 
       
Panel B: Regressions  
 Excess Return 
Intercept -0.049*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.266*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -4.789 (0.13) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q   Inefficient Transfers   100 -1.412*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q   Efficient Transfers   100 0.810* (0.08) 
ΔCash   Inefficient Transfers  -0.183* (0.09) 
ΔCash   Efficient Transfers  -0.439 (0.13) 
Coinsurance_Q 0.036 (0.79) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -0.596 (0.19) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.383 (0.47) 
Inefficient Transfers  0.051 (0.18) 
Efficient Transfers  -0.005 (0.88) 
ΔEarnings 0.007*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.413*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -0.864*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.585*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.717*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.415*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.166*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.779*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.424*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.056*** (0.01) 
Observations     77,090 
Adjusted R2    0.11 
 
Panel C: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel B. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
Single-segment Firms  $1.02            (0.12) 
Diversified Firms  $0.80**            (0.04) 
64 
 
Table 2.7 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
 Overall Efficiency of Internal Transfers 
This table examines how the efficiency of internal transfers affects the relationship between coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and the value of cash. The regressions are estimated separately 
for the ‘Value added by allocation≤ 0’ subsample and the ‘Value added by allocation≥ 0’ subsample. The 
‘Value added by allocation≤ 0’ subsample consists of single-segment firms and diversified firms whose 
overall efficiency of internal transfers is negative. The ‘Value added by allocation≥ 0’ subsample consists 
of single-segment firms and diversified firms whose overall efficiency of internal transfers is positive. 
The overall efficiency of the cross-divisional transfers is measured by the ‘value added’, developed by 
Rajan et al. (2000) as  
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where Assetj is the book value of segment j, qj is the asset-weighted Tobin’s q using single-segment firms 
only in segment j,q is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s q for the firm, Ij is capital 
expenditure, ss is single-segment firms, wj is segment j’s proportion of the firm’s total assets (see text for 
more details). Panel A shows the regression results. The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s 
annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark 
portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional 
cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before 
extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the 
one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in 
interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period 
is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Regressions 
 Excess Return 
 Value added by allocation≤ 0 Value added by allocation≥0 
Intercept -0.059*** (0.01) -0.059*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.331*** (0.01) 1.408*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -2.212*** (0.01)        -0.474 (0.53) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.063 (0.70)        -0.140 (0.45) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -9.809 (0.14)         0.621 (0.78) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.146 (0.84)        -0.043 (0.95) 
ΔEarnings 0.007*** (0.01) 0.024*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.416*** (0.01) 0.416*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -1.001*** (0.01) -0.957*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.662*** (0.01) -1.729*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.803*** (0.01) 1.864*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.518*** (0.01) 0.491*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.158*** (0.01) -0.168*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -1.210*** (0.01) -1.588*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.452*** (0.01) -0.300*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.052*** (0.01) -0.031*** (0.01) 
Observations           71,084         68,624   
Adjusted R2    0.12        0.12    
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Value added by transfers ≤ 0 Value added by transfers ≥ 0  
Single-segment Firms        $1.00               (0.85)  $1.05*** (0.01) 
Diversified Firms        $0.85***         (0.01)  $1.03** (0.04) 
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Table 2.8 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Economic Recessions 
This table examines how the economic recessions affect the relationship between coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities and the value of cash. Panel A shows the regressions results. The 
dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French 
(1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change 
in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). 
ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year 
change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development 
expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year 
change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. 
All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by 
the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported 
in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions 
 Excess Return 
 Coef.    p-value 
Intercept -0.033*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.250*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q   -7.345*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.127 (0.32) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q  Recession  4.131*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Recession 0.291*** (0.01) 
Recession 0.078*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 0.208 (0.97) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.192 (0.73) 
ΔEarnings 0.009*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.421*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -0.927*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.549*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.773*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.283*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.191*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.283*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.518*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.034*** (0.01) 
Observations                         77,090 
Adjusted R2                           0.12 
 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
Single-segment Firms _ Not in Recession $1.08***                 (0.01)  
Single-segment Firms _ In Recession $1.37***                 (0.01)  
Diversified Firms _ Not in Recession $0.83***                 (0.01)  
Diversified Firms _ In Recession $1.26***                 (0.01)  
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Table 2.9A Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash 
-- Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash Holdings 
 
This table shows the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the 
value of corporate cash holdings using an alternative measure of the unexpected change in cash holdings. 
Panel A shows the regressions. The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over 
fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same 
period. ΔNet Cash is the realized change in cash holdings minus the average change in cash holdings in 
the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same period. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see 
Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary 
items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year 
change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest 
expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period 
is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
Entire Sample $1.00   (0.92)  
Single-segment Firms  $1.06***   (0.01) 
Diversified Firms  $0.83***   (0.01) 
 
  
 Excess Return 
 Coef.    p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.014*** (0.01) -0.001 (0.77) 
ΔNet Cash 1.188*** (0.01) 1.230*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_Q 
 
 -5.594*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q  -0.219* (0.09) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_CF 
 
 -4.417 (0.42) 
Coinsurance_CF 
 
 0.322 (0.57) 
ΔEarnings 0.008*** (0.01) 0.009*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.413*** (0.01) 0.407*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -0.695*** (0.01) -0.880*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.534*** (0.01) -1.579*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.744*** (0.01) 1.741*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.308*** (0.01) 0.297*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.193*** (0.01) -0.209*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Casht-1 -0.438*** (0.01) -0.282*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Leverage -0.458*** (0.01) -0.522*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.043*** (0.01) -0.007 (0.43) 
Observations     77,090     77,090 
Adjusted R2       0.12        0.11 
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Table 2.9B Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints 
-- Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash Holdings 
 
This table examines the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and 
the value of cash for less-constrained and constrained firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We 
divide the sample into financially constrained and less-constrained groups based on two measure of 
financial constraints: Payout Ratio and SA Index (see text for more details). The dependent variable 
Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-
and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔNet Cash is the realized change in cash 
holdings minus the average change in cash holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the 
same period. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF 
is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the 
one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets 
minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest 
Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. 
Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the 
new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except 
Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market 
value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
       Panel A: Regressions 
 Excess Return 
 Payout Ratio   SA Index 
 
Less constrained Constrained Less Constrained Constrained 
Intercept -0.016*** (0.01) -0.007 (0.20) 0.007 (0.11) -0.060*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash 1.012*** (0.01) 1.395*** (0.01) 1.274*** (0.01) 1.390*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_Q -3.963*** (0.01) -6.218*** (0.01) -5.508*** (0.01) -6.636*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.128 (0.27) -0.292 (0.26) -0.171 (0.16) -0.531** (0.04) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_CF 0.748** (0.04) -0.803 (0.87) -2.610 (0.38) 0.506 (0.36) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.602 (0.23) 0.432 (0.70) -0.615 (0.23) 1.467 (0.22) 
ΔEarnings 0.368*** (0.01) 0.007*** (0.01) 0.004*** (0.01) 0.122*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.284*** (0.01) 0.425*** (0.01) 0.326*** (0.01) 0.433*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.145 (0.21) -0.917*** (0.01) -0.807*** (0.01) -0.607*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.602*** (0.01) -1.543*** (0.01) -1.652*** (0.01) -1.654*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.641*** (0.01) 0.086 (0.86) 1.277*** (0.01) 2.448*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.231*** (0.01) 0.400*** (0.01) 0.434*** (0.01) 0.421*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.115*** (0.01) -0.222*** (0.01) -0.149*** (0.01) -0.185*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Casht-1 -0.300*** (0.01) -0.486*** (0.01) -1.319*** (0.01) -0.562*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Leverage 0.019 (0.60) -0.581*** (0.01) -0.045*** (0.01) -0.567*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.058*** (0.01) 0.009 (0.48) -0.084*** (0.01) 0.072*** (0.01) 
Observations     36,862      40,228     38,545 38,545 
Adjusted R2       0.11        0.13        0.10  0.14 
 
      Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the F-test 
on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The marginal value of $1 
 Payout Ratio   SA Index 
 
Less Constrained Constrained Less Constrained Constrained 
Single-segment Firms $0.96        (0.17)        $1.17***  (0.01)      $1.02        (0.35)      $1.16***  (0.01)  
Diversified Firms $0.83***  (0.01)        $0.95        (0.42)     $0.81***  (0.01)      $0.94        (0.38) 
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Table 2.9C Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Corporate Governance 
-- Alternative Measure of the Unexpected Change in Cash Holdings 
This table examines how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of cash. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into two 
subsamples based on a firm’s level of corporate governance. We use two criteria of corporate governance: G-index 
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) and the presence of Blockholders (see text for more details). The dependent 
variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-
B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔNet Cash is the realized change in cash holdings minus the 
average change in cash holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same period. Coinsurance_Q is 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows 
(see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. 
ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research 
and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-
year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net 
Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables 
except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value 
of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions 
 Excess Return 
 G-index  Block Holders 
 Good Governance Poor Governance  Good Governance Poor Governance 
Intercept 0.026** 0.021***  0.005 -0.031*** 
 
(0.05) (0.01)  (0.18) (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash 1.206*** 1.054***  1.309*** 1.171*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_Q -1.377 -3.573*  -1.140 -4.202*** 
 
(0.83) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.653 0.124  -0.198 0.107 
 
(0.14) (0.50)  (0.17) (0.68) 
ΔNet Cash   Coinsurance_CF -15.307 -5.694  -1.594 -3.419 
 
(0.52) (0.45)  (0.39) (0.15) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.166 -1.088  0.537 0.362 
 
(0.94) (0.21)  (0.39) (0.74) 
ΔEarnings 0.386*** 0.433***  0.006*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.131*** 0.150***  0.206*** 0.166*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.086 0.188  -0.698*** -0.654*** 
 
(0.82) (0.42)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -2.383*** -2.942***  -2.075*** -1.504*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.920* 0.185  1.360*** 2.941*** 
 
(0.07) (0.75)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.140*** 0.186***  0.333*** 0.348*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.041 -0.129***  -0.163*** -0.182*** 
 
(0.29) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Casht-1 -0.212 -0.575***  -0.376*** -0.370*** 
 
(0.48) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔNet Cash   Leverage 0.413 -0.714***  -0.553*** -0.501*** 
 
(0.31) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.064 -0.076***  -0.017 0.080*** 
 
(0.24) (0.01)  (0.17) (0.01) 
Observations   3,677   7,708             50,811      26,279 
Adjusted R2 0.09  0.12               0.11        0.10 
 
 Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the F-test 
on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 G-Index  Block Holders 
 
Good Governance Poor Governance  Good Governance Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms $1.26** (0.02) $0.78*** (0.01)  $1.11*** (0.01)     $0.99       (0.66) 
Diversified Firms $1.09     (0.56) $0.62*** (0.01)  $1.06**   (0.02)     $0.82*** (0.01) 
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Table 2.10 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Probit Regression 
This table shows the probit regression. The dependent variable is 1 if a firm is a diversified firm and 0 if a 
firm is a single-segment firm. Size is the logarithm of assets. EBIT is the ratio of earnings before interests 
and taxes to sales. Capital Expenditures is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. S&P is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if a firm is in one of the main S&P indices, and 0 otherwise. PNDIV is the fraction of all 
the firms in the industry that are diversified firms. PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by 
diversified firms. MNUM is the number of announced mergers and acquisitions in the year. MVOL is the 
US dollar value of these mergers and acquisitions. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product. GDP Growth is 
the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Contraction is the number of months in the year the economy 
was in a recession. MAJOREX is a dummy that is 1 if the firm is listed on NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX, 
and 0 otherwise. Foreign is a dummy that is 1 if the firm is incorporated outside the United States, and 0 
otherwise. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
   Coef. p-value 
Intercept -4.286*** (0.01) 
Size 0.072*** (0.01) 
Sizet-1 0.127*** (0.01) 
Sizet-2 -0.071*** (0.01) 
EBIT 0.000 (0.83) 
EBITt-1 0.006*** (0.01) 
EBITt-2 -0.001 (0.61) 
Capital Expenditures 0.000 (0.86) 
Capital Expenditurest-1 0.010*** (0.01) 
Capital Expenditurest-2 -0.099*** (0.01) 
S&P 0.343*** (0.01) 
PNDIV 3.238*** (0.01) 
PSDIV 0.123*** (0.01) 
MVOL 0.000*** (0.01) 
MNUM 0.000 (0.30) 
GDP t-1 1.592*** (0.01) 
GDP Growth 1.424** (0.03) 
Contraction -0.001 (0.84) 
Contractiont-1 0.002 (0.45) 
MAJOREX -0.040*** (0.01) 
Foreign -0.096*** (0.01) 
Observations                  77,090 
Pseudo R2                     0.24 
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Table 2.11 Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation and Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
This table shows the regressions using two economic methods. Panel A shows the regression results. 
Column 1 shows the second stage of the Heckman’s two-stage estimation. Column 2 shows the two-way 
fixed effect regression. The dependent variable is the Excess Return, defined as a firm’s stock return over 
fiscal year t−1 to t minus the firm’s benchmark return over the same period. The benchmark return is the 
return a benchmark portfolio, which is one of the 25 Fama and French portfolios formed on size and 
book-to-market ratio. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows 
(see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before 
extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the 
one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in 
interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The p-value is 
reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions - Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation and Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
 Excess Return 
 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation 
Second stage 
 Fixed effect estimation 
(firm and year fixed effects not 
reported) 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.018*** (0.01)    
ΔCash 1.257*** (0.01)          1.138*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -6.924*** (0.01)        -12.284*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q  -0.141 (0.28)       -0.117 (0.41) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 2.780 (0.63)  12.006 (0.12) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.345 (0.55)  -1.098* (0.09) 
ΔEarnings 0.009*** (0.01)  0.362*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.411*** (0.01)  0.280*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D -0.960*** (0.01)  -0.280*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.538*** (0.01)  -1.398*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 1.694*** (0.01)  1.138*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.270*** (0.01)  0.824*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.192*** (0.01)  -0.275*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.253*** (0.01)  -0.449*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.529*** (0.01)  -0.063*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.036*** (0.01)  0.067*** (0.01) 
Lambda -0.001 (0.85)    
Observations  77,090           75,705 
Adjusted R2   0.12             0.17 
 
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 Heckman’s two-stage estimation Fixed effect estimation 
Single-segment Firms $1.08***            (0.01)      $1.05***       (0.01) 
Diversified Firms $0.85***            (0.01)      $0.73***       (0.01)  
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Table 2.12A Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints 
‒ Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation  
This table provides results from the second stage of the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regressions 
estimating the effect of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash for 
less-constrained and constrained firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into 
financially constrained and less-constrained groups based on two measures of financial constraints: 
Payout Ratio and SA Index (see text for more details). The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s 
annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark 
portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional 
cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before 
extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the 
one-year change of research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in 
interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. 
Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus 
new debt issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, 
Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period 
is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions – Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation 
 Excess Return 
 
Payout Ratio 
 
SA Index 
  Less Constrained      Constrained    Less Constrained 
 
Constrained 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept -0.026*** (0.01) 
 
-0.030*** (0.01) 
 
0.021*** (0.01) 
 
-0.086*** (0.01) 
ΔCash 1.173*** (0.01) 
 
1.405*** (0.01) 
 
1.155*** (0.01) 
 
1.270*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -1.246*** (0.01) 
 
-8.717*** (0.01) 
 
-5.182*** (0.01) 
 
-5.798*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.050 (0.66) 
 
-0.058 (0.82) 
 
-0.002 (0.99) 
 
-0.452* (0.08) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF -7.928 (0.26) 
 
0.771 (0.97) 
 
0.328 (0.89) 
 
1.107 (0.79) 
Coinsurance_CF 0.769 (0.12) 
 
-0.021 (0.98)   -0.653 (0.22) 
 
0.800 (0.50) 
ΔEarnings 0.344*** (0.01) 
 
0.006*** (0.01) 
 
0.008*** (0.01) 
 
0.114*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.289*** (0.01) 
 
0.438*** (0.01) 
 
0.329*** (0.01) 
 
0.443*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.084 (0.45) 
 
-0.831*** (0.01) 
 
-0.781*** (0.01) 
 
-0.539*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.540*** (0.01) 
 
-1.413*** (0.01) 
 
-1.601*** (0.01) 
 
-1.575*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.551*** (0.01) 
 
0.026 (0.95) 
 
1.041*** (0.01) 
 
2.301*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.198*** (0.01) 
 
0.343*** (0.01) 
 
0.111*** (0.01) 
 
0.472*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.117*** (0.01) 
 
-0.192*** (0.01) 
 
-0.136*** (0.01) 
 
-0.155*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.220*** (0.01) 
 
-0.411*** (0.01) 
 
0.042*** (0.01) 
 
-0.028*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage -0.725*** (0.01) 
 
-0.553*** (0.01) 
 
-0.677*** (0.01) 
 
-0.667*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.073*** (0.01) 
 
-0.053*** (0.01) 
 
-0.097*** (0.01) 
 
0.025* (0.06) 
Lambda -0.005 (0.22) 
 
0.001 (0.84) 
 
-0.003 (0.39) 
 
0.006 (0.36) 
Observations   36,862 
  
  40,228 
  
  38,545 
  
   38,545 
 Adjusted R2 0.16 
  
0.14 
  
0.10 
  
0.14 
  
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 
Payout Ratio 
 
SA Index 
  Less Constrained 
 
Constrained    Less Constrained 
 
Constrained 
Single-segment Firms $0.99  (0.37) 
 
      $1.10***     (0.01)    $1.00      (0.78) 
 
    $1.11*** (0.01) 
Diversified Firms $0.79***  (0.01) 
 
      $0.98       (0.48) 
 
$0.83***        (0.01) 
 
    $0.92 (0.18) 
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Table 2.12B Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Financial Constraints 
‒ Fixed Effect Estimation 
 
This table provides results from the two-way firm and year fixed effect regressions estimating the effect 
of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash for less-constrained and 
constrained firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into financially constrained 
and less-constrained groups based on two measures of financial constraints: Payout Ratio and SA Index 
(see text for more details). The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over 
fiscal year t minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same 
period. ΔCash is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and 
text for more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet 
Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of 
research and development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. 
ΔDividends is the one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the 
ratio of debt to total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt 
issues minus debt redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and 
Leverage are standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 
2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
Panel A: Regressions – Fixed Effect Estimation 
 Excess Return 
 
Payout Ratio    SA Index 
  Less Constrained 
 
Constrained        Less Constrained 
 
Constrained 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
 (1)      (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
ΔCash 1.043*** (0.01) 
 
1.210*** (0.01) 
 
1.072*** (0.01)  1.184*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -2.821*** (0.01) 
 
-4.170*** (0.01) 
 
-3.203*** (0.01)  -4.658*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q -0.053 (0.70) 
 
-0.151 (0.60) 
 
0.019 (0.89)  -0.241 (0.45) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 1.116*** (0.01) 
 
2.767** (0.02) 
 
-1.695 (0.35)  1.753*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_CF -1.117* (0.07) 
 
-0.327 (0.80) 
 
-1.132* (0.06)  -0.210 (0.88) 
ΔEarnings 0.457*** (0.01) 
 
0.331*** (0.01) 
 
0.372*** (0.01)  0.353*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 0.251*** (0.01) 
 
0.305*** (0.01) 
 
0.253*** (0.01)  0.312*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 0.142 (0.22) 
 
-0.418*** (0.01) 
 
-0.021 (0.86)  -0.378*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses -1.479*** (0.01) 
 
-1.376*** (0.01) 
 
-1.423*** (0.01)  -1.414*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 2.105*** (0.01) 
 
-0.871* (0.08) 
 
0.783*** (0.01) 
 
2.031*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.679*** (0.01) 
 
0.905*** (0.01) 
 
0.579*** (0.01) 
 
1.015*** (0.01) 
Leverage -0.257*** (0.01) 
 
-0.272*** (0.01) 
 
-0.267*** (0.01) 
 
-0.265*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 -0.324*** (0.01) 
 
-0.467*** (0.01) 
 
-0.404*** (0.01) 
 
-0.435*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage 0.051*** (0.01) 
 
-0.121*** (0.01) 
 
0.017** (0.04) 
 
-0.159*** (0.01) 
Net Financing -0.043*** (0.01) 
 
0.106*** (0.01) 
 
-0.044*** (0.01) 
 
0.173*** (0.01) 
Observations        36,491  
 
   39,214 
  
   38,394 
  
   37,311 
 Adjusted R2 0.15  
 
0.19 
  
0.16 
  
0.18 
  
 
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 
Payout Ratio    SA Index 
  Less Constrained 
 
Constrained        Less Constrained 
 
Constrained 
Single-segment Firms $0.97  (0.21) 
 
 $1.10***     (0.01)    $1.00      (0.95) 
 
    $1.13*** (0.01) 
Diversified Firms $0.86***  (0.01) 
 
  $0.98       (0.48) 
 
$0.88***        (0.01) 
 
    $0.99  (0.89) 
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Table 2.13A Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Corporate Governance  
-- Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation 
This table provides results from the second stage of the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage regressions 
estimating the effect of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash for 
well-governed and poorly-governed firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample 
into two subsamples based on a firm’s level of corporate governance. We use two criteria of corporate 
governance: G-index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) and the presence of Blockholders (see text for 
more details). The dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t 
minus Fama and French (1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash 
is the one-year change in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities. Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for 
more details). ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the 
one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and 
development expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the 
one-year change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to 
total assets. Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt 
redemption. All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are 
standardized by the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-
value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions – Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation 
 Excess Return 
 
G-index 
 
Block Holders  
    Good Governance        Poor Governance    Good Governance 
 
Poor Governance  
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  
Intercept -0.027** (0.04) 
 
-0.002 (0.75) 
 
-0.029*** (0.01) 
 
-0.035*** (0.01)  
ΔCash 1.495*** (0.01) 
 
1.148*** (0.01) 
 
1.454*** (0.01) 
 
1.036*** (0.01) 
 ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q -2.140 (0.75) 
 
-5.758*** (0.01) 
 
-0.533 (0.45) 
 
-4.030*** (0.01) 
 Coinsurance_Q -0.633 (0.13) 
 
0.196 (0.30) 
 
-0.172 (0.24) 
 
-0.029 (0.92) 
 ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 0.950 (0.97) 
 
-2.970 (0.71) 
 
-3.027 (0.10) 
 
-1.539 (0.52) 
 Coinsurance_CF 1.324 (0.53) 
 
-0.660 (0.46)   0.559 (0.38) 
 
-0.429 (0.71) 
 ΔEarnings 0.332*** (0.01) 
 
0.422*** (0.01) 
 
0.006*** (0.01) 
 
0.020*** (0.01) 
 ΔNet Assets 0.420*** (0.01) 
 
0.277*** (0.01) 
 
0.444*** (0.01) 
 
0.383*** (0.01) 
 ΔR&D -0.198 (0.60) 
 
-0.101 (0.66) 
 
-0.976*** (0.01) 
 
-0.958*** (0.01) 
 ΔInterest Expenses -2.079*** (0.01) 
 
-2.667*** (0.01) 
 
-1.788*** (0.01) 
 
-1.462*** (0.01) 
 ΔDividends 1.411 (0.18) 
 
0.118 (0.84) 
 
1.160*** (0.01) 
 
2.665*** (0.01) 
 Casht-1 0.184*** (0.01) 
 
0.144*** (0.01) 
 
0.331*** (0.01) 
 
0.246*** (0.01) 
 Leverage -0.031 (0.37) 
 
-0.111*** (0.01) 
 
-0.155*** (0.01) 
 
-0.155*** (0.01) 
 ΔCash   Casht-1 0.023 (0.19) 
 
-0.248*** (0.01) 
 
-0.346*** (0.01) 
 
-0.171*** (0.01) 
 ΔCash   Leverage -0.226 (0.24) 
 
-0.933*** (0.01) 
 
-0.409*** (0.01) 
 
-0.336*** (0.01) 
 Net Financing -0.264*** (0.01) 
 
-0.119*** (0.01) 
 
-0.104*** (0.01) 
 
0.047*** (0.01) 
 Lambda -0.013 (0.34) 
 
-0.007 (0.29) 
 
-0.004 (0.32) 
 
0.011 (0.14) 
 Observations     3,677 
  
  7,708 
  
 50,811 
  
26,279 
  Adjusted R2 0.11 
  
0.13 
  
  0.14 
  
0.10 
   
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 
G-index 
 
Block Holders 
  Good Governance        Poor Governance    Good Governance        Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms $1.45***         (0.01) 
 
    $0.89**     (0.03)   $1.30***      (0.01) 
 
$0.92*** (0.01) 
Diversified Firms $1.38**  (0.03) 
 
    $0.69***       (0.01) 
 
$1.25***        (0.01) 
 
$0.78***     (0.01) 
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Table 2.13B Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities and the Value of Cash: 
Corporate Governance 
-- Fixed Effect Estimation 
This table provides results from the two-way firm and year fixed effect regressions estimating the effect 
of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the value of cash for well-governed and 
poorly-governed firms. Panel A shows the regression results. We divide the sample into two subsamples 
based on a firm’s level of corporate governance. We use two criteria of corporate governance: G-index 
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) and the presence of Blockholders (see text for more details). The 
dependent variable Excess Return is a firm’s annual stock return over fiscal year t minus Fama and French 
(1993) 25 size-and-B/M benchmark portfolio return over the same period. ΔCash is the one-year change 
in cash holdings. Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance across divisional cash flows (see Table 2.1 and text for more details). 
ΔEarnings is the one-year change in earnings before extraordinary items. ΔNet Assets is the one-year 
change of total assets minus cash holdings. ΔR&D is the one-year change of research and development 
expenses. ΔInterest Expenses is the one-year change in interest expenses. ΔDividends is the one-year 
change in dividends. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Net Financing is the new equity issues minus repurchases plus new debt issues minus debt redemption. 
All variables except Excess Return, Coinsurance_Q, Coinsurance_CF and Leverage are standardized by 
the lagged market value of equity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported 
in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions – Fixed Effect Estimation 
 Excess Return 
 
 G-index 
 
Block Holders 
   Good Governance 
 
Poor Governance        Good Governance 
 
Poor Governance 
  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
ΔCash 
 
1.479*** (0.01) 
 
1.148*** (0.01) 
 
1.229*** (0.01) 
 
0.969*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_Q 
 
-3.155 (0.28) 
 
-4.477** (0.03) 
 
-0.713 (0.15) 
 
-3.198*** (0.01) 
Coinsurance_Q 
 
-0.428 (0.39) 
 
0.207 (0.29) 
 
-0.028 (0.86) 
 
-0.067 (0.81) 
ΔCash   Coinsurance_CF 
 
-2.564 (0.89) 
 
-7.264 (0.24) 
 
0.941 (0.65) 
 
1.142 (0.10) 
Coinsurance_CF 
 
-0.659 (0.81) 
 
-1.752* (0.06) 
 
-0.829 (0.26) 
 
-1.437 (0.23) 
ΔEarnings 
 
0.442*** (0.01) 
 
0.438*** (0.01) 
 
0.453*** (0.01) 
 
0.283*** (0.01) 
ΔNet Assets 
 
0.378*** (0.01) 
 
0.209*** (0.01) 
 
0.295*** (0.01) 
 
0.267*** (0.01) 
ΔR&D 
 
-0.001 (1.00) 
 
-0.076 (0.72) 
 
-0.130 (0.15) 
 
-0.419*** (0.01) 
ΔInterest Expenses 
 
-2.789*** (0.01) 
 
-2.107*** (0.01) 
 
-1.715*** (0.01) 
 
-1.173*** (0.01) 
ΔDividends 
 
0.692 (0.50) 
 
-0.317 (0.54) 
 
0.688*** (0.01) 
 
2.033*** (0.01) 
Casht-1 
 
0.581*** (0.01) 
 
0.564*** (0.01) 
 
0.820*** (0.01) 
 
0.828*** (0.01) 
Leverage 
 
-0.160*** (0.01) 
 
-0.202*** (0.01) 
 
-0.284*** (0.01) 
 
-0.261*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Casht-1 
 
-0.259*** (0.01) 
 
-0.348*** (0.01) 
 
-0.502*** (0.01) 
 
-0.348*** (0.01) 
ΔCash   Leverage 
 
-0.087 (0.69) 
 
-0.717*** (0.01) 
 
-0.062*** (0.01) 
 
-0.072*** (0.01) 
Net Financing 
 
-0.200*** (0.01) 
 
-0.068*** (0.01) 
 
0.032*** (0.01) 
 
0.118*** (0.01) 
Observations 
 
  3,673  
 
  7,697 
  
49,999 
  
25,706 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.14  
 
0.16 
  
0.19 
  
 0.16 
  
Panel B: The Value of Cash 
This panel shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in Panel A. We conduct the 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the marginal value of $1 is one, with p-value reported in the parentheses. 
 The Marginal Value of $1 
 
G-index 
 
Block Holders 
    Good Governance        Poor Governance        Good Governance        Poor Governance 
Single-segment Firms $1.41***         (0.01) 
 
  $0.92*     (0.07)    $1.12***      (0.01) 
 
   $0.89*** (0.01) 
Diversified Firms $1.28**  (0.03) 
 
  $0.71***      (0.01) 
 
$1.11***        (0.01) 
 
   $0.79***     (0.01) 
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Chapter 3 
   
Coinsurance across Divisional 
Investment Opportunities and Corporate 
Mergers 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is conventionally understood in the literature on corporate diversification that, if 
there is an imperfect correlation among segment cash flows in a diversified firm, the 
coinsurance among segment cash flows reduces cash flow volatility, leading to a lower 
risk of financial distress and a higher debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971). This is labelled as 
the ‘more-money’ effect of corporate diversification (Stein, 2003). Several empirical 
papers (e.g., Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; Tong, 2012) have investigated coinsurance 
across divisional cash flows, showing that the ‘more-money’ effect of diversification 
relieves financial burdens on diversified firms.  
However, the coinsurance associated with corporate diversification is not limited to 
the imperfect correlation across divisional cash flows. In fact, the uncertainty 
surrounding segment investment opportunities creates another type of coinsurance 
through which corporate diversification can have significant impacts. To our knowledge, 
this is an under-researched area, and only a few studies in the literature have 
investigated how the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities impacts the 
firm value.  
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In this chapter, we examine the effect of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on the announcement returns and the operating performance of 
diversifying mergers. We have chosen mergers as our research setting for a reason. A 
large body of research on the “diversification discount” employs cross-sectional studies 
to compare diversified firms with single-segment ones. However, both the methodology 
and the “diversification discount” have triggered extensive debate. Some researchers 
argue that the “diversification discount” is rather a result of self-selection – firms 
trading with a discount might be more likely to diversify (Campa and Kedia, 2002; 
Villalonga, 2004b). As proposed by a number of other researchers, the measurement of 
the “diversification discount” is flawed, given faulty data or improper measurement 
techniques (Graham et al., 2002; Villalonga, 2004a; Custodio, 2014). In recognition of 
the issues associated with the cross-sectional analysis of the “diversification discount”, 
we use event study approaches to investigate how the equity market investors respond 
to firms’ diversification announcement. As explained by Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010), 
event study approaches have not been adequately emphasized in research on 
diversification, but they nicely complement cross-sectional studies. The announcement 
returns indicate the change in the firm value perceived by the market, in response to the 
change in the degree of coinsurance caused by a merger. The effect of the coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is tested directly, and in isolation from many 
other impacts. Therefore, diversifying mergers provide a unique framework which 
addresses endogeneity concerns and measurement biases.  
We conjecture three channels through which coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities can impact merger outcomes. First, we hypothesize that the 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities has a positive effect on mergers 
outcomes for financially-constrained corporations, because the imperfect correlation 
among segment investment opportunities decreases the financing needs at some point. 
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Secondly, the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities has a positive 
effect on mergers outcomes for financially constrained firms, because imperfectly-
correlated segment investment opportunities reduce the opportunity costs of efficient 
transfers in the internal capital market. Thirdly, the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities has a negative effect on the outcomes of diversifying mergers, 
because the inter-segment correlations in investment opportunities amplify the losses 
owing to agency problems.  
We test these hypotheses using a sample of 1,349 merger deals during the period 
from 1986 to 2010. Following Duchin (2010), we construct a direct measure of 
coinsurance based on the cross-divisional correlations in investment opportunities. We 
find that the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities leads to a reduction 
of 0.30% in announcement returns, and 1.53% in post-merger operating performance. 
We document a positive (zero) relationship between the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the probability of firms attempting mergers when they are 
poorly (well) governed. We find that acquirers, on average, pay $6.1 million more in 
premiums for an increase in coinsurance among segment investment opportunities after 
the merger. We demonstrate that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
decreases the firm value in both financially constrained and less-constrained firms. We 
find that the level of efficiency of internal transfers is not associated with coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities. We show that good corporate governance 
mitigates the negative impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Our results are robust after addressing the potential endogeneity concerns. Taken 
together, evidence suggests that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
has a negative impact on merger outcomes, owing to agency problems.  
This study contributes to the literature on diversification by identifying an 
inefficient link between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the 
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merger outcomes. The impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
has received far less attention in the literature. Duchin (2010) is the first empirical paper 
that explicitly studies the relationship between the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and corporate liquidity. According to him, multi-segment 
firms can maintain less cash than single-segment ones due to coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. He focuses on the positive effect of the coinsurance 
among cash flows and investment opportunities from the perspective of alleviating 
financial constraints; however, the nature of investment opportunity implies that 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can interact with a firm’s 
resource allocation policy. Therefore, coinsurance in investment opportunities can be 
associated with either the internal capital markets or agency problems through which 
diversifying mergers can generate positive or negative synergies. This study thus differs 
from previous ones, in that we reveal an agency problem-related, inefficient link 
between the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the diversifying 
merger outcomes. In broader terms, we add a new piece of evidence to the 
“diversification discount” argument (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1995).  
This study also contributes, in two ways, to a relatively under-explored terrain of 
the impact of diversification on corporate takeovers. First, evidence on the 
announcement returns and operating performance of diversifying mergers is mixed. A 
number of studies document that stock markets react positively to corporate 
diversification (e.g., Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Matsusaka, 1993; Ghosh, 2001; Akbulut 
and Matsusaka, 2010), while some others reveal negative value consequences of 
diversifying mergers (e.g., Morck et al., 1990; Maquieira et al., 1998; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2007). Additionally, several research studies demonstrate insignificant 
changes in announcement returns or post-merger operating performance (e.g., Kaplan 
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and Weisbach, 1992; Switzer, 1996; Linn and Switzer, 2001; Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
We add to the corporate takeover literature by showing that coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities has negative implications for diversifying mergers. 
Secondly, in previous studies, mergers are classified as diversifying, if two merging 
parties operate in different industries, defined on a basis of a 2-digit SIC code level 
(Matsusaka, 1993; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Martynova and Renneboog, 2007), a 3-
digit SIC code level (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010), or a 
4-digit SIC code level (Morck et al., 1990). However, this approach is simply based on 
SIC code only, and provides a rough proxy for diversification; it does not capture the 
importance of business segments or how closely these industries are related to each 
other. Duchin’s (2010) coinsurance measure used in this study incorporates the 
weightings of each segment, the number of business divisions and the cross-divisional 
correlation. We, therefore, complement existing research by providing evidence on the 
value consequence of diversifying mergers based on a relatively more precise 
measurement that captures the change in the degree of coinsurance. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 proposes the 
hypotheses, Section 3.3 explains the data and empirical methodology, Section 3.4 
presents the empirical findings, and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
In this section, we propose three hypotheses about the relationship between 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and merger outcomes. 
3.2.1 The Financial Constraints Hypothesis 
The coinsurance effect of cash flows, first introduced by Lewellen (1971), suggests 
that a diversifying merger can reduce default risk and increase debt capacity if two 
merging parties have imperfect correlations among the segment cash flows. Duchin 
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(2010) argues that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities also 
influences a firm’s financial status in the presence of capital market frictions. The same 
reasoning applies to diversifying mergers as well. After a merger, a higher coinsurance 
(less correlated) across divisional investment opportunities implies that the merged firm 
has lower chances of seeing several simultaneous investment opportunities across 
business segments. This analysis suggests that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities can relax a firm’s financial constraints through a merger. Our first 
hypothesis is thus:  
Hypothesis 1: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities positively 
influences merger outcomes for financially constrained firms. 
3.2.2 The Efficient Internal Capital Market Hypothesis 
Internal capital markets add value when diversified firms have limited access to 
external financing. Stein (1997) suggests that conglomerates’ headquarters with 
superior information about segment investment prospects than outside investors can 
“pick the winner” (Stein, 2003), by shifting funds away from segments with limited 
opportunities to ones with better prospects. We argue that coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities between two merging parties can influence the new firm’s 
resource allocation decisions, which can consequently impact the opportunity cost of 
internal funds. If a merger activity increases the degree of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities, for a given number of investment opportunities in different 
industries, the merged firm is less likely to encounter those investment opportunities in 
more than one segment simultaneously; consequently, the firm, if financially 
constrained, abandons less positive NPV projects. This implies a lower opportunity cost 
of internal funds. Our second hypothesis is thus: 
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Hypothesis 2: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities positively 
influences merger outcomes for financially constrained firms with efficient internal 
capital markets.  
3.2.3 The Agency Problem Hypothesis 
According to the literature on the dark side of the internal capital market (Rajan et 
al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), diversification can be value-reducing, when the 
firm engages in inefficient cross-subsidization, shifting funds away from stronger 
segments towards weaker ones. When coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities is low (investment opportunities are more correlated), segment investment 
opportunities are more likely to arrive simultaneously. A firm engaging in cross-
subsidization may redistribute resources from a segment with high-return projects to 
another with low-return ones. In this case, the firm’s loss from the high-return projects 
is partially offset by the gains from the low-return ones. On the other hand, if 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is high, there might be a 
situation where the firm may use the resources from a segment with high-return projects 
in support of another without any investment opportunities. In this case, the firm can 
lose all possible gains from the high-return projects. The analysis above indicates that 
the firm value can decline with the degree of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities owing to agency problems. Therefore, if shareholders are concerned with 
such agency-type cross-subsidization, they will respond negatively to a diversifying 
merger announcement if the merger induces a higher coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. Our third hypothesis is thus:  
Hypothesis 3: Coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities can be 
associated with agency problems and negatively influences merger outcomes. 
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3.2.4 Summary of Hypotheses 
The following table offers a summary of the three hypotheses.  
The Impact of Coinsurance across Divisional Investment Opportunities 
On Mergers Outcomes 
Signs of predictions: Less Constrained Constrained 
Financial constraints 0 + 
Efficient internal capital market 0  
Agency problems   
 
This table describes the predictions of our hypotheses. A plus (minus) sign 
indicates a positive (negative) impact of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on merger outcomes. A zero sign suggests that there is no connection 
between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and merger outcomes.  
3.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
Multiple data sources are used to obtain information on merger activities, 
companies and governance levels. We identify all US mergers during the period from 
1986 to 2010 from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database in Thomson One Banker. 
We exclude privatizations, exchange offers and repurchases, spinoffs, self-tenders, 
recapitalizations and LBOs. We use the Compustat Segment file to collect segment-
level data, including segment assets and sales and the industry of each segment (at a 3-
digit SIC level). We retrieve firm-level data from the Compustat Industrial Annual file. 
We use CRSP to collect data on stock. The cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, are 
collected from Eventus.  
We apply the following screening criteria: The mergers involve US firms and are 
completed. The sample firms are publicly-listed with daily stock returns available in 
CRSP. The acquirer owns 100% of the targets’ shares after the merger. We then match 
the merger data with the Compustat Segment file, the Compustat Industrial Annual file 
and the Eventus file, excluding deals with incomplete data. In order to calculate the 
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cross-divisional correlation in investment opportunities, we require that both the 
acquirer and the target have segment-level data and valid SIC industry classifications 
from the Compustat Segment file. Based on the literature on diversification (Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Duchin, 2010), we exclude firms in the financial sector and firms with 
financial segments (SIC code 6000 to 6999). We require that the difference between the 
annual sales from the Compustat Industrial Annual file and the total segment sales in a 
firm from the Compustat Segment file is within 1%. We winsorize the data to reduce 
the impact of outliers. The matching and screening procedure yields a final sample of 
1,349 mergers announced between 1986 and 2010.  
3.3.2 Methodology  
3.3.2.1 The Measure of Coinsurance  
In line with Duchin (2010), we construct a measure to capture the degree of 
coinsurance in investment opportunities across various divisions. The measure 
quantifies the reduction in the volatility of investment opportunity owing to the 
imperfect correlation in divisional investment opportunities. We use Tobin’s Q (book 
asset + market value of common equity– common equity ‒ deferred taxes) / (0.9 × book 
asset + 0.1 × market value of common equity) as a proxy for investment opportunities. 
We use the average Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms in an industry to proxy for 
industry-level investment opportunities which are then used as a proxy for the 
investment opportunities of conglomerate segments operating in the same 3-digit SIC 
code industry.  
The firm-level inter-segment investment opportunity volatility within a diversified 
firm in fiscal year t, denoted as tσ(Q) , is computed as follows: 

 

N
1i
tj,
N
1j
ti,ji,jit σ(Q)σ(Q)ρ(Q)wwσ(Q)                                  (1) 
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where N      is the number of segments in a diversified firm. 
  
tiQ ,)( ))(( ,tjQ   is the volatility of investment opportunities of industry i (industry j). 
We use the average series over prior ten years [t-10, t-1] to calculate the 
rolling volatilities for year t. 
jiQ ,)(  is the correlation between the investment opportunities in industry i and 
industry j. 
iw )( jw  is the weighting of segment i (segment j) in a diversified firm, which is 
the ratio of the segment’s assets to the total asset of the firm.  
 
The coinsurance across segment investment opportunities, denoted as 
te_QCoinsuranc , is calculated as the difference between the volatility in the equation 
(1) and a “no-diversification” measure of volatility, assuming a correlation of one 
(perfect correlation) among segment investment opportunities. 
t
N
1i
tj,
N
1j
ti,jit σ(Q)σ(Q) σ(Q) 1wwQ_eCoinsuranc  
 
                         (2) 
The measure captures the reduction in the volatility of investment opportunities 
owing to the imperfectly-correlated divisional investment opportunities. It is positive for 
diversified firms and zero for single-segment firms. A higher value of tQ_eCoinsuranc  
indicates a higher level of coinsurance effect and a higher degree of diversification.  
We also compute the coinsurance in cash flows. It captures the coinsurance effect 
stemming from the imperfect correlation among divisional cash flows. Cash flow is 
defined as earnings less interest and taxes. 
The volatility of cash flows in a diversified firm, denoted as t)CF( , in fiscal year t, 
is defined as follows: 

 

N
i
t,j
N
j
t,ij,ijit )CF()CF()CF(ww)CF(
1 1
                           (3) 
where N      is the number of segments in a diversified firm. 
t,i)CF( ))CF(( t,j   is the volatility of cash flows of industry i (industry j). We use the 
average series over prior ten years [t-10, t-1] to calculate the rolling 
volatilities for year t. 
j,i)CF(  is the correlation between the cash flows in industry i and industry j. 
iw )( jw  is the weighting of segment i (segment j) in a diversified firm, which is 
the ratio of the segment’s assets to the total asset of the firm.  
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The coinsurance across segment cash flows, denoted as tCF_eCoinsuranc , is 
calculated as the difference between the volatility in the equation (3) and a “no-
diversification” measure of volatility that assumes a correlation of one (perfect 
correlation) among cash flows in all segments. 
      t
N
i
t,j
N
j
t,ijit )CF()CF()CF(wwCF_eCoinsuranc   
 1 1
1              (4) 
The variable quantifies the decrease in the cash flow volatility owing to the 
imperfectly-correlated divisional cash flows. It is positive for diversified firms and zero 
for single-segment firms. A higher value of tCF_eCoinsuranc indicates a higher level 
of coinsurance in cash flows.  
3.2.2.2 The Change in the Coinsurance after a Merger 
In order to directly examine the impact of the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities on merger outcomes, we estimate the change in the 
coinsurance induced by the merger. Using equation (2), we first calculate the 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities of the acquirer at the end of the 
fiscal year before the announcement date. The action of merging the acquirer with the 
target can be regarded as adding a new portfolio of assets (segments of the target) to the 
original portfolio (segments of the acquirer). Therefore, we can calculate a post-merger 
coinsurance of the merged firm, using both merging parties’ data. The change in the 
level of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities through the merger is 
thus defined as follows:  
A
1-ti,
A_and_T
1-ti,ti, e_QCoinsurance_QCoinsurancce_QΔCoinsuran            (5) 
where 
A_and_T
1ti,e_QCoinsuranc   
is the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
of the merged firm using both the acquirer firm and the 
target firm data at year t-1. 
A
1ti,e_QCoinsuranc   
is the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
of the acquiring firm using the acquirer data only at year t-1. 
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In this study, we also include a measure of the change in the coinsurance across 
divisional cash flows, caused by the merger, as a control variable. It is calculated in a 
similar way: 
A
1-ti,
A_and_T
1-ti,ti, e_CFCoinsurance_CFCoinsurancce_CFΔCoinsuran           (6) 
where 
A_and_T
1i,te_CFCoinsuranc   
is the coinsurance across divisional cash flows of the 
merged firm using both the acquirer firm and the target 
firm data at year t-1. 
A
1i,te_CFCoinsuranc   
is the coinsurance across divisional cash flows of the 
acquiring firm using the acquirer data only at year t-1. 
   
The value of these two variables is zero, if the merger involves two single-
segmented firms in the same industry (at 3-digit SIC code level). The value of these 
variables can be either positive or negative in other scenarios. A positive value of the 
change in the coinsurance value indicates a reduction in the correlation among segment 
investment opportunities or cash flows, caused by a merger.  
3.3.2.3 Event Study and Control Variables 
In line with previous literature, we conduct an event study based on Brown and 
Warner’s (1985) methodology. We define a merger announcement as the event. The 
abnormal returns of the acquiring firm are evaluated, using a market model with a 220-
day period ending 20 days before the event date. The abnormal returns are computed as 
follows: 
)R(ERAR ititit                                (7) 
Where itAR  is the abnormal return, itR is an actual daily return and )R(E it is an 
expected market return calculated from CRSP daily prices. The cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) over an event window, centered on the announcement date, are 
computed as the sum of the estimated abnormal returns: 
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In this study, we use the event windows of 3-days (-1, +1) and 11-days (-5, +5), 
respectively.  
We employ the following estimation to examine the impact of coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities on the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiring 
firm. 
itj
N
i
iiii XcQ_eCoinsurancba),(CAR   
1
121         (9) 
where ice_QΔCoinsuran  is the change in the coinsurance level induced by a merger, 
and iX is a set of firm and deal characteristics at the end of the fiscal year before the 
merger announcement. j  and tμ  are the industry and year fixed effects. In line with 
previous studies (Asquith et al., 1983; Chang, 1998; Harford, 1999; Moeller et al., 2004; 
Maciasa and Pirinskyb, 2015), we control a number of factors that determine the 
acquirers’ announcement returns, including the firm size (ln(book value of asset)), 
market-to-book ratio, leverage (book value of / assets), cash flows (income before 
extraordinary items / total asset), capital expenditure (capital expenditures / total asset), 
R&D expenditure (research and development expenses / total asset), dividends 
(dividends / total asset), intangibility (intangible assets / total assets), acquirer price run-
up (the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the 
announcement month), prior acquisition experience (a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
corporation has conducted any mergers and acquisitions within the past three years and 
zero otherwise), relative transaction value (deal amount to acquirer’s market value of 
equity), method of payment, competition status and deal attitude.  
We make our predictions for the relationship between the control variables and the 
acquirer returns. Moeller et al. (2004) reveal a stylized fact that acquisitions made by 
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large acquirers are valued significantly less than the ones made by small acquirers, we 
therefore expect that the abnormal return decreases with bidder size. Since acquirers 
may accumulate expertise and build skills from past transactions, the announcement 
return of a merger conducted by an acquirer with acquisition experience is like to be 
positive. According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), the market 
interprets a merger financed by stock as signals of overpricing of the bidder’s securities; 
we thus expect a stock-financed merger to yield lower returns than a cash-financed 
merger. We also expect the acquirer abnormal returns to decrease with the number of 
bidders for a target and the level of hostility. Based on the Q theory of Lang et al. 
(1989), high market-to-book ratio suggests good investment opportunities and better 
usage of target assets, therefore acquirers with high M/B ratio should generate high 
announcement returns. On the other hand, Dong et al. (2002) argues that high M/B ratio 
signals overvaluation of an acquirer’s stock, thus a merger conducted by a high-valued 
acquirer should generate low returns. So the prediction regarding M/B ratio is 
ambiguous. Similarly, purchase of larger targets may point at managerial motives 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) or potential for greater synergy stemming from economies 
of scale (Morck et al., 1990). Moeller et al. (2004) find that the coefficients on relative 
size are negative for big firms and positive for small firms. So the prediction regarding 
relative size is also ambiguous. 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics. Our final sample consists of 1,349 merger 
deals; in 635 out of 1,349 deals, the merged firm experiences a change in the degree of 
coinsurance, caused by the merger. In the entire sample, the mean of ΔCoinsurance_Q 
is 0.0042, approximately 3 times higher than that of ΔCoinsurance_CF, which suggests 
that the magnitude of the changes in the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities is significantly greater than those in the coinsurance across divisional cash 
flows.  
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3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we introduce the empirical results. We first examine the impact of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on acquirers’ returns and the 
post-merger operating performance. Next, we investigate how coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities affects the probability of a firm becoming an 
acquirer. We then examine the link between merger premiums and coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. We further split the sample by financial constraints. 
We then examine the impact of efficiency of internal transfers. We also split the sample 
by levels of corporate governance. Finally, we employ the Heckman’s two-stage 
estimation as a robustness check.  
3.4.1 Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Although acquirer returns (as compared to combined returns) do not reflect the 
overall valuation of a merger by shareholders, they can signal the agency motives 
underlying mergers (Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010). As Morck et al. (1990) notice, if 
the stock market responds negatively to a merger announcement, it is not difficult to 
assume that the merger deal is driven by managerial objectives instead of value-
maximizing decisions. Therefore, we use acquirers’ returns in our analysis. In Table 3.2, 
we provide estimates from regressions to test the relationship between the coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and acquirers’ abnormal announcement 
returns. The dependent variables are the acquirers’ eleven-day and three-day CARs. 
We find that the coefficients on the variable ΔCoinsurance_Q are negative and 
significant at higher than 1%, which suggests that a higher coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is negatively associated with the acquirers’ announcement 
returns. In our sample, the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
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increases by 0.0042, on average, after mergers; it corresponds to a reduction of 0.30%
6
 
in the acquirers’ eleven-day CARs, and 0.44% in three-day CARs. Given that the 
market capitalization of the average acquirer in our sample is £8.4 billion, the reduction 
means a drop of $25.2(37.0) million in the firm value based on the eleven-day (three-
day) CARs. The coefficients on the variable ΔCoinsurance_CF are positive and 
significant, which is consistent with the cash flow coinsurance hypothesis in Lewellen 
(1971) that a lower correlation among segment cash flows is value-enhancing for 
diversified firms. 
 It is noteworthy that this evidence is not inconsistent with the findings reached by 
Duchin (2010). In his paper, a higher coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the level of cash holdings. Our findings suggest that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities can lead to inefficiency from other 
perspectives of a firm’s decisions (for example, resource allocation policy), not from its 
cash policy. Evidence in Table 3.2 supports our agency problem hypothesis, that the 
impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is value-reducing in 
diversifying mergers.  
The estimated coefficients on control variables are consistent with those reported in 
earlier studies (e.g., Moeller et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2006; Wang and Xie, 2009). 
Specifically, we observe that mergers financed with cash produce higher announcement 
returns, whereas mergers conducted by large acquirers and financed with stock produce 
lower announcement returns. 
3.4.2 Changes in Operating Performance 
We have provided evidence that shareholders respond negatively to an increase in 
the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after a merger, which is 
                                                 
6
 30 basis points=(–0.713*0.0042);44 basis points=(–1.050*0.0042) 
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consistent with the agency hypothesis. We now examine how coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities affects the changes in operating performance over 
pre-merger and post-merger periods of the combined firm.  
In line with Wang and Xie (2008), we use return on assets (ROA), computed as the 
operating incomes divided by total assets, as a measure of operating performance. 
According the literature on corporate takeover, acquirers usually experience a period of 
high operating performance before a merger activity (Morck et al., 1990). However, the 
acquirers’ superior performance gradually declines following merger announcements as 
a result of mean reversion in performance (Lie 2005). Barber and Lyon (1996) argue 
that performance comparison can be misleading without controlling for abnormal pre-
merger performance of sample firms. Therefore, to ensure that the change in operating 
performance is caused by a merger alone, we match each acquirer and each target in our 
sample with a non-merging control firm to filter out the effects of industry trend and 
mean reversion.  
We employ two methodologies to construct control samples. First, following Bena 
and Li (2013), we choose control firms based on industry, size, and book-to-market 
(B/M) ratios. This approach is similar to that of Barber and Lyon (1996). Specifically, 
for each acquirer and each target in our sample, we select their matching firms from 
other firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry. We require that the matching firms were 
not involved in any mergers or acquisitions over the past three years before the 
transaction date. From the resulting pool of firms, we choose the firms whose size and 
B/M ratio in year t-1 are the closest to that of our sample firms.  
Secondly, we form the control sample based on a propensity score matching 
approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This methodology enables us to select control 
firms that were not involved in mergers or acquisitions, but are very comparable to the 
acquirers or targets in our sample. We first run a probit-model to predict the 
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probabilities of firms becoming acquirers, using both acquiring firms and non-merging 
firms for each fiscal year over the sample period. We present the regression estimates in 
Table 3.3 Panel A. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 for an 
acquiring firm and zero otherwise. In line with previous studies (Asquith et al., 1983; 
Harford, 1999; Huang et al., 2014), we incorporate variables controlling the 
determinants of merger likelihood, including size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, non-
cash working capital (net working capital excluding cash / asset), cash holdings (cash 
and cash equivalent holdings / assets), sales’ growth (prior 3-year average sales’ 
growth), prior acquisition experience, average abnormal stock returns (market adjusted 
abnormal return over the past year), and P/E ratio (stock price over EPS).  
In Table 3.3 Panel B, we run a probit-model for the probabilities of a firm 
becoming a target for each fiscal year. The dependent variable is an indicator variable 
which takes the value of 1 for target firms and zero otherwise. We control a number of 
firm and deal features that have been used by researchers as the determinants of the 
probability of being acquired (Palepu, 1986; Cremers et al., 2009; Edmans et al., 2012; 
Macias and Pirinsky, 2015). The variables include size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, 
cash holdings, ROA, intangibility, R&D expenses, market share (a firm’s sales to the 
total sales reported by firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry), sales’ growth, potential 
target availability (number of firms in the industry), average abnormal stock returns, 
firm age (number of years since premier appearance in Compustat) and HHISIC3 (the 
Herfindahl index of the sales reported by all firms in the 3-digit SIC industry). As the 
propensity score matching methodology involves more variables, we lose some 
observations due to missing data and the sample size decreases to 1,190. 
The propensity scores indicate how closely a non-merging firm can be matched to 
the sample firm, given the set of observed characteristics. We require that the control 
firm was not involved in any mergers or acquisitions over the past three years before the 
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transaction date. Each sample firm is then matched to the control firm with the closest 
propensity score of becoming an acquirer (or a target) to the sample firms.  
Next, we calculate the changes in the operating performance of the merged firm 
from the pre-merger fiscal year t-1 to the post-merger year t+1. Figure 1 describes the 
calculation process.  
Figure 3.1 
Methodology to Measure the Change in Operating Performance 
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 In year t-1, the weighted average ROA of the acquirer and the target “A+T” (S1), 
minus the weighted average ROA of the control firms (C1), with the weights being the 
book value of assets for the two merging parties, is defined as the pre-merger operating 
performance adjusted for industry trend, Pre_adjusted_ROA.  
In year t+1, the ROA of the merged firm “AT” (S2), minus the weighted average 
ROA of the control firms (C2), with the same weighting scheme as in year t-1, is 
defined as the post-merger operating performance adjusted for industry trend, 
Post_adjusted_ROA. 
The changes in the operating performance of the merged firm, denoted as 
ΔAdjusted_ROA, are defined as the difference between Pre_adjusted_ROA and 
Post_adjusted_ROA.  
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We then estimate the regression of the change in the operating performance of the 
merged firm on the change in the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities after a merger and other control variables as those in Table 3.2. A number 
of factors affecting abnormal returns are also found be determinants of post-merger 
performance. For example, since takeover activities conducted by highly leveraged 
firms are more closely scrutinized, value-reducing mergers are less likely to be 
approved ex-ante. Mergers of larger targets relative to the acquirers can be associated 
with both empire building (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and value-maximizing motives 
(Morck et al., 1998). Moreover, post-merger integration is harder to achieve for larger 
targets. As such, the impact of relative size on post-merger operating performance is 
unclear. Mergers financed by cash are more likely to result in better operating 
performance than the ones financed by equity (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2004; Ghosh, 
2001). Costly hostile bids can be a signal potential for high synergy, and hence hostile 
takeovers may bring about performance improvement (Burkart and Panunzi, 2006). 
Table 3.4 presents the regression results. We demonstrate that the coefficients on 
ΔCoinsurance_Q are negative and significant; using different matching schemes, 
suggesting that the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is 
negatively associated with the post-merger operating performance. The results are also 
economically meaningful; they indicate that a rise in the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities, induced by an average merger, reduces return-on-assets ratios 
by 1.53% (1.26%)
7
. The findings corroborate evidence in Table 3.2, thus supporting our 
agency problem hypothesis that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
is value-reducing.  
                                                 
7
 1.53%=3.634*0.0042; 1.26%=2.995*0.0042 
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3.4.3 The Probability of Becoming an Acquirer 
Evidence so far is consistent with the agency problem hypothesis that the 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is associated with agency 
problems and thus reduces firm value. Therefore, it is conceivable that a poorly-
governed firm is more likely to make merger decisions when it can anticipate a higher 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after the merger. We test the 
conjecture in this section. Specifically, we investigate whether the impact of the 
coinsurance across segment investment opportunities on firms’ merger likelihood is 
stronger in poorly-governed firms. We construct two proxies for corporate governance:  
(i) The presence of blockholders (e.g., Cremers and Nair, 2005). Blockholders are 
defined as shareholders who own at least 5% of a company’s common stocks. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argue that blockholders with substantial stakes and voting control 
rights have the incentives to monitor and pressure the management and hence improve 
corporate governance. 
(ii) The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) G-index. The G-index counts the 
number of charter provisions that restricts shareholder rights and strengthen takeover 
defenses. A higher G-index suggests greater managerial power and hence is associated 
with more agency costs. Therefore, a high G-index corresponds to poor corporate 
governance. We collect the G-index data from the “Investor Responsibility Research 
Centre” (IRRC) database. As the data is available for a subset of the firms in Compustat 
for every two years from 1990 to 2006, the size of the sample based on G-index is 
smaller than the one based on blockholders.  
A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it has a G-index =>7,
8
 or if it does not 
have any blockholder. We construct a dummy variable, Bad_Governance, which takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is poorly-governed, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
8
 These are the firms with more restrictions on shareholder rights. 
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We include the dummy variable Bad_Governance in the probit regression as in 
Table 3.3 Panel A. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes the value 
of 1 for acquiring firms, and zero for the control firms. For each acquiring firm, we 
select up to five control firms in the fiscal year preceding the announcement date. We 
first collect all non-merging firms operating in the same three-digit SIC industry as the 
acquirer. We also match control firms with the acquiring firms by the same governance 
level. We then choose the firms whose size and B/M ratios in year t-1 are closest to 
those of the acquiring firms. We also require that the control firms were not involved in 
any mergers or acquisitions over the past three years before the announcement date. We 
then split the entire sample into three sub-samples, based on whether the merged firm 
will experience an increase, no-change or a decrease in the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities after the merger. 
Table 3.5 presents the estimated coefficients of the probit regression. We find that 
the coefficients on Bad_Governance are positive and significant only in the 
“ΔCoinsurance_Q>0’ sub-samples. The coefficients are insignificant in the other two 
sub-samples. This suggests that poorly-governed firms have a higher tendency to make 
merger decisions, if the merger can leads to an increase in the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities. In other words, the higher the coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities, the more likely that a poorly-governed firm 
engages in a merger. It strongly indicates that the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is related to agency motives.  
3.4.4 Merger Premiums 
If the impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is negatively 
associated with merger outcomes owing to agency problems, the shareholders of target 
firms might be concerned over such agency-type inefficiency. Therefore, we conjecture 
that acquiring firms are required to pay higher merger premiums, in response to a rise in 
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the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by the merger. In 
Table 3.6, we estimate the regression of coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities on merger premiums. The dependent variable in column 1 (2) is 1 
subtracted from the ratio of the final offer price to the targets’ stock price one day (one 
week) before the announcement date. In line with previous literature (e.g., Betton et al., 
2008; Bargeron et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2014), we control acquirer and target 
characteristics, including size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, non-cash working capital, 
run-up, Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (ln[1+ average daily ratio of absolute return to 
firms’ dollar trading volume over the fiscal year]), and sales’ growth. We also include a 
number of deal features: the relative transaction value and dummy variables for stock 
offers, cash offers, competing offers, hostile deals and tender offers.  
In Table 3.6, we find that coefficients on the variable ΔCoinsurance_Q are positive 
and significant at higher than 5%. The change in coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities on average increases the one-day (one-week) premium by 0.57% 
(0.65%), which corresponds to an extra $6.1 (6.9) million cost based on the mean deal 
value of $1.07 billion. It suggests that shareholders are concerned over the increase in 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after a merger, which is 
consistent with our agency problem hypothesis that coinsurance across segment 
investment opportunities is value-reducing. The coefficients on the other control 
variables are, generally, qualitatively consistent with previous studies (Schwert, 2000; 
Officer, 2003; Moeller et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Betton et al., 2008). 
Specifically, merger premiums are higher in competing offers, hostile offers and tender 
offers. 
3.4.5 Financial Constraints 
In this section, we test the financial constraint hypothesis. We construct two 
measurements of financial constraints as follows: 
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 (i) Payout ratio: According to Fazzari et al. (1988), a firm paying high dividends is 
more likely to obtain access to internal financing, and is therefore less constrained. Thus 
we use the payout ratio as our first measure of financial constraints. We define payout 
ratio as the ratio of total dividends plus stock repurchases to book assets. A firm is 
classified as financially constrained (less-constrained) if the firm has a payout ratio 
smaller (bigger or equal) the mean of the sample distribution.  
 (ii) SA index: We use the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size and age index as our 
second measure of financial constraints (Hann et al., 2013; Chi and Su, 2016). Size and 
age are found closely and negatively related to financial constraints.  We first calculate 
the firm-year SA index. A higher SA index value indicates that the firm is more 
financially constrained. We then classify a firm as financially constrained (less-
constrained) if the firm has an above (equal to or below) median SA index in the sample 
distribution. 
We then define a dummy variable, Constrained, which equals 1 for financially 
constrained firms, and zero otherwise. We then construct an interaction term, 
ΔCoinsurance_Q × Constrained, to examine whether coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities affects the merger outcomes of financially constrained and 
less-constrained firms differently. Table 3.7 presents the coefficient estimates from the 
regressions of the acquirers' eleven-day and three-day cumulative abnormal returns on 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. The coefficients on the variable 
ΔCoinsurance_Q remain negative and significant. However, the coefficients on 
ΔCoinsurance_Q × Constrained are not significant and are much smaller than the ones 
on ΔCoinsurance_Q. For example, based on Column 1, for a financially constrained 
acquirer, coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities corresponds to a 
reduction of 0.65% (0.0042 × [(‒1.387) + (‒0.166)]) in the firm’s eleven days CARs. 
For a less-constrained acquirer, coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
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corresponds to a reduction of 0.58% in the eleven days CARs. Since the coefficient on 
the interaction term ΔCoinsurance_Q × Constrained only has a p-value of 0.60, it 
means that the estimated drops are not significantly different from each other. Overall, 
evidence suggests that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities does not 
affect financially constrained or less-constrained firms differently, and the negative 
effect of coinsurance across segment investment opportunities prevails in both 
financially constrained and less-constrained firms.  
Table 3.8 provides the results from the regressions of the post-merger operating 
performance. The results are consistent when using both measures of financial 
constraints, employing industry, size and B/M ratio matching or the propensity score 
matching methodology. The coefficients on ΔCoinsurance_Q are significantly negative 
across samples, while the coefficients on ΔCoinsurance_Q × Constrained are smaller 
than the ones on ΔCoinsurance_Q and not significant, which indicates that the effect of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities on the post-merger operating 
performance is negative, regardless of the firms’ financial status, which supports the 
agency problem hypothesis.  
3.4.6 Efficiency of Internal Transfers 
In this section, we test the efficient internal capital hypothesis. Specifically, we 
examine if coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities influences merger 
outcomes differently between acquirers with an efficient internal capital market and the 
ones without an efficient internal capital market.  
First, we compute the cross-divisional transfers within a firm:   
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where j is segment j, ss represents single-segment firms,  jI is capital expenditure, 
jAsset is the segment j’s asset, jw  is segment j’s asset divided by firm total asset, and 
ss
j
ss
j
Asset
I
  is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure-to-asset ratio using only 
single-segment firms in segment j. Next, we compute the efficiency of internal transfers. 
The measure is developed by Rajan et al. (2000) and is computed as follows:  
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where q is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q, jq is the asset-weighted 
Tobin’s Q ratio using only single-segment firms in segment j. Rajan et al. (2000) refer 
to this variable as “relative value added by allocation”. It can be interpreted as the 
overall value created by the inter-segment transfers made by a diversified firm. A higher 
value of the measure suggests greater efficiency of internal transfers. It can be either 
positive or negative for diversified firms. It is zero for single-segment firms. 
We then construct an interaction term, ΔCoinsurance_Q × Efficiency of Internal 
Transfers, to examine whether coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
affects the announcement returns and operating performance differently for acquirers 
with varying levels of internal efficiency. If coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities creates value through an efficient internal capital market, the coefficient 
on the interaction term ΔCoinsurance_Q × Efficiency of Internal Transfers should be 
positive.  
Table 3.9 presents the results from the regressions of the acquirers' eleven-day and 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns. Based on the eleven-day CARs, we find that the 
coefficient on the variable ΔCoinsurance_Q is negative and significant, while the 
coefficients on the interaction term ΔCoinsurance_Q × Efficiency of Internal Transfers 
is not significant. Based on the three-day CARs, the coefficient on ΔCoinsurance_Q is 
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significantly negative; moreover, the coefficient on ΔCoinsurance_Q × Efficiency of 
Internal Transfers is positive with p-value equal to 0.06. It suggests that as the 
efficiency of internal allocation improves, investors may perceive coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities as value-enhancing through the internal capital 
market. However, the positive impact of internal capital market does not totally offset 
the dark side the agency problems, the overall effect of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is still negative.  
Table 3.10 provides the results from the regressions on the post-merger operating 
performance. The results are consistent when we employ the industry, size and B/M 
ratio matching or the propensity score matching methodology. The coefficients on 
ΔCoinsurance_Q are significantly negative across samples, but the coefficients on 
ΔCoinsurance_Q × Efficiency of Internal Transfers are not significant. This indicates 
that the efficiency of the internal capital market in an acquiring firm does not positively 
affect the relationship between the investment-opportunity coinsurance and operating 
performance. Taken together, we do not find strong evidence that supports the efficient 
internal capital market hypothesis. We still find that agency problem hypothesis 
dominates the other two hypotheses in explaining how coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities can influence merger outcomes. 
3.4.7 Corporate Governance 
We have provided evidence that the impact of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities is negatively associated with the firm value. In this section, we 
investigate the influence of corporate governance. It is reasonable to expect that the 
negative impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is mitigated 
in well-governed firms.  
We use G-index and the presence of blockholders to proxy for the level of 
corporate governance. A firm is classified as a well-governed firm, if its G-index is 
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smaller than 7, or if it has at least one blockholder. We then divide the sample into two 
sub-samples, depending on whether the firm is well-governed or poorly-governed. 
Table 3.11A and 3.11B
9
 present the estimated coefficients from the regression of 
the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns on coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities. We find that the coefficients on ΔCoinsurance_Q are only negative and 
significant within the “Bad Governance” sub-samples. For example, in column 1 of 
Table 3.11A, the higher coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after a 
merger, on average, cuts the acquirer’s eleven-day CARs by 2.5% (–6.055*0.0042), 
corresponding to a $214 million drop in the market value for an average acquirer in our 
sample. It suggests that poorly-governed firms suffer great losses as investors are 
concerned over the agency problems underlying the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities. In firms with better corporate governance, coinsurance does 
not affect the firm value. 
Table 3.12A and 3.12B presents the results from the regressions of the post-merger 
operating performance on coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. The 
coefficients on the variable ΔCoinsurance_Q are only negative and significant in the 
“Bad Governance” sub-samples, which suggest that the negative impact of coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is associated with agency problems. The 
coefficients on ΔCoinsurance_Q are not significant in “Good Governance” sub-samples, 
which indicates that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities does not 
reduce value in well-governed firms. Collectively, the results support our agency 
problem hypothesis. 
                                                 
9
 The IRRC data are only available for a relative small number of firms, so the size of our sample, based 
on G-index, decreases to 358.  
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3.5 About Endogeneity 
As argued by Li and Prabhala (2007), firms do not randomly make strategic 
decisions. In this study, our sample is based on actual completed merger deals. To 
mitigate the potential endogeneity concern that a firm may self-choose to make merger 
decisions, we exploit the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model. In the first stage, we run a 
probit-model to predict the merger likelihood. The specification is the same as in Table 
3.3 Panel A. We calculate the Inverse Mills ratio, denoted as Lambda, based on the 
probit-model. In the second stage, we include the Inverse Mills ratio as an additional 
variable in our regressions of the firms’ announcement returns and operating 
performance.  
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 present the estimated coefficients of the second stage 
regressions of the Heckman’s two-stage estimation. We continue to find that the 
coefficients on ΔCoinsurance_Q are negative and significant across the samples, which 
suggest that the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities reduces 
announcement returns and post-merger operating performance. Evidence is consistent 
with the findings in Table 3.2 and Table 3.4, which further supports the agency problem 
hypothesis after controlling the potential endogeneity problems. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities on corporate mergers. We develop three hypotheses, based on 
financial constraints, the efficient internal capital market and the agency problems. We 
find that the effect of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is 
negatively associated with abnormal announcement returns and post-merger operating 
performance. A poorly-governed firm is more likely to engage in a merger, when it can 
expect a higher coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after the merger. 
We demonstrate that the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is 
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value-reducing in both financially constrained and less-constrained firms. We do not 
find evidence suggesting that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
can create value through the efficient internal capital market. The negative effect of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is mitigated when firms have 
better corporate governance. We find similar results when we employ the Heckman’s 
two-stage model to address endogeneity concerns. Our results are consistent with the 
interpretation that coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities is negatively 
associated with merger outcomes. The findings support our agency hypothesis, and we 
disclose a specific channel through which corporate diversification has a negative value 
consequence.  
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table provides the summary statistics. The sample consists of 1,349 completed US mergers between 
1986 and 2010. CARs (-1, +1) and CARs (-5, +5) are the three-day and eleven-day cumulative abnormal 
returns centered on the announcement date respectively. PREM1D is the ratio of the final offer price to 
the target stock price one day prior to the original announcement date minus one. PREM1W is the ratio of 
the final offer price to the target stock price one week prior to the original announcement date minus one. 
Coinsurance_Q is coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. It is computed as the difference 
between the volatility of segment-level investment opportunities in a conglomerate and the volatility that 
assumes a correlation of 1 between all segment-level investment opportunities in the conglomerate. 
Segment-level investment opportunities is the average Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms in a 3-digit SIC 
code industry over a prior 10-year period (see text for more details). Coinsurance_CF is coinsurance 
across divisional cash flows. It is computed as the difference between the volatility of segment-level cash 
flows in a conglomerate and the volatility that assumes a correlation of 1 between all segment-level cash 
flows in the conglomerate. Segment-level cash flows is the average cash flows of single-segment firms in 
a 3-digit SIC code industry over a prior 10-year period (see text for more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF 
is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger. Asset is log of total assets. 
Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) 
divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total 
asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the 
cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Cash 
holdings is the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total asset. Noncash Working Capital is net 
working capital excluding cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Relative transaction value is 
ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of 
one ‐ if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock 
deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). 
All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date.  
 
Variable N Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
    Std. Dev. 
CARs (-1,+1) 1,349 -0.0128 -0.0101 -0.0723 0.0450 0.1102 
CARs (-5,+5) 1,349 -0.0117 -0.0091 -0.0514 0.0246 0.0797 
PREM1D 1,237 0.3651 0.2800 0.1300 0.5000 0.4642 
PREM1W 1,235 0.4168 0.3400 0.1700 0.5800 0.4515 
ΔCoinsurance_Q 1,349 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0132 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 1,349 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0031 
Acquirer assets 1,349 20.5860 20.5581 19.2279 15.5569 26.3424 
Acquirer market-to-book 1,349 2.4709 1.8097 1.3129 0.3541 13.4288 
Acquirer leverage 1,349 0.1808 0.1511 0.0232 0.0000 0.7311 
Acquirer cash flow 1,349 0.0287 0.0524 0.0159 -0.6806 0.4333 
Acquirer capital expenditure 1,349 0.0678 0.0480 0.0265 0.0000 0.8850 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 1,349 0.0517 0.0115 0.0000 0.0000 0.4427 
Acquirer dividends 1,349 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1151 
Acquirer intangibility 1,349 0.1199 0.0364 0.0000 0.0000 0.8567 
Acquirer run-up 1,349 0.1393 0.1127 -0.0375 -1.7362 3.3126 
Acquirer cash holdings 1,349 0.1825 0.0976 0.0247 0.0000 0.9243 
Acquirer noncash working capital 1,349 0.0735 0.0577 -0.0231 -0.5540 0.6390 
Relative transaction value 1,349 0.2969 0.1500 0.0486 0.0002 2.0422 
Cash deal 1,349 0.2706 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Stock deal 1,349 0.3996 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Competing offer 1,349 0.0586 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Hostile 1,349 0.0133 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
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 Table 3.2 Regressions Analysis of Acquirer Returns 
 
This table reports coefficient estimates of the regression to test the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and acquirers’ abnormal announcement returns. The dependent variables are the eleven-day (-
5, +5) and three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date. ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change 
in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. 
Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total 
asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. 
Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development 
expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets 
divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the 
announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following 
dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition 
experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% 
in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). 
All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 
1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
CAR 
           (-5,+5)         (-1,+1) 
Intercept        0.116 0.064 
 (0.24) (0.49) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -0.713*** -1.050*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 2.236*** 2.220*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Acquirer assets -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Acquirer market-to-book  -0.003** -0.010*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage 0.015 0.009 
 (0.39) (0.60) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.014 -0.028 
 (0.48) (0.15) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.021 0.019 
 (0.61) (0.62) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure -0.016 -0.066 
 (0.71) (0.12) 
Acquirer dividends 0.055 0.148 
 (0.68) (0.25) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.022 -0.008 
 (0.22) (0.65) 
Acquirer run-up -0.021*** -0.014** 
 (0.01) (0.04) 
Relative transaction value -0.017*** -0.027*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience -0.001 0.002 
 (0.87) (0.74) 
Cash deal 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.05) (0.02) 
Stock deal -0.015** -0.020*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Competing offer -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.15) (0.25) 
Hostile -0.018 0.005 
 (0.42) (0.81) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects            Yes         Yes 
Observations            1,349         1,349 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.09 
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Table 3.3 Probability of Being an Acquirer or a Target 
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from logit regressions on the probability of being an acquirer. 
Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from logit regressions on the probability of being a target Asset is 
log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market 
value of equity) over total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash holdings is cash and 
cash equivalent holdings over total assets. Noncash Working Capital is net working capital excluding cash 
and cash equivalents over total assets. Sales Growth is the average of (Salest_Salest-1)/ Salest-1 within past 
three years prior to the merger. Avg. Abnormal Return is average daily market-model abnormal return 
over yeart-1.The market model parameters are estimated using the daily returns from yeart-2. Price-to-
Earnings is the stock price over earnings per share at the beginning of each fiscal year. R&D expenses is 
research and development expenses to asset. Asset Turnover is sales to asset. Intangibility is intangible 
assets to total assets. ROA is EBIT to the book value of total asset. Market share is a firm’s sales to the 
total sales in the same SIC 3-digit industry. HHISIC3 is Herfindahl index of all firms’ sales within the 
firm’s primary three-digit SIC. Firm Age is the number of years since the firm’s first report in Compustat. 
All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probability of Becoming an Acquirer    
 
 
Panel B:  Probability of Becoming a Target 
 P [becoming a target] 
      Coef.   Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -2.365*** (0.01) 
Target assets 0.003 (0.56) 
Target Market-to-Book -0.047*** (0.01) 
Target leverage 1.008*** (0.01) 
Target cash holdings 0.108** (0.04) 
Target R&D expenses 0.126***     (0.01) 
Target asset turnover 0.055***     (0.01) 
Target intangibility 0.009     (0.89) 
Target ROA 0.050***     (0.01) 
Target market share -0.558***     (0.01) 
Target sales growth 0.015     (0.23) 
Target avg. abnormal returns -1.431     (0.23) 
Number of firms in industry 0.000***     (0.01) 
HHISIC3 -0.064     (0.45) 
Target firm age -0.001     (0.29) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects      Yes  
No. of Observations      123,671  
Pseudo R2    0.04  
 P [becoming an acquirer] 
      Coef.  Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -4.499*** (0.01) 
Acquirer assets 0.133*** (0.01) 
Acquirer Market-to-Book 0.088*** (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage -0.402*** (0.01) 
Acquirer cash holdings 0.133*** (0.01) 
Acquirer noncash working capital 0.270*** (0.01) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.108*** (0.01) 
Acquirer avg. abnormal returns 0.615*** (0.01) 
Acquirer Price-to-Earnings 7.647*** (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects      Yes  
No. of Observations      128,420  
Pseudo R2 0.16  
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Table 3.4 Changes in Operating Performance 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression to test the relationship between post-
merger operating performances and coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. In 
specification (1), sample firms are matched with control firms based on industry, size, and B/M ratio. In 
specification (2), sample firms are matched with control firms using a propensity score matching 
approach (see text for more details). The dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is the change in the 
merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement to the 
fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA is the ratio of operating incomes to the book 
value of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA is its ROA minus the control firm’s 
ROA (see text for more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across 
divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-
to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided 
by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items 
divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure 
is research and development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total 
asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return 
of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of 
deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a 
firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal 
announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in 
stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly 
(Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement 
date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for 
brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 ΔAdjusted_ROA 
 Industry-,Size-,B/M Matching  Propensity Score Matching 
 (1)  (2) 
   Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.710*** (0.01)  -0.040 (0.79) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -3.634*** (0.01)  -2.995** (0.03) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 4.211** (0.02)  9.423*** (0.01) 
Acquirer assets 0.001 (0.87)  0.009 (0.11) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.012*** (0.01)  0.003 (0.19) 
Acquirer leverage -0.063 (0.16)  0.016 (0.48) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.007 (0.86)  0.032 (0.17) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.057 (0.44)  -0.046 (0.39) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.291*** (0.01)  -0.122** (0.03) 
Acquirer dividends 0.244 (0.11)  -0.072 (0.27) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.020 (0.54)  0.023 (0.31) 
Acquirer run-up 0.015 (0.44)  0.035 (0.04) 
Relative transaction value -0.035*** (0.01)  0.025*** (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.001 (0.90)  -0.006 (0.40) 
Cash deal 0.004 (0.78)  -0.006 (0.52) 
Stock deal -0.013 (0.25)  -0.002 (0.82) 
Competing offer 0.012 (0.57)  -0.009 (0.51) 
Hostile -0.027 (0.51)  0.022 (0.40) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes      Yes  
Observations    1,349      1,190  
Adjusted R2    0.08     0.07  
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Table 3.5 The Probability of Becoming an Acquirer  
 
This table examines whether a poorly-governed firm is more likely to engage in a merger if the firm can 
expect an increase in the coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after the merger. The 
dependent variable takes the value of 1 for the acquiring firms and zero for the control firms. We split the 
entire sample into three subgroups based on whether the acquirer can expect an increase, no-change or a 
decrease in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities after a merger. ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF 
is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). 
Bad_governance is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for poorly-governed firms, and zero 
otherwise. We use two measures of corporate governance: the presence of Blockholders and the G-index 
proposed by Gompers et al. (2003). A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it has a G-index =>7, or if 
it does not have any blockholder. Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm 
(total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) over total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt 
to total assets. Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalent holdings over total assets. Noncash Working 
Capital is net working capital excluding cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Sales Growth 
is the average of (Salest_Salest-1)/ Salest-1 within past three years prior to the merger. Avg. Abnormal 
Return is average daily market-model abnormal return over yeart-1.The market model parameters are 
estimated using the daily returns from yeart-2. Price-to-Earnings is the stock price over earnings per share 
at the beginning of each fiscal year. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose 
coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
      Panel A. Governance measured by the presence of blockholders  
 
 Probability of becoming an acquirer   
      ΔCoinsurance_Q >0  ΔCoinsurance_Q=0            ΔCoinsurance_Q<0  
      Coef. Pr > ChiSq         Coef. Pr > ChiSq   Coef. Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -5.223*** (0.01) -3.999*** (0.01)  -5.834*** (0.01)  
Bad_Governance 0.240*** (0.01) 0.068 (0.21) 0.169 (0.22)  
Assets 0.185*** (0.01) 0.143*** (0.01) 0.229*** (0.01)  
Market-to-Book 0.092*** (0.01) 0.222*** (0.01) -0.008 (0.86)  
Leverage -0.059 (0.75) -0.096 (0.49) -0.004 (0.99)  
Cash holdings 0.439** (0.04) 0.075 (0.60) -0.568 (0.30)  
Noncash working capital 0.746*** (0.01) 0.268 (0.15) 0.891** (0.03)  
Sales growth 0.204*** (0.01) 0.447*** (0.01) 0.301* (0.07)  
Avg. abnormal returns 13.148 (0.17) -4.887 (0.73) 15.404 (0.41)  
Price-to-Earnings 0.000 (0.39) 0.000 (0.69) 0.001 (0.48)  
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes                 Yes               Yes   
No. of Observations      2,760              4,138                799   
No. of Merged Firm Observations         493                 714                142   
No. of Control Firm Observations      2,267              3,424                657   
Pseudo R2        0.08                0.06               0.05   
               
 
 
      Panel B. Governance measured by G_Index 
 
 Probability of becoming an acquirer   
      ΔCoinsurance_Q >0         ΔCoinsurance_Q=0          ΔCoinsurance_Q<0        
      Coef. Pr > ChiSq    Coef. Pr > ChiSq          Coef. Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -11.384*** (0.01) -5.234*** (0.01) -14.738*** (0.01)  
Bad_Governance 0.241* (0.06) 0.033 (0.78) -0.255 (0.41)  
Assets 0.508*** (0.01) 0.208*** (0.01) 0.663*** (0.01)  
Market-to-Book 0.056 (0.26) 0.074** (0.03) -0.087 (0.37)  
Leverage -0.872* (0.09) -0.521 (0.16) -2.329** (0.03)  
Cash holdings -0.158 (0.74) 0.272 (0.40) -5.589*** (0.01)  
Net working capital 0.975** (0.04) 0.300 (0.46) 3.762*** (0.01)  
Sales growth 0.778** (0.02) 0.474*** (0.01) -0.070 (0.95)  
Avg. abnormal returns 7.012 (0.86) -38.886* (0.07) 73.527 (0.35)  
Price-to-Earnings 0.000 (0.90) -0.001 (0.43) -0.002 (0.55)  
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes                Yes                Yes   
No. of Observations         592                820                191   
No. of Merged Firm Observations         133                177                  48   
No. of Control Firm Observations         459                643                143   
Pseudo R2        0.16               0.11               0.40   
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Table 3.6 Regressions Analysis of Premiums 
This table examines the relationship between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and 
merger premiums. The dependent variable in specification 1(2) is the ratio of the final offer price to the 
target stock price one day (one week) prior to the original announcement date minus one. 
ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a 
merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger 
(see text for more details). Asset is logarithm of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm 
(total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) over total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt 
to total assets. Noncash Working Capital is net working capital excluding cash and cash equivalents over 
total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the firm over the six months before the 
announcement month. Amihud Liquidity is the illiquidity measure in Amihud (2002), defined as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the average ratio of the daily absolute return to dollar trading volume for the 
firm over the fiscal year. Sales Growth is the average of (Salest_Salest-1)/ Salest-1 within past three years 
prior to the merger. Relative transaction value is deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The 
following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if 
the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); 
if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile); if the deal is a tender offer (Tender offer). All firm 
characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is 
reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Premiums 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.694** (0.02)  0.886*** (0.01) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q 1.352** (0.04)  1.552** (0.04) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF -5.662** (0.03)  -5.906** (0.04) 
Acquirer Characteristics      
Acquirer assets 0.014* (0.06)  0.035*** (0.01) 
Acquirer market-to-book 0.008*** (0.01)  0.011*** (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage 0.008 (0.88)  0.020 (0.70) 
Acquirer noncash working capital -0.015 (0.81)  0.023 (0.75) 
Acquirer run-up -0.017 (0.69)  0.008 (0.92) 
Acquirer Amihud liquidity -0.038 (0.64)  -0.055 (0.53) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.011* (0.07)  0.008 (0.23) 
Target Characteristics      
Target assets -0.011 (0.12)  -0.044*** (0.01) 
Target market-to-book -0.011*** (0.01)  -0.015*** (0.01) 
Target noncash working capital 0.092** (0.05)  0.055 (0.28) 
Target run-up -0.069*** (0.01)  -0.122*** (0.01) 
Target Amihud liquidity 0.029*** (0.01)  0.038*** (0.01) 
Target sales growth 0.013 (0.49)  -0.006 (0.40) 
Deal Characteristics      
Relative transaction value 0.030 (0.18)  0.383** (0.02) 
Cash deal -0.007 (0.75)  0.008 (0.73) 
Stock deal -0.011 (0.55)  -0.024 (0.26) 
Competing offer 0.112*** (0.01)  0.148*** (0.01) 
Hostile 0.191*** (0.01)  0.182*** (0.01) 
Tender offer 0.028 (0.20)  0.041* (0.08) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects       Yes         Yes  
Observations      1, 237        1,235  
Adjusted R2 0.07   0.10  
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Table 3.7 Regressions Analysis of Acquirer Returns and Financial Constraints 
This table examines whether coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities affects the acquirer 
returns for constrained and less-constrained firms differently. The dependent variables are the eleven-day (-
5, +5) and three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date respectively. 
ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a 
merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger 
(see text for more details). Constrained is a dummy variable that equals 1if the firm is financially 
constrained and zero otherwise. Financial constraints are measured based on Payout Ratio and SA Index (see 
text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – 
book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital 
expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total 
asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total 
assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the 
announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. 
The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three 
years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash 
(Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders 
(Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the 
fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 
sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, 
**, and *, respectively. 
 
 CARs 
  (-5,+5)   (-1,+1) 
 
SA Index 
(1) 
 Payout Ratio 
(2) 
 SA Index 
(3) 
 
Payout Ratio 
(4) 
    Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.147 (0.25)  0.174 (0.17)  0.087 (0.38)  0.094 (0.33) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -1.387*** (0.01)  -1.196*** (0.01)  -1.371*** (0.01)  -0.800** (0.02) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q * Constrained -0.166 (0.60)  0.295 (0.33)  0.081 (0.73)  0.203 (0.36) 
Constrained 0.004 (0.64)  -0.012 (0.16)  -0.004 (0.56)  -0.007 (0.30) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 2.965*** (0.01)  2.460** (0.04)  1.839** (0.04)  2.037** (0.02) 
Acquirer assets -0.006** (0.02)  -0.007*** (0.01)  -0.006*** (0.01)  -0.005*** (0.01) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.010*** (0.01)  -0.009*** (0.01)  -0.005*** (0.01)  -0.010*** (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage 0.031 (0.16)  0.035 (0.12)  0.007 (0.70)  0.010 (0.55) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.002 (0.93)  -0.008 (0.77)  -0.039** (0.04)  -0.035* (0.08) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.021 (0.68)  0.027 (0.60)  0.010 (0.80)  0.013 (0.74) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.009 (0.87)  0.011 (0.84)  -0.086 (0.04)  -0.075* (0.08) 
Acquirer dividends 0.121 (0.48)  0.030 (0.87)  0.111 (0.39)  0.098 (0.49) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.020 (0.39)  -0.019 (0.40)  -0.011 (0.54)  -0.009 (0.60) 
Acquirer run-up -0.045*** (0.01)  -0.046*** (0.01)  -0.011 (0.12)  -0.014** (0.04) 
Relative transaction value -0.035*** (0.01)  -0.027*** (0.01)  -0.033*** (0.01)  -0.032*** (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience -0.002 (0.75)  -0.002 (0.82)  0.002 (0.67)  0.002 (0.74) 
Cash deal 0.016* (0.06)  0.016* (0.07)  0.014** (0.03)  0.014** (0.04) 
Stock deal -0.017** (0.03)  -0.016** (0.04)  -0.019*** (0.01)  -0.020*** (0.01) 
Competing offer -0.021 (0.13)  -0.022 (0.12)  -0.011 (0.30)  -0.011 (0.29) 
Hostile -0.009 (0.74)  -0.011 (0.68)  0.007 (0.73)  0.007 (0.76) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes  
Observations    1,349    1, 349     1, 349     1, 349  
Adjusted R2 0.05     0.05     0.08     0.08  
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Table 3.8 Changes in Operating Performance and Financial Constraints 
This table examines whether coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities affects the post-merger 
operating performance for constrained and less-constrained firms differently. In specification (1) and (2), sample 
firms are matched with control firms based on industry, size and B/M ratio. In specification (3) and (4), sample 
firms are matched with control firms using a propensity score matching approach (see text for more details). The 
dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is the change in the merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from the 
fiscal year prior to the merger announcement to the fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA is 
the ratio of operating incomes to the book value of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA is 
its ROA minus the control firm’s ROA (see text for more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance 
across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). Constrained is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the firm is financially constrained and zero otherwise. Financial constraints are measured based 
on Payout Ratio and SA Index (see text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market 
value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is 
the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital 
expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development 
expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets 
divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the 
announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The 
following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior 
acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the 
deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal 
attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
    
 ΔAdjusted_ROA 
 Industry-, Size-, B/M Matching  Propensity Score Matching 
 
SA Index 
(1) 
 Payout Ratio 
(2) 
 SA Index 
(3) 
 
Payout Ratio 
(4) 
  Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.679*** (0.01)  -0.756*** (0.01)  0.243* (0.08)  0.237* (0.08) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -3.536*** (0.01)  -2.285*** (0.01)  -2.906* (0.06)  -3.346** (0.04) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q * Constrained 0.584 (0.20)  1.010 (0.11)  -0.126 (0.69)  0.278 (0.43) 
Constrained -0.012 (0.34)  0.009 (0.45)  0.003 (0.80)  0.006 (0.49) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 3.484** (0.05)  8.749 (0.06)  14.893** (0.02)  11.652* (0.09) 
Acquirer assets 0.000 (0.92)  0.002 (0.45)  -0.002 (0.54)  -0.002 (0.49) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.010*** (0.01)  -0.009*** (0.01)  0.004** (0.05)  0.003** (0.02) 
Acquirer leverage -0.033 (0.30)  -0.040 (0.22)  0.021 (0.40)  0.023 (0.38) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.021 (0.61)  -0.009 (0.83)  0.043* (0.09)  0.050** (0.04) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.066 (0.37)  0.058 (0.44)  -0.044 (0.45)  -0.041 (0.49) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.287 (0.01)  0.286*** (0.01)  -0.147** (0.02)  -0.084 (0.12) 
Acquirer dividends 0.197 (0.20)  0.316** (0.04)  -0.082 (0.27)  -0.069 (0.36) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.021 (0.53)  -0.022 (0.51)  0.028 (0.28)  0.035 (0.17) 
Acquirer run-up 0.019 (0.36)  -0.011 (0.48)  0.037** (0.04)  0.039** (0.04) 
Relative transaction value -0.034*** (0.01)  -0.027** (0.02)  0.023*** (0.01)  0.022** (0.02) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.000 (0.99)  0.000 (0.97)  -0.006 (0.51)  -0.007 (0.44) 
Cash deal 0.003 (0.82)  0.004 (0.77)  -0.004 (0.65)  -0.004 (0.70) 
Stock deal -0.013 (0.25)  -0.015 (0.19)  -0.003 (0.75)  -0.003 (0.73) 
Competing offer 0.009 (0.67)  0.008 (0.69)  -0.011 (0.48)  -0.013 (0.42) 
Hostile -0.027 (0.50)  -0.027 (0.51)  0.026 (0.39)  0.028 (0.36) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes  
Observations    1,349     1,349     1,190     1,190  
Adjusted R2 0.08     0.08     0.07     0.07  
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Table 3.9 Regressions Analysis of Acquirer Returns and  
Efficiency of Internal Transfers 
 
This table examines whether the efficiency of internal transfers affects the relationship between coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and acquirer returns. The dependent variables are the eleven-day (-
5, +5) and three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date respectively. 
Efficiency of Internal Transfers is measure developed by Rajan et al. (2000) to estimate the overall efficiency 
of the cross-divisional transfers, the measure is defined as:  
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where Assetj is the book value of segment j, qj is the asset-weighted Tobin’s q using single-segment firms 
only in segment j,q is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s q for the firm, Ij is capital expenditure, 
ss is single-segment firms, wj is segment j’s proportion of the firm’s total assets (see text for more details). 
ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a 
merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger 
(see text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset 
– book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital 
expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total 
asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. 
Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. 
Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy 
variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition 
experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are 
financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal 
attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 CARs 
 
 (-5,+5)  (-1,+1)  
    Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.162 (0.20)  0.071 (0.46) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -0.919*** (0.01)  -0.685** (0.04) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q * Efficiency of Internal Transfers *100 0.578 (0.12)  0.669* (0.06) 
Efficiency of Internal Transfers -0.270 (0.71)  0.182 (0.75) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 2.551** (0.03)  2.094** (0.02) 
Acquirer assets -0.007*** (0.01)  -0.005*** (0.01) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.009*** (0.01)  -0.005*** (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage 0.028 (0.21)  0.005 (0.79) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.004 (0.87)  -0.039** (0.04) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.023 (0.65)  0.005 (0.89) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.009 (0.87)  -0.088** (0.04) 
Acquirer dividends 0.103 (0.55)  0.113 (0.38) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.020 (0.38)  -0.012 (0.49) 
Acquirer run-up -0.046*** (0.01)  -0.012 (0.10) 
Relative transaction value -0.035*** (0.01)  -0.033*** (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience -0.002 (0.80)  0.003 (0.66) 
Cash deal 0.016* (0.07)  0.014** (0.03) 
Stock deal -0.017** (0.04)  -0.019*** (0.01) 
Competing offer -0.021 (0.14)  -0.010 (0.37) 
Hostile -0.009 (0.74)  0.007 (0.75) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes  
Observations    1,349    1, 349  
Adjusted R2 0.05     0.09  
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Table 3.10 Changes in Operating Performance and Efficiency of Internal Transfers 
This table examines whether the efficiency of internal transfers affects the relationship between coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities and operating performance. Sample firms are matched with control 
firms based on industry, size and B/M ratio or the propensity score matching approach (see text for more details). 
The dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is the change in the merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from 
the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement to the fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA 
is the ratio of operating incomes to the book value of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA 
is its ROA minus the control firm’s ROA (see text for more details). Efficiency of Internal Transfers is measure 
developed by Rajan et al. (2000) to estimate the overall efficiency of the cross-divisional transfers, the measure 
is defined as:  
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where Assetj is the book value of segment j, qj is the asset-weighted Tobin’s q using single-segment firms only in 
segment j,q is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s q for the firm, Ij is capital expenditure, ss is 
single-segment firms, wj is segment j’s proportion of the firm’s total assets (see text for more details). 
ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. 
ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for 
more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of 
equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is 
income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by 
total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio 
of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative 
stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Relative transaction value 
is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ 
if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal announcement; 
if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal 
has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics 
are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. 
The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, 
**, and *. 
 
 ΔAdjusted_ROA 
 
Industry-, Size-, B/M Matching  Propensity Score Matching 
    Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.733*** (0.01)  0.250* (0.06) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -2.980** (0.02)  -3.049* (0.06) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q * Efficiency of Internal Transfers *100 -0.326 (0.55)  -0.079 (0.84) 
Efficiency of Internal Transfers 0.775 (0.46)  0.654 (0.49) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 3.963** (0.02)  13.944** (0.02) 
Acquirer assets 0.002 (0.68)  -0.002 (0.41) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.010*** (0.01)  0.004** (0.04) 
Acquirer leverage -0.035 (0.27)  0.021 (0.40) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.019 (0.64)  0.043* (0.09) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.061 (0.41)  -0.044 (0.46) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.284*** (0.01)  -0.145** (0.02) 
Acquirer dividends 0.235 (0.12)  -0.084 (0.25) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.021 (0.51)  0.028 (0.27) 
Acquirer run-up 0.018 (0.37)  0.037** (0.05) 
Relative transaction value -0.032*** (0.01)  0.023*** (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.000 (0.97)  -0.006 (0.51) 
Cash deal 0.004 (0.78)  -0.004 (0.66) 
Stock deal -0.014 (0.21)  -0.003 (0.75) 
Competing offer 0.010 (0.61)  -0.012 (0.45) 
Hostile -0.030 (0.45)  0.026 (0.38) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes  
Observations    1,349    1, 190  
Adjusted R2 0.08     0.07  
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Table 3.11A Acquirer Returns and Corporate Governance: 
Regression Analysis based on CARs (-5, +5) 
This table reports how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities and acquirer returns. The dependent variable, CARs (-5, +5), is the 
eleven-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date. ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF 
is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). 
Good_governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is well governed and zero otherwise. We 
use two measures of corporate governance: the presence of Blockholders and the G-index proposed by 
Gompers et al. (2003). A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it has a G-index <7, or if it has at least 
blockholder. Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book 
value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is 
capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses 
divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets 
divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months 
before the announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value 
of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the 
past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% 
in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one 
bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are 
measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions control for year 
and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 CARs (-5,+5) 
 Blockholders  G_Index 
 
Bad Governance 
 (1) 
 Good Governance 
 (2) 
 Bad Governance 
 (3) 
 
Good Governance 
 (4) 
    Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.223*** (0.16)  0.143*** (0.22)  0.068*** (0.59)  0.606** (0.05) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -6.055** (0.02)  -0.464 (0.24)  -3.068** (0.04)  3.041 (0.27) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 1.860 (0.36)  1.880 (0.18)  5.151 (0.54)  -14.629 (0.63) 
Acquirer assets -0.009* (0.07)  -0.006*** (0.01)  -0.003 (0.53)  -0.023 (0.14) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.006 (0.21)  -0.005*** (0.01)  -0.004 (0.32)  -0.028*** (0.01) 
Acquirer leverage 0.008 (0.87)  0.022 (0.37)  0.030 (0.53)  0.530** (0.02) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.018 (0.75)  -0.020 (0.49)  -0.036 (0.61)  0.466*** (0.01) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.099 (0.29)  -0.045 (0.48)  0.091 (0.56)  -0.565 (0.19) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure -0.036 (0.78)  0.001 (0.99)  0.130 (0.26)  1.017** (0.05) 
Acquirer dividends 0.113 (0.75)  0.156 (0.42)  -0.309 (0.40)  1.237 (0.24) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.054 (0.31)  -0.023 (0.35)  -0.023 (0.57)  -0.661** (0.02) 
Acquirer run-up -0.038 (0.12)  -0.028** (0.04)  -0.007 (0.79)  0.001 (0.98) 
Relative transaction value -0.030** (0.05)  -0.033*** (0.01)  -0.043* (0.06)  -0.102 (0.45) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.026 (0.61)  -0.007 (0.34)  0.002 (0.88)  0.063 (0.10) 
Cash deal 0.022 (0.34)  0.017* (0.06)  0.026* (0.06)  -0.031 (0.47) 
Stock deal -0.009 (0.60)  -0.013 (0.14)  -0.017 (0.24)  0.035 (0.45) 
Competing offer -0.034 (0.35)  -0.018 (0.20)  0.005 (0.82)  -0.070 (0.44) 
Hostile -0.009 (0.92)  -0.012 (0.66)  0.023 (0.54)  0.005 (0.98) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes  
Observations    387     962     292      66  
Adjusted R2 0.05     0.05     0.05     0.05  
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Table 3.11B Acquirer Returns and Corporate Governance: 
Regression Analysis based on CARs (-1, +1) 
This table reports how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities and acquirer returns. The dependent variable, CARs (-1, +1), is the 
three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date. ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF 
is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). 
Good_governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is well governed and zero otherwise. We 
use two measures of corporate governance: the presence of Blockholders and the G-index proposed by 
Gompers et al. (2003). A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it has a G-index <7, or if it has at least 
blockholder. Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book 
value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is 
capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses 
divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets 
divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months 
before the announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value 
of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the 
past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% 
in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one 
bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are 
measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions control for year 
and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 CARs (-1,+1) 
 Blockholders  G_Index 
 
Bad Governance 
 (1) 
 Good Governance 
 (2) 
 Bad Governance 
 (3) 
 
Good Governance 
 (4) 
    Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value     Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.066 (0.43)  0.028 (0.68)  -0.100 (0.24)  0.340 (0.32) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -2.061* (0.08)  -0.902 (0.39)  -1.945* (0.08)  0.033 (0.99) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 0.898 (0.39)  0.647 (0.33)  6.535 (0.45)  9.734 (0.76) 
Acquirer assets -0.003 (0.34)  -0.004*** (0.01)  0.001 (0.72)  -0.009 (0.58) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.008*** (0.01)  -0.002** (0.02)  0.001 (0.83)  -0.027** (0.02) 
Acquirer leverage 0.002 (0.95)  0.005 (0.74)  0.068** (0.03)  -0.196 (0.43) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.007 (0.81)  0.003 (0.87)  0.020 (0.67)  0.185 (0.22) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.037 (0.46)  -0.029 (0.43)  -0.007 (0.95)  0.381 (0.42) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.059 (0.39)  -0.053 (0.12)  0.031 (0.69)  0.277 (0.61) 
Acquirer dividends -0.157 (0.40)  0.248** (0.03)  0.096 (0.70)  -1.546 (0.21) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.030 (0.30)  0.008 (0.59)  0.002 (0.94)  0.111 (0.71) 
Acquirer run-up -0.001 (0.96)  -0.003 (0.65)  0.014 (0.39)  0.052 (0.32) 
Relative transaction value -0.015* (0.06)  -0.033*** (0.01)  -0.056*** (0.01)  -0.077 (0.58) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.034 (0.21)  -0.001 (0.78)  0.005 (0.55)  0.000 (0.98) 
Cash deal 0.027** (0.03)  0.011** (0.03)  0.013 (0.16)  0.022 (0.64) 
Stock deal -0.009 (0.36)  -0.015*** (0.01)  -0.012 (0.22)  0.064 (0.24) 
Competing offer -0.026 (0.19)  0.003 (0.76)  0.024** (0.08)  0.012 (0.90) 
Hostile -0.028 (0.52)  0.010 (0.53)  0.022 (0.39)  0.358 (0.17) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes  
Observations    387      962      292       66  
Adjusted R2 0.11     0.11     0.15     0.05  
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Table 3.12A Changes in Operating Performance and Corporate Governance: 
Regression Analysis using Industry-, Size-, and B/M Matching Approach 
This table reports how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and post-merger operating performances. Sample firms are matched with control firms 
based on industry, size and B/M ratio. (see text for more details). The dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is 
the change in the merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from the fiscal year prior to the merger 
announcement to the fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA is the ratio of operating incomes 
to the book value of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA is its ROA minus the control 
firm’s ROA (see text for more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional 
cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details). Good_governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the firm is well governed and zero otherwise. We use two measures of corporate governance: the presence of 
Blockholders and the G-index proposed by Gompers et al. (2003). A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it 
has a G-index <7, or if it has at least blockholder. Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of 
the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio 
of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital 
expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and development 
expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets 
divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the 
announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The 
following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior 
acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the 
deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal 
attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. 
The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 ΔAdj_ROA 
 Blockholders  G_Index 
 
Bad Governance 
 (1) 
 Good Governance 
 (2) 
 Bad Governance 
 (3) 
 
Good Governance 
 (4) 
  Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value   Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.015 (0.95)  -0.521*** (0.01)  0.024 (0.90)  1.460*** (0.01) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -5.915** (0.07)  -0.598 (0.19)  -3.412** (0.04)  -5.831 (0.47) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 8.630 (0.22)  2.180 (0.51)  19.678 (0.13)  8.906 (0.48) 
Acquirer assets 0.005 (0.60)  -0.005 (0.39)  0.001 (0.85)  -0.079*** (0.01) 
Acquirer  market-to-book -0.008 (0.15)  -0.004*** (0.01)  0.028*** (0.01)  -0.012 (0.34) 
Acquirer leverage -0.045 (0.56)  -0.024 (0.52)  0.065 (0.35)  0.794** (0.05) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.356*** (0.01)  0.045 (0.36)  -0.229** (0.03)  0.175 (0.51) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.048 (0.76)  0.062 (0.53)  0.059 (0.80)  0.725 (0.26) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.548*** (0.01)  0.225*** (0.01)  0.059 (0.73)  1.342* (0.07) 
Acquirer dividends 0.598 (0.22)  0.091 (0.58)  -0.128 (0.81)  1.551 (0.36) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.050 (0.55)  -0.015 (0.69)  0.023 (0.70)  -0.903* (0.06) 
Acquirer run-up 0.041 (0.54)  0.022 (0.51)  -0.040 (0.30)  -0.032 (0.64) 
Relative transaction value -0.013 (0.59)  -0.056*** (0.01)  -0.098*** (0.01)  -0.211 (0.28) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience -0.046 (0.56)  0.005 (0.69)  -0.008 (0.62)  0.139*** (0.01) 
Cash deal -0.009 (0.80)  0.002 (0.89)  -0.003 (0.87)  -0.020 (0.76) 
Stock deal -0.026 (0.37)  -0.013 (0.33)  -0.013 (0.51)  0.055 (0.46) 
Competing offer 0.038 (0.51)  0.005 (0.81)  -0.006 (0.85)  0.055 (0.71) 
Hostile -0.047 (0.72)  -0.011 (0.80)  0.005 (0.93)  0.042 (0.91) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes  
Observations    387       962     292         66  
Adjusted R2 0.09   0.08   0.13   0.08  
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Table 3.12B Changes in Operating Performance and Corporate Governance: 
Regression Analysis using Propensity Score Matching Approach 
This table examines how corporate governance affects the relationship between coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and post-merger operating performances. Sample firms are matched with control firms 
using a propensity score matching approach (see text for more details). The dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is 
the change in the merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement 
to the fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA is the ratio of operating incomes to the book value 
of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA is its ROA minus the control firm’s ROA (see text for 
more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a 
merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text 
for more details). Good_governance is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is well governed and zero 
otherwise. We use two measures of corporate governance: the presence of Blockholders and the G-index proposed 
by Gompers et al. (2003). A firm is classified as poorly-governed, if it has a G-index <7, or if it has at least 
blockholder. Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of 
equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is 
income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total 
asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of 
dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price 
return of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of deal 
value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any 
mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are 
financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one 
bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the 
fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects 
whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 ΔAdj_ROA 
 Blockholders  G_Index 
 
Bad Governance 
 (1) 
 Good Governance 
 (2) 
 Bad Governance 
 (3) 
 
Good Governance 
 (4) 
   Coef. p-value      Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value      Coef.   p-value 
Intercept 0.100 (0.73)  0.192 (0.46)  0.528 (0.28)  0.317 (0.83) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -2.200*** (0.01)  0.653 (0.25)  -7.992* (0.09)  -7.292 (0.24) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 3.887 (0.33)  -1.353 (0.61)  3.417 (0.49)  5.602 (0.67) 
Acquirer assets 0.004 (0.71)  0.006 (0.48)  -0.030 (0.18)  -0.006 (0.93) 
Acquirer  market-to-book 0.006 (0.34)  0.004 (0.13)  -0.022** (0.05)  0.002 (0.91) 
Acquirer leverage -0.005 (0.96)  0.073 (0.19)  -0.093 (0.41)  -0.253 (0.59) 
Acquirer cash flow 0.089 (0.19)  -0.006 (0.92)  0.247 (0.13)  0.178 (0.54) 
Acquirer capital expenditure -0.061 (0.71)  -0.080 (0.55)  0.061 (0.86)  0.220 (0.68) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure -0.381 (0.03)  -0.134 (0.21)  0.042 (0.87)  0.451 (0.63) 
Acquirer dividends -0.695 (0.18)  -0.061 (0.62)  -0.116 (0.88)  0.182 (0.94) 
Acquirer intangibility 0.036 (0.70)  0.011 (0.82)  0.094 (0.28)  0.255 (0.64) 
Acquirer run-up 0.035 (0.38)  0.150*** (0.01)  0.146*** (0.01)  -0.070 (0.50) 
Relative transaction value 0.029 (0.24)  0.054*** (0.01)  0.035 (0.47)  0.164 (0.51) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.029 (0.73)  -0.015 (0.35)  -0.039 (0.12)  -0.121 (0.12) 
Cash deal 0.036 (0.35)  -0.023 (0.22)  -0.031 (0.32)  -0.045 (0.68) 
Stock deal 0.061** (0.05)  -0.012 (0.49)  0.039 (0.21)  -0.096 (0.41) 
Competing offer 0.051 (0.42)  -0.005 (0.86)  0.055 (0.22)  0.212 (0.54) 
Hostile 0.177 (0.18)  0.003 (0.95)  -0.007 (0.93)  -0.427 (0.27) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes      Yes      Yes       Yes  
Observations   340      850      268        60  
Adjusted R2 0.07   0.09   0.09       0.06  
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Table 3.13 Heckman’s Two-stage Estimation: 
Regression Analysis of Acquirer Returns 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the second-stage regressions of Heckman’s two-stage 
estimation approach. The dependent variables are the eleven-day (-5, +5) and three-day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal returns centered on the announcement date respectively. ΔCoinsurance_Q is the 
change in coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. 
ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see 
text for more details). Asset is log of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total 
asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of 
debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital 
expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total asset. R&D expenditure is research and 
development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to total asset. 
Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the cumulative stock price return of 
the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Relative transaction value is ratio of 
deal value to acquirer market value of equity. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the 
probit estimates in Table 3.3 Panel A. The following dummy variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm 
makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition experience) before deal 
announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are financed 100% in 
stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal attitude is 
unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 1986 
and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 CAR 
 (-5,+5) (-1,+1) 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.099 (0.60) -0.182 (0.22) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -0.713*** (0.01) -1.062*** (0.01) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 2.102** (0.04) 2.182*** (0.01) 
Acquirer assets 0.000 (0.96) 0.001 (0.66) 
Acquirer market-to-book 0.001 (0.85) -0.002 (0.65) 
Acquirer leverage -0.001 (0.98) -0.012 (0.52) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.007 (0.76) -0.031 (0.12) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.012 (0.79) 0.016 (0.67) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure -0.017 (0.73) -0.081* (0.06) 
Acquirer dividends 0.057 (0.70) 0.116 (0.37) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.026 (0.20) -0.011 (0.52) 
Acquirer run-up -0.016* (0.08) -0.008 (0.28) 
Relative transaction value -0.024*** (0.01) -0.028*** (0.01) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience 0.030 (0.14) 0.033** (0.03) 
Cash deal 0.017** (0.03) 0.015** (0.02) 
Stock deal -0.016** (0.03) -0.020*** (0.01) 
Competing offer -0.018 (0.14) -0.011 (0.27) 
Hostile -0.013 (0.59) 0.007 (0.76) 
Lambda 0.064 (0.10) 0.062** (0.03) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects        Yes              Yes  
Observations        1, 349  1, 349  
Adjusted R2        0.04               0.09  
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Table 3.14 Heckman’s Two-stage Estimation: 
Regression Analysis of Operating Performance 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the second-stage regressions of Heckman’s two-stage 
estimation approach. In specification (1), sample firms are matched with control firms based on industry, 
size, and B/M ratio. In specification (2), sample firms are matched with control firms using a propensity 
score matching approach (see text for more details). The dependent variable, ΔAdjusted_ROA, is the 
change in the merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA from the fiscal year prior to the merger 
announcement to the fiscal year subsequent to the merger announcement. ROA is the ratio of operating 
incomes to the book value of total asset. The merged firm’s performance adjusted ROA is its ROA minus 
the control firm’s ROA (see text for more details). ΔCoinsurance_Q is the change in coinsurance across 
divisional investment opportunities induced by a merger. ΔCoinsurance_CF is the change in coinsurance 
across divisional cash flows induced by a merger (see text for more details).Asset is log of total assets. 
Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) 
divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by total asset. Capital expenditure is capital expenditures divided by total 
asset. R&D expenditure is research and development expenses divided by total asset. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to total asset. Intangibility is intangible assets divided by total assets. Run-up is the 
cumulative stock price return of the bidder over the six months before the announcement month. Relative 
transaction value is ratio of deal value to acquirer market value of equity. The following dummy 
variables take the value of one ‐ if a firm makes any mergers within the past three years (Prior acquisition 
experience) before deal announcement; if the deals are financed 100% in cash (Cash deal); if the deals are 
financed 100% in stock (Stock deal); if a deal has more than one bidders (Competing offer); if the deal 
attitude is unfriendly (Hostile). All firm characteristics are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
merger announcement date. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients 
are not reported for brevity. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The sample period is between 
1986 and 2010. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 ΔAdjusted_ROA 
 Industry-,Size-,and B/M Matching  Propensity Score Matching 
 (1)  (2) 
   Coef. p-value    Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.607** (0.03)  0.247 (0.28) 
ΔCoinsurance_Q -3.602*** (0.01)  -2.993** (0.04) 
ΔCoinsurance_CF 4.149** (0.02)  8.695*** (0.01) 
Acquirer assets -0.002 (0.77)  -0.003 (0.52) 
Acquirer market-to-book -0.013*** (0.01)  0.001 (0.79) 
Acquirer leverage -0.051 (0.30)  0.029 (0.29) 
Acquirer cash flow -0.011 (0.80)  0.049** (0.04) 
Acquirer capital expenditure 0.057 (0.44)  -0.048 (0.38) 
Acquirer R&D expenditure 0.289*** (0.01)  -0.129** (0.03) 
Acquirer dividends 0.242 (0.12)  -0.073 (0.28) 
Acquirer intangibility -0.020 (0.54)  0.027 (0.26) 
Acquirer run-up 0.014 (0.47)  0.038** (0.03) 
Relative transaction value -0.035*** (0.01)  0.019** (0.02) 
Acquirer prior acquisition experience -0.010 (0.68)  -0.016 (0.54) 
Cash deal 0.003 (0.80)  -0.006 (0.50) 
Stock deal -0.013 (0.25)  -0.003 (0.71) 
Competing offer 0.011 (0.59)  -0.007 (0.62) 
Hostile -0.028 (0.49)  0.024 (0.38) 
Lambda -0.023 (0.60)  -0.023 (0.63) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes      Yes  
Observations    1,349      1,190  
Adjusted R2    0.08     0.06  
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Chapter 4 
Corporate Diversification and the Cost of 
Debt: The Role of Product Market 
Competition 
 
 
 
  
4.1 Introduction   
A firm’s organizational form has important implications for its ability to obtain 
external financing. Researchers have, both theoretically and empirically, established a 
negative link between corporate diversification and cost of debt financing. As first 
argued by Lewellen (1971), the aggregation of imperfectly correlated earnings across 
segments creates coinsurance that decreases cash flow volatility and relaxes a firm’s 
financial status. Recent studies (Hann et al., 2013; Aivazian et al., 2015) show evidence 
that coinsurance reduces the cost of debt financing for diversified firms. However, the 
impact of product market competition on the cost of debt financing for diversified firms 
has remained unclear. The competitive landscape fundamentally affects a firm’s 
operating strategies and shapes its business environment. Since diversified firms are 
systematically different from single-segment firms (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et 
al., 2002), the product market competition is likely to influence diversified firms and 
single-segment firms differently, and consequently, affect the ‘diversification-cost of 
debt financing’ relationship. In this chapter we aim to examine the empirical impact of 
product market competition on the association between diversification and the cost of 
borrowing. In particular, we study whether product market competition amplifies or 
reduces the difference in bond spreads between diversified firms and their single-
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segment rivals, we also examine the mechanisms through which product market 
competition can affect the cost-reduction benefit of diversification.  
In this study, we focus on bonds in the primary debt market and use bond yield 
spreads over comparable treasury securities as our proxy for the cost of debt. We use at-
issue yield spread of bond offerings rather than the all-in-drawn spread of bank loans 
over LIBOR. We do so because the bond issuing-market is reported to be more liquid 
than the secondary market, which enhances price discovery. In two related studies, 
Chou et al. (2014) and France et al. (2016) argue that at-issue bond yield spread 
captures the cost of debt financing more accurately. According to Bao et al. (2011), 
illiquidity in the secondary market is the most important factor in the pricing decisions 
of debt securities and the liquidity premium component explains a sizable part of the 
volatility in bond spreads. Therefore, we choose publicly offered debt over private debt 
placements to mitigate the pricing influence of secondary market illiquidity.  
We identify three mechanisms through which product market competition can affect 
the relationship between diversification and the cost of debt financing. First, as firms are 
more vulnerable when competition intensifies, the coinsurance effect hypothesis 
(Lewellen, 1971) suggests that diversification helps to reduce the default risk for 
diversified firms by pooling complementary resources among segments. Moreover, 
coinsurance enables conglomerates to redistribute resources away from one segment to 
another and facilitate predatory pricing in the latter segment, thereby increasing market 
power (Villalonga, 2000). Thus, the coinsurance effect hypothesis predicts that the 
negative association between diversification and the cost of borrowing is stronger for 
firms facing greater competition. Second, diversified firms have the ability to transfer 
internal funds to the most promising segment (Stein, 1997; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002; 
Mathews and Robinson, 2008). If competition reshapes an industry, a diversified firm 
can shift resources away from a declining segment towards stronger segments, 
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depending on whether the intensifying competition undermines industry profitability or 
signals new investment opportunities. Since this form of “winner picking” is likely to be 
ex post efficient, we hypothesize that the product market competition amplifies the cost-
reduction benefit of diversification for firms with efficient internal capital markets. 
Third, Tirole (1988) and Bernheim and Whinston (1990) argue that diversification can 
create value in concentrated markets where a diversified firm can tacitly collude with its 
diversified rivals who compete with the former in multiple industries, thereby earning 
extra rents. Since tacit collusion loses its effectiveness when there are more players in 
the market, we hypothesize that intensifying competition mitigates the cost-reduction 
benefit of diversification for firms with relatively more multimarket contacts. Taken 
together, the discussions above suggest that product market competition can affect the 
relationship between corporate diversification and cost of debt financing through 
different channels, and hence, the net effect of competition is an empirical question.  
In this study we use a sample of 4,339 public bonds issued from 1986 to 2010. We 
find strong evidence that the negative relationship between corporate diversification and 
the cost of borrowing is stronger for firms in competitive industries. Following Valta 
(2012), we construct several proxies for the product market competition using the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index in three-digit SIC code industries. Our results show that 
the average borrowing cost of diversified firms operating in competitive (less-
competitive) industries is 60.8 (16.3) basis points lower than that of their single-
segment rivals. In the sample, this effect corresponds to cost savings of $1,264,640 
($339,040) per bond per year for an average firm. We find similar results when we use 
alternative measures of diversification. To alleviate the endogeneity concern of product 
market competition, we employ a quasi-natural experiment based on tariff rates. We use 
unexpected reductions of industry-level import tariff rates as an exogenous change in 
firms’ competitive environment. Unexpected tariff rate cuts lower barriers to 
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international trade, leading to rising penetration of foreign rivals and intensifying 
competition in domestic industries (Bernard et al., 2006). Using a large panel of tariff 
data for the manufacturing sector in the US, which spans from 1986-2005, we conduct 
difference-in-difference tests that specifically examine the bond spreads of diversified 
firms in the affected industries. We find that the difference in borrowing costs between 
diversified firms and single-segment firms is much bigger in industries experiencing 
large tariff cuts. We next replace the diversification proxies with a direct measure of 
coinsurance based on the firms’ cross-divisional cash flows (Duchin 2010). We split the 
sample into two groups based on their financial strength and find that the impact of 
competition on the diversification-cost of borrowing is stronger in financially 
constrained firms. Following Rajan et al. (2000), we construct a measure of the 
efficiency of internal transfers and find that product market competition affects the 
‘diversification-cost of borrowing’ relationship only in diversified firms who have an 
efficient internal capital market. We also compute the multimarket contacts of 
diversified firms and find that the diversification benefit disappears in diversified firms 
that have a high level of multimarket contacts. We use instrumental variables estimation 
and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation to address the potential endogeneity of 
diversification and find similar results. 
Our findings imply that bondholders are aware of the different characteristics in a 
diversified firm (e.g., financial constraints, efficiency of internal transfers and number 
of multimarket contacts), and respond accordingly to changes in the firm’s competitive 
environment. We find that product market competition increases the cost-reduction 
benefits of diversification in financially constrained firms and firms with efficient 
internal capital markets, but reduces the diversification benefit in firms with a high level 
of multimarket contact. 
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This study contributes to a growing body of research on the cost of debt financing 
for diversified firms. While there is a plethora of evidence on the relationship between 
diversification and shareholder value,
10
 there is limited evidence regarding the value 
consequences of diversification from the bondholders’ perspective except three recent 
papers. Hann et al. (2013) document a lower cost of capital for diversified firms because 
the coinsurance effect helps reduce the systematic risk. Aivazian et al. (2015) show that 
diversification lowers the cost of bank loans primarily through the coinsurance channel. 
Franco et al. (2016) document a greater diversification benefit in reducing bond yields 
when firms provide high-quality segment disclosures. Our study complements this 
strand of literature by investigating whether and how product market competition 
affects the relationship between diversification and the cost of borrowing.  
Secondly, our study adds to the debate on the costs and benefits of corporate 
diversification. Despite the substantial empirical literature in corporate diversification, 
there is still no consensus on its overall effect. Early studies suggest a loss in 
shareholder value due to diversification (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 
1995), generally referred to as the “diversification discount” by researchers. More 
recent studies throw doubt on the “diversification discount” (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 
2002; Graham et al., 2002) and argue for a diversification premium (Hadlock et al., 
2001; Villalonga, 2004a; Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; Tate and Yang, 2015; Anjos and 
Fracassi, 2015). Our evidence indicates that diversified firms have a lower cost of 
borrowing than single-segment firms, and the difference is even larger as competition 
intensifies. Therefore, we add to the debate over the value consequences of 
diversification from the perspective of bond investors.  
Thirdly, we contribute to an under-explored area of the conglomerate literature: the 
multimarket contacts in diversified firms. Yu and Cannella Jr. (2013) point out that 
                                                 
10
 For an excellent review, see Martin and Sayark (2003). 
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“diversification and multimarket competition are theoretically inseparable”. Although 
the multimarket competition and corporate diversification has been extensively studied 
independently, the interaction between these two is “significantly underexplored” (p.98).  
Their argument highlights the need to link the research of multimarket competition to 
the diversification studies. Hughes and Oughton (1993) find that multimarket contacts 
increases profitability using a sample of UK diversified firms in manufacturing sectors. 
Li and Greenwood (2004) use the Canadian insurance industry data and find that 
diversification can lead to superior performance through multimarket competition under 
certain conditions. However, to our knowledge, the empirical evidence on the 
integrative effects of multimarket contacts and cross-industry diversification is still 
scarce. This study adds to this area by showing that product market competition can 
undermine the tacit collusion in conglomerates with multimarket contacts, thereby 
decreasing the cost-reduction benefit of diversification in the bond market.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 reports 
our main findings. Section 5 addresses the endogeneity concern of product market 
competition. Section 6 investigates the channels through which product market 
competition affects the relationship between corporate diversification and the cost of 
debt financing. Section 7 addresses the potential endogeneity of corporate 
diversification and Section 8 concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
In this section, we identify three channels through which product market 
competition can amplify or reduce the cost-reduction benefit of corporate diversification.  
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4.2.1 The Coinsurance Effect Hypothesis 
Diversification matters when the external capital market is not frictionless. As first 
pointed out by Lewellen (1971), the aggregation of imperfectly correlated segment cash 
flows reduces the overall cash flow volatility in a diversified firm, leading to a lower 
probability of defaulting and higher debt capacity. This is recognized as the 
“coinsurance effect.” Hann et al. (2013) corroborates the coinsurance hypothesis by 
documenting a lower cost of capital for diversified firms because coinsurance helps 
avoid deadweight losses from financial distress. Valta (2012) argues that product 
market competition increases a firm’s default risk by reducing profits (Tirole, 2006), 
increasing cash flow volatility (Gaspar and Massa, 2006; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009), 
intensifying predation risk by rival firms (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Froot et al., 
1993), and affecting a firm’s liquidation value (Benmelech et al., 2005; Ortiz-Molina 
and Phillips, 2014). 
Taken together, we argue that creditors are sensitive to competitive risks and will 
value the benefit of the coinsurance effect of diversification in different industry 
environments. Friction in the market for external finance is likely to worsen in more 
competitive industries. Expenses will rise substantially as firms spend a significant 
amount on marketing and research. Profits fall and cash flows become more volatile. 
Such competitive pressures will disproportionately affect the stand-alone firms who rely 
more on the external financial market. In contrast, diversified firms have easy access to 
internal financing because they can pool their complementary resources. Since 
coinsurance brings forth additional debt capacity, diversified firms are less subject to 
credit rationing in the external capital market. Therefore, diversified firms are better off 
than single-segment firms when the product market competition increases. Moreover, 
coinsurance helps exercise market power because a diversified firm can employ the 
funds in one segment to facilitate predatory pricing in another, thereby strengthening 
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itself against its single-segment rivals. Increased market power deters potential 
competitors, reduces the cash flow volatility driven by intense competition, and 
consequently mitigates future earning uncertainty. Less uncertainty implies less 
monitoring costs for bondholders and hence a lower cost of borrowing. Thus, 
coinsurance provides competitive advantages for diversified firms, and the cost-
reduction benefit is greater in more competitive industries. We therefore present our 
first hypothesis as follows.  
H1: The coinsurance hypothesis predicts that the negative association between 
diversification and the cost of debt is stronger for firms facing greater product market 
competition. And the effect is more pronounced in financially constrained firms. 
4.2.2 The Efficient Internal Capital Market Hypothesis 
Researchers have proposed that the diversified firms’ headquarters, who have 
superior information than outside investors, can exercise decision control over capital 
allocation and promote investment efficiency by distributing internal resources to 
segments with better growth prospects (e.g., Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997; 
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). The ability of diversified 
firms to shift capital internally can be highly beneficial in tough competitive 
environments. If intensifying competition leads to a drop in profitability and investment 
opportunities in one segment in a conglomerate, the firm can redistribute resources to 
less-competitive segments where the returns are higher through the internal capital 
market. On the other hand, if intensifying competition signals greater profit potential in 
an industry, the relevant segment can obtain additional funds internally and effectively 
compete against or drive out rival firms by investing more in R&D or advertising, and 
consequently increase its market share and business profits. In either case, the 
conglomerate can engage in ‘winner picking’ through the internal capital market. 
Single-segment firms, in contrast, lack alternative investment opportunities or internal 
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financing when competition intensifies, and hence, are more vulnerable to changes in 
business conditions than diversified firms. Since diversified firms are able to respond 
more flexibly through internal capital markets when competition intensifies, they are 
expected to have lower default risks and hence lower cost of debt financing then single-
segment firms in these situations. Moreover, the precondition for a diversified firm to 
benefit from an internal capital market is that the transfers of funds are efficient. Just a 
clustering of stand-alone firms operating on their own does not lead to the 
diversification benefit. Therefore, we propose our second hypothesis.  
H2: The efficient internal capital market hypothesis predicts that the negative 
association between diversification and the cost of debt is stronger for firms facing 
greater product market competition. And the effect is more pronounced in firms with 
efficient internal capital markets. 
4.2.3 The Multimarket Contact Hypothesis 
When at least two companies are in direct competition with one another across 
several markets, this situation is referred to as multi-market contact (MMC) competition. 
This can lead to a phenomenon called “mutual forbearance” (Edwards, 1955). It implies 
that rivalry is reduced because a multimarket firm is less likely to use aggressive tactics 
when it assumes that its rivals can attack back in the market where the firm initiates the 
attacks, in the core market of the firm, or even in all of the markets shared by both firms 
(Gimeno, 1999).  
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) develop the formal models that link multi-market 
contact to tacit collusion (mutual forbearance). They demonstrate that a price reduction 
by one company may lead to a market wide price war in MMC competition, thus there 
are high incentives towards tacit collusion in such situations. Hughes and Oughton 
(1993) extend the MMC analysis to diversified firms and propose that the more 
industries shared by two conglomerates, the higher the likelihood of tacit collusion, thus 
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the greater potential for profitability. Tirole (1988) suggest that it is easier to maintain 
tacit collusion in markets with a small number of players.  
Therefore, we argue that diversification is value-enhancing in concentrated 
industries where multi-market contacts facilitate tacit collusion. However, as more 
players compete in the market and competition intensifies, tacit collusion fails and 
economic profits decline. As creditors are rational, the negative effect of the failure of 
tacit collusion should be reflected in the pricing of bonds issued by diversified firms 
facing intense competition. Therefore, we propose our third hypothesis. 
H3: The multimarket contacts hypothesis predicts that the product market 
competition undermines tacit collusion among diversified firms and hence can offset the 
negative association between corporate diversification and the cost of debt when 
product market competition intensifies. And the effect is more pronounced in firms with 
more multimarket contacts. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
We begin our sample selection process by collecting data on nonconvertible and 
fixed rate bonds issued by US firms between 1986 to 2010 from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) New Issue database via Thomson One Banker. The database provides 
information on bond characteristics including issue date, issue size, yield to maturity, 
coupon and credit ratings. This database has been widely used by researchers to study 
the cost of debt (Jiang 2008; Chou et al. 2014; Lamoureux and Nejadmalayeri 2015). 
We use the Compustat Segment file to collect a firm’s segment information, including 
the total number of segments, assets and sales per segment, and industry at the 3-digit 
SIC code level. We use the Compustat Industrial Annual file to collect firm-level 
financial information such as book assets, sales, market-to-book ratios, tangibles, and 
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leverage. We merge the bond data, Compustat Segment data, and Compustat Industrial 
Annual data to create our bond sample. Next we collect industry concentration ratios (at 
3-digit SIC code level) from the Hoberg-Phillips data library.
11
 We then combine our 
bond sample with the industry for each industry and year. 
We apply the following sample selection criteria: (1) we drop bonds with missing 
information on borrower ID (CUSIP), bond pricing, maturity and issuing size. (2) We 
require that the data be available for each firm in the Compustat Industry Annual file. (3) 
To measure firm diversification, we require that each firm have non-missing segment 
industry SIC code, sales and assets in the Compustat Segment file and Compustat 
Industrial Annual file. (4) Following the diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Duchin, 2010), we exclude firms in the financial sector and firms with financial 
segments (SIC code between 6000 and 6999). (5) We require that the difference 
between the total segment sales in a firm from the Compustat Segment file and the 
annual sales of a firm from the Compustat Industrial Annual file is within 1%. We 
winsorize the data to exclude outliers. The matching and screening procedure yields a 
final sample of 4,339 bonds issued from 1986 to 2010. Of the 4,339 bonds issued, 2,118 
were made by diversified firms.  
4.3.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the yield spread of a firm’s newly issued 
bond. It is collectively priced by the creditors and represents the risk premiums that 
firms are required to pay. The yield spread has been used as a measure of the cost of 
debt by a number of researchers (e.g., Sengupta 1998, Shi 2003; Jiang 2008; Crabtree 
and Maher, 2009). It is the difference between a bond’s yield to maturity at the time of 
                                                 
11
 We thank Gordon Phillips and Gerard Hoberg for providing access to their product market datasets.  
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issuance and a Treasury yield with equivalent maturity. Treasury yields are the interest 
rates paid for treasury securities issued by the US government with varying maturities 
of up to 30 years. Treasury securities are a low-risk investment option and are widely 
used as benchmark bonds because they are guaranteed by “the full faith and credit of the 
U.S. government” (the basics of treasury securities, 2016). The US Treasury publishes 
the Treasury yields on its website. Following Cremers et al. (2009), we collect the 
offered yields of treasury securities issued with maturities of 1 to 30 years from the H15 
release in the U.S Federal Reserve Board website. We linearly interpolate the offered 
yields of treasury securities issued within a term of 30 years. We use the 30-year 
Treasury benchmark if a treasury bond was issued with a term over 30 years. The yield 
spreads in our sample are expressed in percentage form. 
4.3.2.2 Proxies for Corporate Diversification 
Following the diversification literature (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Mansi and 
Reeb 2002; Aivazian et al., 2015; Franco et al., 2016), we construct three proxies for 
corporate diversification. First, we define a dummy variable, DIV3, which equals 1 if a 
corporation operates in multiple industry segments (at three-digit SIC code level) in a 
fiscal year and zero otherwise. Our second measure, NUMSEG, counts the number of 
three-digit SIC code industry segments disclosed by a firm. Our third measure, 
SALESHINDEX, is a modified Herfindahl index using segment sales data. It is defined 
as: 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡
2𝑁
𝑗=1 , where N is the number of 3-digit SIC segments of 
firm i in fiscal year t and 𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of sales in segment j to total sales. 
SALESHINDEX equals less than 1 for conglomerates and 0 for stand-alone firms. A 
higher value of SALESHINDEX implies a higher dispersion of sales across different 
segments and hence indicates a higher level of corporate diversification. 
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4.3.2.3 Proxies for Product Market Competition  
In this study, we construct proxies for the product market competition using the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is well-founded in the theory of industrial 
organization (Tirole, 1988) and widely used by researchers as a proxy for the intensity 
of industry competition (Mackay and Phillips, 2005; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Fresard, 
2010). The HHI measures the degree of industry concentration. It is calculated as the 
sum of squared market shares of each firm in an industry. The market share of each firm 
is the proportion of sales made by the firm. A lower value of HHI indicates stronger 
competition. 
Specifically, we construct four proxies for the intensity of product market 
competition. First, we follow Valta (2012) and use the industry level (3-digit SIC code) 
“fitted Herfindahl Hirschman Index” proposed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). The 
fitted HHI is the predicted value of industry concentration calculated from three 
databases: manufacturing HHI data from the Department of Commerce; employee data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Compustat public-firm-only HHI data.
12
 This 
index includes both private and public firms. The fitted HHI data is collected from the 
Hoberg and Phillips library website.
13
 The firm-level HHI for a diversified company is 
the weighted average of the segment HHI in the firm, with weights being the proportion 
of sales made by a segment. To allow for an intuitive interpretation, we categorize the 
industries by the degree of competition. We create a dummy variable Competition 
(Fitted HHI), which takes the value of 1 for firms with a HHI in the lowest tercile, and 
zero otherwise. As a second proxy, we first calculate the sales-weighted HHI for each 
industry using Compustat data. We then define a dummy variable, Competition 
                                                 
12
 The Compustat based HHI only covers public firms. The Department of Commerce Herfindahl data 
cover both public and private firms but only in the manufacturing industries. The BLS data cover number 
of employees per firm in both public and private firms in all industries. Therefore, the combination of the 
three databases is necessary to get a broader HHI that captures both public and private firms in all 
industries. Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) describe the construction of the fitted HHI. 
13
 We thank Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for providing the data. 
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(Compustat), which takes the value of 1 for firms with a Compustat based HHI in the 
lowest tercile, and zero otherwise. We also use the continuous version of the fitted HHI 
as our third proxy for competition. Our fourth proxy is the C4-Index (Compustat), 
which is defined as the proportion of sales made by the four biggest firms in the 
industry. 
4.3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics. Panel A of Table 4.1 provides the 
descriptive statistics for the set of firm-specific characteristics of bond issuers in the 
sample. The average borrowers have an asset size of $8.52 billion, a market-to-book 
ratio of 1.74, and leverage of 0.34. Overall, the sample is consistent with the earlier 
empirical evidence in related studies (Chou et al., 2014; Franco et al., 2016). 
Panel B of Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of bond-specific 
characteristics. The yield spread over LIBOR of the average bond in our sample is 
1.88%, with an average maturity of 12.28 years and issue size of $207.82 million. The 
average credit score for the bonds is 11, equivalent to a “BBB-” rating assigned by 
Standard and Poor’s. The statistics of the bonds in our sample are comparable to the 
findings in related studies (Qiu and Yu, 2009; Chou et al., 2014; Franco et al., 2016). 
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the measures of corporate 
diversification. About 49% of the sample bonds are issued by diversified firms. An 
average bond issuer in the sample has two business divisions and a modified sales-based 
Herfindahl index of 0.21. The sample is consistent with the evidence reported by 
Aivazian et al. (2015) and Franco et al. (2016). 
Panel D of Table 4.1 describes the proxies for the intensity of the product market 
competition. The average borrower in the sample has a fitted HHI of 0.062, a 
Compustat-based HHI of 0.15 and a Compustat-based C4-Index of 0.14. The evidence 
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here is comparable to the evidence presented by Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) and Valta 
(2012). 
 4.3.2.5 Empirical Methodology 
To investigate the impact of product market competition on the cost of borrowing 
for diversified firms, we follow Qiu and Yu (2009) and Chou et al. (2014) and utilize 
the following model: 
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Subscripts i and t indicate the borrower and the year of bond issuance. The 
dependent variable ti,y denotes the bond spread of firm i in year t, measured in 
percentage terms. The variable Competitioni,t-1 stands for the measure of product market 
competition. The variable Diversificationi,t-1 stands for measure of corporate 
diversification. The vector 1ti,Χ   controls for and firm-specific features, Bi,t  controls for 
bond-specific features, and tμ and j  are the year and industry fixed effects 
respectively. We focus on the interaction term Competition × Diversification. The 
coefficient on this interaction term indicates the difference in the impact of competition 
on the cost of borrowing between single-segment firms and diversified firms. In other 
words, it suggests how the product market competition affects the relationship between 
corporate diversification and the cost of borrowing.  
 Following the earlier research (Klock et al., 2005; Qiu and Yu, 2009), we include 
several firm-specific characteristic variables that are well-documented determinants of 
yield spreads. We measure firm specific variables at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
bond issuance. We use the logarithm of the firm’s book asset, denoted as Log(Asset), to 
capture the firm size. Bigger firms are more likely to obtain more favorable contract 
terms given that they are less risky. Therefore, firm size is expected to be negatively 
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related to bond spread. We use Market-to-book to capture a firm’s growth opportunities. 
It is computed as the market value of the firm (book asset ‒book value of equity + 
market value of equity) divided by the total assets. High-growth firms are usually more 
vulnerable to a deterioration of public finance, thus we expect market-to-book ratios to 
be positively related to bond spread. On the other hand, if high market-to-book ratios 
indicate greater earning potential, as noted by Fama and French (1995), it should have a 
negative association with bond spread. Leverage is the sum of current and long-term 
liabilities divided by total assets. Highly leveraged firms generally have higher default 
risk and, consequently, higher borrowing costs. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to 
total assets. High profitability suggests lower default risk and hence a lower yield 
spread. We follow Qiu and Yu (2009) and define firm risk as the volatility of annual 
operating cash flows (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization divided by total assets) in the five years prior to bond issuance. Firm risk 
represents earnings risk and is positively associated with bond spread. We also use 
Tangibility (net value of property, plant and equipment divided by total assets) to 
control for the potential collateral value and the liquidation value in case of a default. 
More tangible assets indicate a lower cost of debt. 
We also include several bond-specific characteristics in our models. Log (bond 
maturity) is the logarithm of years to maturity. Merton (1974) states that the effect of 
maturity on yield spreads can be ambiguous, depending on the firm risk. Flannery (1986) 
suggests that bonds with a longer maturity are expected to have a higher default risk, 
and hence higher borrowing costs. On the other hand, Helwege and Turner (1999) 
suggest that yield spreads can decrease with maturity because firms with lower risks 
tend to issue longer term bonds. Since our sample is a pool of bonds of varying credit 
quality, the impact of bond maturity on yield spread is inconclusive. Bond size is total 
amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. A larger issue size indicates a 
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heavier debt burden, a higher default risk and hence higher yield spreads. On the other 
hand, Sengupta (1998) suggests that yield spreads decline with issue size because bonds 
with larger issue amounts tend to be more liquid. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient 
on bond size is ambiguous. Rating is defined as the numerical S&P credit rating of the 
bond issuer. Ederington et al. (1987) and Ziebart and Reiter (1992) propose that credit 
ratings convey extra information about a firm’s default risk that is not captured by 
publically available information. We follow Qiu and Yu (2009) and translate the credit 
ratings into a numerical score,
14
 where lower values represent higher credit quality. As 
such, the variable Rating is expected to be positively associated with the yield spread.  
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Preliminary Evidence 
We begin our analyses by estimating two OLS models that relate the bond spreads 
to our proxies for corporate diversification and product market competition separately. 
Table 4.2 reports the coefficients of the regression on the relationship between 
diversification and the cost of borrowing. We find that the coefficients on our proxies 
for diversification are all significant and negative. The economic magnitude is nontrivial. 
For example, column 1 indicates that the average bond spread of conglomerates is 16.2 
basis points lower than single-segment firms. Column 2 suggests that one additional 3-
digit SIC segment in a firm decreases the borrowing cost by 7.8 basis points. Column 3 
implies that diversification reduces the borrowing costs of an average firm in the sample 
by 39.6 basis points when the Herfindahl index based on segment sales moves from 0 to 
1. The results are consistent with three related papers (Hann el al., 2013; Aivazian et al, 
2015; Franco et al., 2016).  
                                                 
14
  The conversion scheme is as follows: 1-AAA+, 2-AAA, 3-AA+, 4-AA, 5-AA–, 6-A+, 7-A, 8-A–, 9-
BBB+, 10-BBB, 11-BBB–, 12-BB+,13-BB, 14-BB–, 15-B+,16-B, 17-B–, 18-CCC+,19-CCC, 20-CCC–, 
21-CC, 22-C, and 23-D. 
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 Table 4.3 shows estimates from the regressions studying the effect of product 
market competition on the cost of borrowing. We construct four proxies for the intensity 
of competition. We find that competition increases the cost of debt financing. For 
example, column 1 indicates that the average bond spread for firms facing intense 
competition (fitted HHI in the lowest tercile) is 15.6 basis points higher than firms 
operating in less-competitive sectors. Column 2 reports similar results using the 
Compustat based HHI. In columns 3 and 4, we use two continuous measures of industry 
concentration, Fitted HHI and C4-Index (Compustat), in our regressions. Higher values 
imply greater market concentration in the industry and hence less competition. The 
coefficient on the C4-Index (Compustat) is insignificant. However, the coefficient on 
Fitted HHI is significantly negative, indicating that firms operating in more 
concentrated (less-competitive) industries obtain cheaper financing. Overall, we show 
that competition is positively related to the cost of borrowing, which is consistent with 
the evidence in Valta (2012).  
4.4.2 Differences in Bond Spreads: Partitions Based on Competition 
In this section we examine whether the intensity of competition affects the 
relationship between diversification and bond spread differently. We initially conduct a 
univariate analysis that partitions the entire bond sample into two subsamples. Firms are 
categorized into a competitive (less-competitive) industry group if their fitted HHI are 
in (above) the lowest tercile of the sample distribution. We further divide the 
subsamples by a firm’s degree of diversification based on three criteria: 1) single-
segment firms and diversified firms; 2) single-segment firms, diversified firms reporting 
two or three divisions and diversified firms reporting more than three divisions; 3) 
single-segment firms, diversified firms with a sales-based Herfindahl index between 0 
and 0.46, and diversified firms with a sales-based Herfindahl index between 0.46 and 1. 
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We use the median of the segment numbers (=3) and the median of sales-based 
Herfindahl index (=0.46) as the cut-off points for diversified firms.  
Table 4.4 presents the univariate analysis. First, in both competitive and less-
competitive groups, the bond spreads monotonically decrease with a firm’s degree of 
diversification, consistent with conglomerates having cheaper financing. More 
importantly, we observe that the negative effect of diversification on the cost of debt 
financing is much stronger for firms operating in competitive industries. For example, 
according to the “Diversification Indicator (DIV3)” panel, corporate diversification 
reduces the cost of borrowing by 103.5 (34.6) basis points in competitive (less-
competitive) industries. Second, within the subsample of competitive industries, we find 
that a higher degree of diversification leads to further reductions in the cost of 
borrowing. For example, in column 6 of the “Number of Industry Segments (NUMSEG)” 
panel, the difference in yield spread between a focused firm and a conglomerate 
reporting two or three segments is 87.3 basis points, and the difference increases to 
140.3 (87.3+53.0) basis points when the conglomerate expands into new industries and 
becomes more diversified. Both differences are statistically significant at 5% or lower 
based on a t-test. We find similar results in the “Industrial Herfindahl Index 
(SALESHINDEX).” In contrast, within the subsample of less-competitive industries, we 
do not find strong evidence suggesting that the cost-reduction benefit of diversification 
increases with the degree of diversification. Taken together, the findings indicate that 
diversification has greater implications for diversified firms operating in competitive 
markets.  
4.4.3 Baseline Empirical Results 
We next study the role of competition by estimating equation (1). In Table 4.5A we 
report the coefficient estimates using the proxy for competition based on the fitted HHI 
developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). We define a dummy variable Competition 
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(Fitted HHI) as equal to 1 if a firm is operating in competitive industries (fitted HHI 
value in the lowest tercile of sample distribution), and zero otherwise. We then interact 
the dummy variable with our three diversification measures. We find that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are significant and negative in all specifications, 
suggesting that the negative association between corporate diversification and the cost 
of borrowing is stronger for firms operating in competitive industries. For example, in 
column 1 of Table 4.5A, the coefficient on DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) indicates 
that diversification reduces the average bond spread by 16.3 basis points for 
conglomerates in less-competitive industries. In contrast, diversification reduces the 
spread by 60.8 (16.3+44.5) basis points for diversified firms in competitive industries. 
Given that the average bond spread in our sample is 1.8844% and average bond size is 
$208 million, the coefficient indicates a 32.3% reduction in average bond spreads. In 
cash terms, it corresponds to a cost saving of $1,264,640 for the average diversified firm 
in competitive industries.  
In Table 4.5B, we employ the Compustat-based HHI as another proxy for 
competition. We define a dummy variable, Competition (Compustat), that takes the 
value of 1 for firms operating in competitive sectors (Compustat-based HHI in the 
lowest tercile), and zero otherwise. The results in Table 4.5B are similar to the ones in 
Table 4.5A, supporting the theory that product market competition increases the cost-
reduction benefit of corporate diversification.  
In Table 4.5C, we use the fitted HHI in the regression analysis. The fitted HHI is a 
continuous value and it increases with industry concentration (less competition), and 
hence, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the diversification measures and 
fitted HHI are positive. For example, in Table 4.5C column 1, the coefficient on the 
DIV3 × Fitted HHI is 3.564, suggesting that a one standard deviation decrease in fitted 
HHI (more competition) leads to an additional reduction of 10 basis points in the cost of 
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borrowing for diversified firms, suggesting that firms operating in less concentrated 
(more competitive) industries benefit more from being diversified, which corroborates 
the prior findings.  
Finally, in Table 4.5D we utilize the C4-Index calculated from Compustat data. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms between the diversification measures and C4-Index 
(Compustat) are all positive and significant, which is consistent with the evidence in 
Table 4.5C. Overall, we show that the negative effect of diversification on the cost of 
borrowing is stronger for firms facing intense competition.  
 
4.5 Endogeneity of Product Market Competition 
4.5.1 A Quasi-Experiment: Import Tariff Cuts 
To alleviate the concern that firms are able to endogenously shift the competitive 
environment of an industry, we follow Valta (2012) and examine how bond spreads for 
diversified firms respond to an unanticipated reduction of import tariff rates. As widely 
discussed in the literature on trade barriers (Tybout, 2003), the competitive landscape of 
industries has undergone major changes as a result of trade openness and economic 
liberalization. Over the past dozens of years, the US government has gradually lowered 
trade barriers by substantially reducing trade costs, a large portion of which are import 
tariffs on a wide range of products (Andersen and Van Wincoop, 2004). Bernard et al 
(2006) demonstrate that diminishing trade barriers substantially intensify competition 
from foreign competitors. Therefore, import tariff cuts represent exogenous shocks to 
the competitive environment of a domestic industry which results in increased 
competitive pressure in domestic firms. A number of papers have used tariff reduction 
as a quasi-experiment to study the implications of product market competition (e.g., 
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Fresard, 2010; Bernard et al., 2011; Valta, 2012; Alimov, 2014; Fresard and Valta, 
2016). 
 We adopt the method used by Fresard (2010) in utilizing a series of large 
unexpected import tariff reductions at industry level. The US employs the “Harmonized 
System (HS)” established by “World Customs Organization (WCO)” as the basis for 
their “import and export classification systems”, where each product imported to the US 
is assigned a 10-digit number HS code (Harmonized system, 2016). Early researchers 
(Feenstra, 1996; Feenstra et al., 2002; Pierce and Schott, 2009; Schott, 2010) have 
gradually compile the import data and link tables that convert the HS code into 4-digit 
SIC code covering a period from 1974 to 2005. Based on the prior work above, Fresard 
and Valta (2016) compile the industry-year tariff data at the 4-digit SIC code level. 
They compute the tariff rates as the ratio of total customs duties to the Free-on-Board 
(FOB) cost of imported products. We obtain the tariff rates data from Laurent Fresard 
and Philip Valta’s webpage.15 The dataset covers 508 manufacturing industries for the 
period from 1974 to 2005, 133 of which are matched to Compustat. Since the tariff rates 
data is compiled at 4-digit SIC industry level, we re-construct our proxies for 
diversification at the 4-digit SIC industry level. 
The tariff data only includes manufacturing industries, so we restrict our study to 
those industries and require that all the segments of a firm are classified as 
manufacturing industries (SIC code 2000-3999). Next, for each industry, we compare 
the annual tariff change to the average change in tariff rates over the period from 1986 
to 2005. Following Fresard (2010), Valta (2012), Fresard and Valta (2016), we define a 
large tariff cut as a reduction exceeding three times the mean absolute change 
experienced by the industry in the time series data. Since there was a change in the 
coding system for import products in 1989, we neglect the tariff changes between 1988 
                                                 
15
 We thank Laurent Fresard and Philip Valta for providing the data.  
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and 1989, as suggested by Fresard (2010). To ensure that the observed cut is not a 
transitory anomaly, we exclude tariff cuts that are offset with an equally large raise in 
rates over the following three year period. For a diversified firm, if at least one of its 
segments underwent a tariff cut in a given year, the firm is considered to have 
experienced a tariff cut in the corresponding year.  We next merge the tariff data with 
our bond sample.  After merging the tariff dataset with our bond sample, we are left 
with 1,414 observations from 1986 to 2005. There are 8 years in our sample identified 
as a tariff cut year. The cuts do not cluster in any specific year. About 2.33% of the 
observations in the sample are identified to have experienced a tariff cut event, the ratio 
is similar to that in Fresard (2010). Fresard (2010) also demonstrates that tariff 
reductions are associated with a sharp rise in imports in the affected industries, which 
justifies the validity of using tariff cuts as a shock to the competitive environment. 
4.5.2 Tariff Rate Cuts and Cost of Debt for Diversified Firms  
To examine the impact of large tariff cuts on the relationship between corporate 
diversification and the cost of borrowing, we follow Fresard (2010) and Swanburg 
(2014) and utilize the following difference in difference estimation:  
tj,i,tjti,5
1ti,4-1ti,-1tj,3
-1ti,2-1tj,1ti,
εμηBβ
ΧβationDiversificTariffCutβ
ationDiversificβTariffCutβαy



                      (2) 
Subscripts i is the firm, j is the industry and t is the year of bond issue. ti,y
represents the yield spreads of bonds issued by firm i; and Diversification stands for 
proxies for corporate diversification. We re-construct our proxies for diversification at 
the 4-digit SIC industry level. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry 
j  underwent a tariff cut in year t-1, and zero otherwise. The vector Xi,t-1 and Bi,t 
represents firm- and bond-specific characteristics. We also include industry fixed effects 
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( j ) and year fixed effects ( t ). Our focus is the coefficient on the interaction term, 
Tariff Cut × Diversification, 3 , which indicates the effect of diversification on the cost 
of borrowing in times of unexpectedly intensified competition.   
We show the regression results in Table 4.6A. We find that coefficients on the 
interaction term Tariff Cut × Diversification are all negative and significant at 5% or 
lower. For instance, column 2 suggests that, in times of sudden tariff cuts, the gap in 
yield spreads between a single-segment firm and a diversified firm widens by 56.2 basis 
points with the diversified firm expanding into one more industry. This is consistent 
with our earlier findings, supporting that the negative impact of diversification on the 
cost of borrowing is stronger for firms facing increased competition.  
In Table 4.6B and 4.6C, we conduct robustness checks using an alternative 
definition for tariff cuts. In Table 4.6B (4.6C), Tariff Cut is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the tariff reduction in a given year is three (two) times larger than the median tariff 
reduction in the same industry during the sample period. In both tables, we find that the 
coefficients on the interaction terms between diversification and tariff cuts are 
significant and negative when we use a dummy variable (DIV4) to proxy for 
diversification, or when we use the sales-based Herfindahl index (SALESHINDEX) to 
proxy for diversification. Overall, after addressing the potential endogeneity of 
competition in a quasi-experimental setting, we continue to find evidence that the 
negative relationship between diversification and the cost of borrowing is stronger for 
firms facing intense competition.  
4.6 Possible Channels 
Our findings suggest that product market competition increases the cost-reduction 
benefit of diversification. We then conduct a closer examination of the channels through 
which competition can affect the relationship between diversification and the cost of 
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borrowing. Specifically, we test the coinsurance effect hypothesis, the efficient internal 
capital market hypothesis and the multimarket contact hypothesis. We examine whether 
the effect of competition depends the firm’s financial strength, the efficiency of internal 
transfers, and the level of multimarket contacts.  
4.6.1 The Coinsurance Channel 
In this section, we test our first hypothesis that the cost of debt financing will be 
more negatively associated with diversification when competition intensifies because 
coinsurance facilitates diversified firms to mitigate financial market frictions and create 
comparative advantage over single-segment firms. Since the benefit of the coinsurance 
derives from the firm’s cross-segment cash flow correlations, we replaced our proxies 
for corporate diversification with a direct measure of the coinsurance effect on cash 
flows in the equation. 
We construct our measure of the coinsurance effect in cash flows using Duchin’s 
(2010) method. The measure quantifies the reduction in cash flow volatility due to the 
coinsurance effect. We define cash flow as earnings less interest and taxes, divided by 
total assets. For each 3-digit code industry, we use the median cash flows of all single-
segment firms as the industry cash flow. We then estimate the industry cash flows 
volatility, defined as the standard deviation of industry cash flows over the sample 
period rolling from year 10t- to .t-1  We require a minimum of five years of non-missing 
observations within the rolling window. This reduces our sample size from 4,339 to 
4,290. Next we estimate the cash flow correlation across all 3-digit SIC code industries. 
The firm-level inter-segment cash flow volatility of a diversified firm in fiscal year t, 
denoted by tσ(CF) , is computed as follows: 

 

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where N      is the number of segments in a diversified firm. 
   tiCF ,)( ))(( ,tjCF   is the volatility of cash flows of industry i (industry j). We use the 
average series over the prior ten years [t-10, t-1] to calculate the rolling 
volatilities for year t. 
jiCF ,)(  is the correlation between the cash flows in industry i and industry j. 
iw )( jw  is the weighting of segment i (segment j) in a diversified firm, which is 
the ratio of the segment’s assets to the total assets of the firm.  
 
The coinsurance across segment cash flows, denoted tCOIN_CF , is calculated as 
the difference between the volatility in equation (3) and a hypothetical measure of 
volatility that assumes a correlation of one (perfect correlation) among the cash flows in 
all segments. 
      t
N
1i
tj,
N
1j
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                              (4) 
The variable measures the reduction in cash flow volatility due to the imperfectly 
correlated divisional cash flows. The variable is positive for diversified firms and zero 
for single-segment firms. A higher value of te_CFCoinsuranc  indicates a stronger 
coinsurance effect in cash flows.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that the value of a firm is unaffected by how it is 
financed in a frictionless capital market. Less financially constrained firms can rely on 
the external capital market without incurring deadweight losses from credit rationing 
and hence, the degree of diversification will not be a concern. On the other hand, 
coinsurance help increase debt capacity, thus it would be valuable to financially 
constrained firms. This suggests that the coinsurance effect of cash flows should 
stronger for firms with costly external financing. Therefore, if coinsurance generates a 
larger cost-reduction benefit for diversified firms facing greater competition, we should 
expect a stronger effect in financially constrained firms.  
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To examine this conjecture, we split our sample and repeat the regression analysis 
separately for financially constrained and less-constrained firms. We employ four 
measures of financial constraints as follows. 
1. SA index: Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that size and age are powerful 
predictors of a firm’s financial strength. Young and small firms are generally more 
financially constrained than mature ones. Therefore, we use the SA index
16
 as our first 
measure of financial constraints. The higher the SA index, the more constrained the firm. 
We calculate the firm-year SA index and classify a firm as financially constrained (less 
constrained) if the firm has an above (equal to or below) median SA index in the sample 
distribution. 
2. WW index: Whited and Wu (2006) develop the WW index to measure financial 
constraints. Firms that are small, grow slowly, generate less cash flow and use more 
equity financing tend to have higher WW indices. For a given firm, we computed the 
WW index
17
 for each fiscal year and categorize it into the financially constrained (less-
constrained) group if they have an above (equal to or below) median WW index in the 
sample distribution.   
3. Pay-out ratios: Fazzari et al. (1988) suggest that financially constrained firms 
tend to pay lower dividends to shareholders. We calculate the pay-out ratios as the sum 
of the dividends and stock repurchases divided by the total assets to proxy for financial 
                                                 
16
 The SA index calculated as (−0.737 × Assets + 0.043 × Assets2 − 0.040 × Age), where Assets is the 
natural log of inflation-adjusted book assets that is capped at $4.5 billion, and Age is the number of years 
a firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat and is capped at 37 years. 
 
17
 The WW index is calculated as (0.091 × Cash Flow ‒ 0.062 × Dividend Dummy + 0.021 × Long Term 
Debt ‒ 0.044 × Size + 0.102 × Industry Sales Growth ‒ 0.035 × Firm Sales Growth). Cash Flow is 
defined as (operating income plus depreciation) / beginning-of-year book assets. The Dividend Dummy is 
a variable indicating positive preferred or common dividends. Long Term Debt is calculated as (book 
value of long term debt) / current book assets. Size is calculated as the log of inflation adjusted assets. 
Industry sales growth is defined as the most recent annual percentage change in inflation-adjusted three-
digit industry sales. Firm sales growth is the firm’s most recent annual percentage change in inflation-
adjusted sales. 
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constraints. We assign a firm to the financially constrained (less-constrained) group if 
its pay-out ratio is less (more) than the mean pay-out ratio in the sample distribution. 
4. Investment-grade vs speculative-grade rating: Based on a CFO survey aiming to 
investigate firms’ liquidity management during the 2008 financial crisis, Campello et al. 
(2010) find that credit ratings are the most representative measure of financial 
constraints. Thus, we use credit ratings as our fourth measure of financial constraints. 
Following Hann et al. (2013), we categorize a firm as financially constrained or less-
constrained based on whether the firm’s S&P credit rating is below BBB (speculative-
grade) or BBB and above (investment-grade).  
We present our results in Table 4.7A-4.7D. First, we find that the coinsurance 
effect in cash flows reduces the borrowing cost for diversified firms within the 
financially constrained subsamples. For example, in column 5 and 6 of Table 4.7A, a 
one-standard deviation increase in the coinsurance effect in cash flows leads to a 8.93 
(18.8) basis point reduction in the cost of debt for less-financially-constrained 
(constrained) firms. Second, and more relevant to our study, we show that the 
coefficients on the interaction term COIN_CF × Competition are significant and 
negative (positive for the competition measures using continuous version of HHI) only 
in the subsamples of financially constrained firms, indicating that competition affects 
the relationship between corporate diversification and bond spread for financially 
constrained firms. Moreover, there is a notable pattern worth mentioning. Across the 
constrained subsamples, the coefficients on COIN_CF are either insignificant or very 
small compared to the coefficients on COIN_CF × Competition, indicating that a large 
portion of the coinsurance benefit goes to the diversified firms that operate in 
competitive industries. For example, in column 8 of Table 4.7B, the coinsurance effect 
is absent (not significant) for financially constrained conglomerates operating in less-
competitive industries, in contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the coinsurance 
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effect corresponds to a 32.7 basis point reduction in the cost of borrowing for 
financially constrained conglomerates operating in competitive industries. This 
translates into an annual cost saving of $680,160 for an average firm in our sample. In 
Table 4.7C and 4.7D, we find consistent and more pronounced results when we use the 
continuous version of HHI as proxies for product market competition. Overall, the 
findings above support our coinsurance hypothesis. 
4.6.2 The Efficiency Internal Capital Market Channel 
In this subsection, we examine whether an efficient internal capital market 
facilitates further reduction in borrowing costs for diversified firms facing greater 
product market competition in comparison to their single-segment rivals.  
Since the efficiency of inter-segment transfers within a diversified firm cannot be 
observed directly, we follow Rajan et al. (2000) and construct a proxy for the efficiency 
of inter-segment transfers. First, we compute the cross-divisional transfers within a 
diversified firm:   
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where j is segment j, ss represents single-segment firms,  jI is capital expenditure, 
jAsset is the segment j’s asset, jw  is segment j’s asset divided by firm total asset, and 
ss
j
ss
j
Asset
I
  is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure-to-asset ratio using only 
single-segment firms in segment j.   
Next, we compute the efficiency of internal transfers. The measure is developed by 
Rajan et al. (2000) and is computed as follows:   
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where q  is the asset-weighted average of segment Tobin’s Q, jq is the asset-weighted 
Tobin’s Q ratio using only single-segment firms in segment j. The variable is referred to 
as the “relative value added by allocation” by Rajan et al. (2000) because it indicates 
the overall value created by the internal allocation policy of a diversified firm. A higher 
value of the measure suggests greater efficiency of internal transfers made by a 
diversified firm. The measure is zero for single-segment firms. 
Next we split the diversified firm sample into two subsamples based on the 
efficiency measure. We assign a diversified firm to the inefficient (efficient) subsample 
if the firm has a negative (positive) efficiency value. We then compare them separately 
with the single-segment firms. Table 4.8A-4.8D reports the regression results. We find 
that, within the subsamples of inefficient-transfers, none of the coefficients on the 
interaction term Diversification × Competition are significant, except in column 1 of 
Table 4.8A. In contrast, within the subsamples of efficient-transfers, the coefficients on 
the interaction term Diversification × Competition are all significant and negative 
(positive for the competition measures using a continuous version of HHI), except in 
column 4 of Table 4.8D. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the ability to 
efficiently distribute resources across divisions is a necessary condition for product 
market competition to affect the negative diversification-cost of borrowing relationship. 
Without an efficient allocation policy, conglomerates in competitive industries do not 
benefit more from diversification than their single-segment rivals. Moreover, across the 
subsamples of efficient transfers, the coefficients on Diversification are either 
insignificant or much smaller than the coefficients on Diversification × Competition, 
indicating that a large portion of the efficient ICM benefit goes to the diversified firms 
that operate in competitive industries. For example, in column 2 of Table 4.8B, the 
diversification effect is absent (not significant) for efficient conglomerates operating in 
less-competitive industries, in contrast, the diversification effect leads to a 52.1 basis 
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point reduction in the cost of borrowing for efficient conglomerates operating in 
competitive industries. It implies that in competitive industries, an efficient ICM brings 
about an annual cost saving of $1,083,680 for an average firm in our sample. Overall, 
the findings support our efficient internal capital market hypothesis.  
4.6.3 The Multimarket Contact Channel 
So far, we do not find evidence suggesting that product market competition can 
mitigate the cost-reduction benefit of diversification. However, in the regressions using 
the number of business segments as a diversification proxy, the coefficients on the 
interaction term NUMSEG × Competition are not always significant (see Table 4.5C 
column 2; Table 4.6A-4.6C column 2; Table 4.8D column 4). Intuitively, as the number 
of business segments increase, a diversified firm is more likely encounter the same rival 
in more than one industry, thus the possibility of tacit collusion increases. As argued in 
section 4.2.3, a higher level of product market competition may undermine tacit 
collusion. Therefore, if the negative impact of multimarket contact offsets the positive 
impact of coinsurance and efficient internal capital markets, the coefficients on the 
interaction term NUMSEG × Competition may be insignificant. Thus, in this section, we 
investigate whether multimarket contacts undermine the cost-reduction benefits for 
diversified firms facing greater product market competition. 
We follow prior literature (e.g., Gimeno and Woo, 1999; Gimeno and Jeong, 2001; 
Dominguez et al., 2016) and construct a simple count measure of multimarket contacts 
for each firm-year as follows: 

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 MMCAverage                               (7) 
where MMCij is the number of industries where firm i and its multimarket rival j meet 
each other in fiscal year t, and No. of j is the total number of rival firms that meet firm i 
in at least two industries. For instance, if a diversified firm is competing with two rivals 
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and meets the first in two industries and the second in three industries in a fiscal year, 
the measure of multimarket contact would be 2.5 ([2+3]/2). By construction, the 
minimum value of MMC is two for a diversified firm that has multimarket rivals. We 
report the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 Panel A. In our sample, 2,118 bonds were 
issued by diversified firms, 65.5% (1,388/2,118) of which were issued by those having 
at least one multimarket rival.  
Researchers have argued that there is a MMC threshold above which tacit collusion 
can be effective (e.g., Baum and Korn, 1999; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000; 
Fuentelsaz and Gómez, 2006). When the MMC is small, retaliatory attacks are not yet 
significant enough to deter multimarket rivals from acting aggressively. After reaching a 
certain point of MMC, competitive interconnections become strategically important and 
facilitate tacit collusion. Therefore, we expect that, among the diversified firms that 
have multimarket contacts, the negative impact of product market competition is more 
likely to be found in the diversified firms that have a high value of MMC.  
Thus, we split the sample of multimarket firms into two groups based on the value 
of MMC. We assign a diversified firm into the high (low) MMC group if the firm has a 
MMC above (equal to or below) the median value of MMC in the sample. We then 
compare them separately with the single-segment firms. Table 4.9A-4.9D provide the 
results. 
We find that the coefficients of the interaction term Diversification × Competition 
are significant and negative (positive for the competition measures using continuous 
version of HHI) only in the subsamples of low MMC. For example, column 4 of Table 
4.9A indicates that, for diversified firms with a low value of MMC (a situation where 
there is low possibility for tacit collision), with the diversified firm operating in one 
more segment, the gap in yield spreads between a single-segment firm and a diversified 
firm widens by 17.2 basis points when competition intensifies. In contrast, based on 
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column 3 of Table 4.9A, for diversified firms with a high value of MMC (high 
possibility for tacit collision), the diversification benefit disappears, implying that as 
competition intensifies, the negative effect of multimarket contacts (tacit collusion falls 
apart in the presence of intense competition) offsets the positive effect of coinsurance 
and efficient internal capital markets. Consequently, diversified firms no longer obtain 
cheaper financing than their single-segment rivals. We find similar results in Table 
4.9C-4.9D. Overall, the evidence supports our multimarket contact hypothesis. 
4.7 Robustness Check 
In section 4.5 we addressed the endogeneity of product market competition. 
However, another concern in our regression specification is the endogeneity of 
diversification, that unobservable factors may affect both the diversification decision 
and the cost of borrowing. Although the diversification measures, NUMSEG and 
SALESHINDEX, capture the degree of diversification and partially mitigate the concern, 
in this section we implement two additional robustness tests to address the endogeneity 
concern.  
4.7.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation 
We initially use the two-stage instrumental variable estimation. Following Campa 
and Kedia (2002) and Aivazian et al. (2015), we use PNDIV and PSDIV as exogenous 
variables to predict the probability that a firm choose to engage in diversification. 
PNDIV is the fraction of the number of firms that are diversified in the same 3-digit SIC 
industry (excluding the sample firms). PSDIV is the fraction of sales made by 
diversified firms in the same industry (excluding sample firms). These two variables 
capture the attractiveness of an industry to diversified firms and are widely used by 
researchers to generate the instrument for diversification (see Dimitrov and Tice, 2006; 
Hann et al., 2013). Since we exclude sample firms from the computation, these two 
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variables are less likely to be correlated with unobservable factors that might be related 
to both diversification and the cost of borrowing. In implementing the IV process, we 
first regress the diversification proxy DIV3, which is a dummy variable, on PNDIV and 
PSDIV together with other control variables in equation (1). The predicted probability 
of diversification is the generated instrument. We report the coefficient estimates of the 
first-stage regressions in column 1-4 of Table 4.10. We show that the coefficients of 
PNDIV and PSDIV are both positive and significant. In the next stage, we follow 
Dimitrov and Tice (2006) and combine the instruments for DIV3 with Competition 
measures and use them to generate the instrumental variables for DIV3 × Competition. 
We then repeat our estimation of equation (1) using the instrumented proxies. We report 
the second-stage regression results in Column 1-4 of Table 4.11A. We observe that the 
coefficients on the instrumented variables DIV3 × Competition are similar to the early 
results reported in column 1 of Table 4.5A-4.5D and statistically significant.  
Franco et al. (2013) state that PNDIV and PSDIV qualify as instruments as long as 
the characteristics of the industries appealing to diversified firms (e.g., industry credit 
risk) do not affect the borrowing costs of individual firms. To address this concern, we 
follow Franco et al. (2013) and use a modified version of PNDIV and PSDIV. We re-
calculate these two variables using diversified firms who have a leverage ratio less than 
5% or at least an “A-” S&P credit rating. The diversification propensity of firms with 
very low credit risk is unlikely to be correlated with bond spreads, and hence, is a valid 
instrument. Column 5-8 of Table 4.10 reports the results of the first-stage regression 
results. We show that the coefficients on PNDIV_Modified and PSDIV_Modified remain 
positive and significant. We repeat the second-stage IV analysis using the modified 
instruments and report the results in Table 4.11B Column 1-4. We continue to find that 
the coefficients of DIV3 × Competition are significantly negative (positive for the 
competition measures using continuous version of HHI).  
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4.7.2 Heckman’s (1979) Two-Stage Estimation 
We employ Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to address self-selection. First, as 
in the first-stage analysis of the instrumental variable process, we run a probit model for 
the likelihood that a firm may decide to diversify. We calculate the inverse Mills ratio 
(Lambda) from the probit regression and include it in the second-stage estimation as an 
additional explanatory variable. We present the coefficient estimates of the second-stage 
regressions in column 5-8 of Table 4.11A and Table 4.11B. We find that the 
coefficients on the interaction term DIV3 × Competition are similar to the prior findings 
in this study, both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, column 6 of Table 
4.11A indicates that the product market competition widens the gap in yield spreads 
between single-segment firms and diversified firms from 36.5 basis points to 79.3 
(0.365+0.428) basis points. Overall, the evidence corroborates our main findings after 
controlling for endogeneity. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the impact of product market competition on the association 
between diversification and the cost of borrowing. We formulate three hypotheses based 
on the coinsurance effect, the efficient internal capital markets and the multimarket 
contacts in diversified firms. We find that the negative association between 
diversification and the cost of debt financing is stronger when there are high levels of 
product market competition. We exploit a quasi-experiment by using the tariff rate cuts 
as exogenous shocks to the competitive environment. We show that our findings are 
unlikely to be driven by endogenous competition strategies. We find that the impact of 
competition on the diversification-cost of borrowing relationship is stronger in firms 
that are financially constrained or make efficient cross-divisional transfers. However, 
the impact of competition is mitigated in diversified firms with relatively more 
multimarket contacts. Our results indicate that the cost-reducing effect of coinsurance 
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and efficient internal capital markets dominate the cost-increasing effect of multimarket 
contacts. We use instrumental variables estimation and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage 
estimation to address the potential endogeneity of diversification and continue to find 
consistent results. This study provides unique evidence that product market competition 
affects the relationship between diversification and the cost of borrowing. In particular, 
we show that bondholders take into consideration how the competitive landscape of an 
industry interacts with the potential benefits and costs of diversification and how such 
interactions ultimately affect the cost of borrowing for diversified firms. Although 
intense competition may undermines the benefit of multimarket contacts in some cases, 
overall, the negative association between diversification and the cost of debt financing 
is stronger when product market competition intensifies.  
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics. This sample consists of 4,339 bonds issued by US firms from 1986 to 
2010. Asset is book value of total assets (in billions). Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – 
book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows from 
operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) 
over the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to 
total assets. COIN_CF is the cash-flow coinsurance measure, constructed following Duchin (2010). Efficiency of 
transfers is the overall efficiency of internal transfer of a diversified firm, constructed following Rajan et al. 
(2000). MMC is the average number of industries shared by a diversified firm and its multimarket rivals (see text 
for more details). Bond spread is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to 
maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. Maturity is the bond’s 
maturity in years. Issue proceeds is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the 
numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. DIV3 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. 
NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX 
is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. 
Fitted HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at 3-digit SIC code level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). It is a 
measure of industry concentration that covers private and public firms in all industries by combing Compustat 
data with Herfindahl data from the Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). Competition (Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is in the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. 
Compustat HHI is sales-weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman for each industry using Compustat data only. 
Competition (Compustat) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed based on 
Compustat data is in the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. C4-Index (Compustat) is 
the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry based on Compustat data. For a diversified 
firm, the firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code level). 
 
Panel A:  Firm Characteristics       
 
N    Mean   Median  Std. Dev. 25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
Asset  (in billions) 4339 8.5174 3.6217 13.1924 1.2024 10.1616 
Market-to-Book 4339 1.7420 1.4748 0.8824 1.2070 1.9506 
Leverage 4339 0.3414 0.3241 0.1714 0.2286 0.4232 
Profitability 4339 0.1504 0.1498 0.0691 0.1104 0.1898 
Firm risk 4339 0.0312 0.0213 0.0357 0.0115 0.0347 
Tangibility 4339 0.4457 0.4138 0.2381 0.2628 0.6337 
COIN_CF × 100 4290 0.4390 0.0000 0.7321 0.0000 0.6249 
Efficiency of transfers (diversified firms) 2118 -0.0016 -0.0006 0.0096 -0.0036 0.0006 
MMC (firms having multimarket contacts) 1388 2.0556 2.0000 0.0998 2.0000 2.0972 
 
 
      
Panel B:  Bond Characteristics 
      
 
N    Mean   Median Std. Dev. 25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
Bond spread (in %) 4339 1.8844 1.4100 1.8709 0.6452 2.7113 
Maturity years 4339 12.2789 10.1400 10.4476 7.0900 12.1600 
Issue proceeds (in millions) 4339 207.8167 149.9250 219.0001 86.6850 250.0000 
Rating 4339 11.0565 10.0000 5.4144 7.0000 15.0000 
   
  
  Panel C:  Proxies for Corporate Diversification 
 
    
 
N   Mean    Median  Std. Dev. 25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
DIV3 4339 0.4881 0.0000 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
NUMSEG 4339 1.9811 1.0000 1.2614 1.0000 3.0000 
SALESHINDEX 4339 0.2127 0.0000 0.2591 0.0000 0.4529 
  
 
    Panel D: Proxies for Product Market Competition      
 
N    Mean    Median   Std. Dev. 25th Percentile  75th Percentile 
Fitted HHI 4339 0.0623 0.0581 0.0279 0.0465 0.0727 
Competition (Fitted HHI) 4339 0.3300 0.0000 0.4703 0.0000 1.0000 
Compustat HHI 4339 0.1526 0.1263 0.1141 0.0820 0.1833 
Competition (Compustat) 4339 0.3284 0.0000 0.4697 0.0000 1.0000 
C4-Index (Compustat) 4339 0.1396 0.1127 0.1183 0.0630 0.1722 
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Table 4.2 Corporate Diversification and the Bond Spreads 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the effect of diversification on the cost of 
borrowing. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond 
minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. 
DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment 
database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code 
level) over the firm’s total sales. Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the 
firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the 
ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard 
deviation of annual cash flows from operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization, normalized by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the 
ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. 
Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the numerical S&P 
credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All regressions control 
for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
  
DIV3 
(1)  
NUMSEG 
(2)  
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 10.055*** 
 
9.932*** 
 
9.911*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.162*** 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
NUMSEG   -0.078***   
   (0.01)   
SALESHINDEX     -0.396*** 
     (0.01) 
Log (Asset) -0.428*** 
 
-0.419*** 
 
-0.421*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.233*** 
 
-0.236*** 
 
-0.237*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.054*** 
 
2.035*** 
 
2.039*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -3.132*** 
 
-3.147*** 
 
-3.090*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 7.666*** 
 
7.675*** 
 
7.663*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.185** 
 
-0.180** 
 
-0.207** 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.071** 
 
-0.072** 
 
-0.073** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
Bond size 0.217*** 
 
0.217*** 
 
0.217*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.052***  0.053***  0.052*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects              Yes 
 
             Yes 
 
             Yes 
No. of Observations            4,339 
 
            4,339 
 
           4,339 
Adj. R2 0.442 
 
0.442 
 
0.443 
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Table 4.3 Product Market Competition and the Bond Spreads 
This table presents coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of competition on bond 
spreads. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond 
minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. 
Competition (Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the fitted HHI is in the lowest terciles of the 
sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The Fitted HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at 3-digit SIC 
code level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). It is a measure of industry concentration that covers private 
and public firms in all industries by combing Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the Commerce 
Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Competition (Compustat) is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed based on Compustat data is in 
the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. C4-Index (Compustat) is the sum of the 
market shares of the four largest firms in an industry based on Compustat data. For a diversified firm, the 
firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code level). Asset 
is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity 
+ market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is 
the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows from 
operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total 
assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of 
proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, 
where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The 
p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
Competition 
(Fitted HHI) 
 
Competition 
(Compustat) 
 Fitted HHI  
C4-Index 
Compustat) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (1) 
Intercept 17.068*** 
 
17.263*** 
 
13.222*** 
 
17.667*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.156*** 
      
 
(0.01) 
      Competition (Compustat) 
  
0.138*** 
    
   
(0.01) 
    Fitted HHI 
    
-1.125** 
  
     
(0.04) 
  C4-Index (Compustat)  
     
-0.090 
 
      
(0.58) 
Log (Asset) -0.857*** 
 
-0.863*** 
 
-0.725*** 
 
-0.876*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.208*** 
 
-0.211*** 
 
-0.175*** 
 
-0.272*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.319*** 
 
2.330*** 
 
2.084*** 
 
2.336*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -1.803*** 
 
-1.830*** 
 
-1.579*** 
 
-1.615*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.517*** 
 
2.458*** 
 
2.565*** 
 
2.520*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.226*** 
 
-0.267*** 
 
-0.224*** 
 
-0.223*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) 0.001 
 
0.004 
 
0.015 
 
-0.006 
 
(0.96) 
 
(0.877) 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.84) 
Bond size 0.194*** 
 
0.190*** 
 
0.231*** 
 
0.191*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.092***  0.093***  0.108***  0.092*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
        Year & Industry Fixed Effects           Yes             Yes       Yes      Yes 
No. of Observations           4,339 
 
           4,339 
 
     4,339 
 
     4,339 
Adj. R2 0.478 0.477 0.443 0.478 
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Table 4.4 The Impact of Competition on the Bond Spreads of Diversified Firms 
‒ Univariate Analysis 
This table provides the average bond spreads across single-segment firms and diversified firms, the 
number 3-digit SIC code business segments, and the sales-based Herfindahl index, conditioned on the 
level of competition. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC 
code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in 
Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales 
(at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Firms are assigned to the ‘Competitive Industry’ 
group if the firms’ fitted HHI from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is in the lowest terciles of the sample. The 
rest of the firms are assigned to the ‘Less-competitive Industry’ group. The Difference column provides 
the difference in bond spreads between the average bond spread and the average bond spread reported in 
the line above, within the same diversification proxy. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote the statistical significance levels of the difference reported at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively, using a t-test. 
 
 
Less-competitive Industry  Competitive Industry 
 
N Mean Spread Difference  N Mean Spread Difference 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Diversification Indicator (DIV3) 
Single-segment firms  1389 1.872 
 
 832 2.708 
 Diversified firms 1518 1.526 -0.346***  600 1.673 -1.035*** 
    
 
   
Number of Industry Segments(NUMSEG) 
1 segments 1389 1.872 
 
 832 2.708 
 2-3 segments 1112 1.577 -0.295***  454 1.835 -0.873*** 
>3 segments 406 1.076 -0.501*  146 1.304 -0.530*** 
    
 
   Industrial Herfindahl Index (SALESHINDEX) 
Equal to 0 1389 1.890 
 
 832 2.708 
 Between 0 and 0.46 733 1.658 -0.233***  326 1.898 -0.810*** 
Between 0.46 and 1 785 1.233 -0.425  274 1.328 -0.569** 
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Table 4.5A The Impact of Product Market Competition on the Relationship between 
Corporate Diversification and Bond Spreads: 
Regression Analysis Based on Competition (Fitted HHI) 
This table examines the effect of competition on the relationship between diversification and bond spreads. The 
dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to 
maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the 
number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the 
sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Competition 
(Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) 
is in the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 3-
digit SIC code industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is a measure of industry concentration that 
covers private and public firms in all industries by combing Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the 
Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For a diversified firm, the 
firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code level). Asset is 
book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + 
market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio 
of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows from operations (income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) for the past five years 
prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. Bond 
maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the 
issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit 
quality. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3 
(1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 19.397*** 
 
19.134*** 
 
19.267*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.163*** 
    
 
(0.01) 
    DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.445***     
 (0.01)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.139*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × Competition (Fitted HHI)   -0.111***   
   (0.01)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-0.649*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Fitted HHI)  
 
 
 
-0.506*** 
  
 
 
 
(0.01) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.337*** 
 
0.337*** 
 
0.220*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Log (Asset) -0.957*** 
 
-0.932*** 
 
-0.945*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.238*** 
 
-0.241*** 
 
-0.241*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.392*** 
 
2.344*** 
 
2.351*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -2.384*** 
 
-2.489*** 
 
-2.320*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 3.107*** 
 
3.107*** 
 
3.134*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.264*** 
 
-0.248*** 
 
-0.311*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.014 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.022 
 (0.68) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.51) 
Bond size 0.171*** 
 
0.170*** 
 
0.172*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.092*** 
 
0.092*** 
 
0.091*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes          Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations        4,339         4,339         4,339 
Adj. R2 0.432  0.435  0.434 
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Table 4.5B The Impact of Product Market Competition on the Relationship between 
Corporate Diversification and Bond Spreads: 
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Compustat) 
This table examines the effect of competition on the relationship between diversification and bond 
spreads. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond 
minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. 
DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment 
database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code 
level) over the firm’s total sales. Competition (Compustat) is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed based on Compustat data is in the lowest terciles of the sample 
distribution, and zero otherwise. For a diversified firm, the firm level HHI is the sales weighted average 
of all business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code level). Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-
book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by 
total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. 
Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows from operations (income before extraordinary 
items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond 
issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is 
the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. 
Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit 
quality. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for 
brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3 
 (1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 10.567*** 
 
10.087*** 
 
10.443*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.053 
    
 
(0.33) 
    DIV3 × Competition (Compustat) -0.401***     
 (0.01)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.061*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × Competition (Compustat)   -0.085**   
   (0.04)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-0.274*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Compustat)  
 
 
 
-0.609*** 
  
 
 
 
(0.01) 
Competition (Compustat) 0.211*** 
 
0.214** 
 
0.141** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Log (Asset) -0.451*** 
 
-0.429*** 
 
-0.444*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.168*** 
 
-0.153*** 
 
-0.170*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.125*** 
 
2.084*** 
 
2.109*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -3.589*** 
 
-3.580*** 
 
-3.547*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.774*** 
 
2.781*** 
 
2.811*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.183* 
 
-0.159* 
 
-0.202** 
 (0.05) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.03) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.094*** 
 
-0.114*** 
 
-0.098*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Bond size 0.220*** 
 
0.222*** 
 
0.219*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.058*** 
 
0.063*** 
 
0.059*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes          Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations        4,339         4,339         4,339 
Adj. R2 0.475 
 
0.489 
 
0.475 
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Table 4.5C The Impact of Product Market Competition on the Relationship between 
Corporate Diversification and Bond Spreads: 
Regression Analysis based on Fitted HHI 
This table examines the effect of competition on the relationship between diversification and bond 
spreads. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond 
minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. 
DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment 
database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code 
level) over the firm’s total sales. Fitted HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 3-digit SIC code 
industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). It is a measure of industry concentration that covers 
private and public firms in all industries by combing Compustat data with Herfindahl data from the 
Commerce Department and employee data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For a diversified 
firm, the firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code 
level). Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book 
value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash 
flows from operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized 
by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount 
of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond 
issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All regressions control for year and industry 
fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. 
The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3 
(1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 19.839*** 
 
19.812*** 
 
19.129*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.537*** 
    
 
(0.01) 
    DIV3 × Fitted HHI 3.564**     
 (0.03)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.228*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × Fitted HHI   0.531   
   (0.41)   
SALESHINDEX     -1.048*** 
     (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Fitted HHI  
 
 
 
8.248** 
  
 
 
 
(0.02) 
Fitted HHI -2.249** 
 
-2.449* 
 
-0.643 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.46) 
Log (Asset) -0.966*** 
 
-0.985*** 
 
-0.764*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.231*** 
 
-0.426*** 
 
-0.132*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.407*** 
 
2.223*** 
 
1.545*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -2.418*** 
 
-1.968*** 
 
-2.529*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 3.122*** 
 
3.556*** 
 
2.233*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.262*** 
 
-0.294*** 
 
-0.057 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.51) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.015 
 
-0.068** 
 
-0.191*** 
 (0.66) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.01) 
Bond size 0.169*** 
 
0.169*** 
 
0.165*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.093*** 
 
0.107*** 
 
0.049*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects        Yes         Yes         Yes 
No. of Observations       4,339        4,339        4,339 
Adj. R2 0.429 
 
0.435 
 
0.465 
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Table 4.5D The Impact of Product Market Competition on the Relationship between 
Corporate Diversification and Bond Spreads: 
Regression Analysis based on C4-Index (Compustat)  
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of competition on the 
relationship between diversification and bond spreads. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as 
the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar 
maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more 
than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code 
segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares 
of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. C4-Index (Compustat) is the 
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry based on Compustat data. For a 
diversified firm, the firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all business segment HHI based on 3-
digit SIC code industry. For a diversified firm, the firm level HHI is the sales weighted average of all 
business segment HHI (at 3-digit SIC code level). Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is 
market value of the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total 
asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm 
risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows from operations (income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond 
issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is 
the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. 
Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit 
quality. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for 
brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3 
 (1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 13.509*** 
 
12.887*** 
 
15.749*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.310*** 
    
 
(0.01) 
    DIV3 × C4-Index (Compustat) 0.808**     
 (0.02)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.147*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × C4-Index (Compustat)   0.319**   
   (0.04)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-1.098*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × C4-Index (Compustat)  
 
 
 
1.503* 
  
 
 
 
(0.08) 
C4-Index (Compustat) -0.450* 
 
-0.482 
 
-0.223 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.32) 
Log (Asset) -0.583*** 
 
-0.450*** 
 
-0.815*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.371*** 
 
-0.132*** 
 
-0.650*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.096*** 
 
1.436*** 
 
2.208*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -2.674*** 
 
-2.900*** 
 
-1.961*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.653*** 
 
2.067*** 
 
3.823*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.140 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.330*** 
 (0.12) 
 
(0.98) 
 
(0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.108 
 
-0.196*** 
 
-0.080** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
Bond size 0.207*** 
 
0.218*** 
 
0.151*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.066*** 
 
0.040*** 
 
0.115*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects        Yes         Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations       4,339        4,339         4,339 
Adj. R2 0.488 
 
0.476 
 
0.426 
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Table 4.6A Reductions of Import Tariff Cuts 
‒ Definition of Tariff Cut: Abs (ΔTariff) > 3 × Mean 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of tariff rate cuts on the 
relationship between diversification and bond spreads. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable that equals one if 
an industry where the firm operates has experienced a large tariff reduction in the previous year t-1 that is 
larger than three times the mean tariff rate reduction in that industry, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity 
of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV4 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 4-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the 
number of 4-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one 
minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 4-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. 
Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of 
equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash 
flows from operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized 
by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount 
of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond 
issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All regressions control for year and industry 
fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2005. 
The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 Tariff Cut Definition : Abs (ΔTariff) > 3 × Mean 
   
DIV4 
(1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 18.887*** 
 
21.302*** 
 
21.732*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV4 0.028 
    
 
(0.93) 
    DIV4 × Tariff Cut -1.334**     
 (0.03)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.149*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × Tariff Cut   -0.562***   
   (0.01)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-0.669*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Tariff Cut  
 
 
 
-1.966** 
  
 
 
 
(0.04) 
Tariff Cut 1.108** 
 
1.500*** 
 
0.832* 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.06) 
Log (Asset) -0.805*** 
 
-0.979*** 
 
-1.034*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.528*** 
 
-0.211*** 
 
-0.211*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 3.227*** 
 
2.837*** 
 
3.002*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -1.312 
 
-2.406*** 
 
-2.199*** 
 (0.19) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.651*** 
 
2.367*** 
 
2.459*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility 0.321 
 
0.355 
 
0.739* 
 (0.50) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.08) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.159*** 
 
-0.128** 
 
-0.167*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
Bond size 0.203*** 
 
0.178*** 
 
0.231*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.045*** 
 
0.054*** 
 
0.057*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects        Yes         Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations        1,414         1,414         1,414 
Adj. R2 0.563  0.596  0.597 
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Table 4.6B Reductions of Import Tariff Cuts 
‒ Definition of Tariff Cut: Abs (ΔTariff) > 3 × Median 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of tariff rate cuts on the 
relationship between diversification and bond spreads. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable that equals one if 
an industry where the firm operates has experienced a large tariff reduction in the previous year t-1 that is 
larger than three times the median tariff rate reduction in that industry, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity 
of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV4 is a dummy variable equal 
to one if a firm operates in more than one different 4-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. 
NUMSEG is the number of 4-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. 
SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales in unique 4-digit SIC code 
industry over the firm’s total sales. Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of 
the firm (total asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is 
the ratio of debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the 
standard deviation of annual cash flows from operations (income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. 
Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s 
maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is 
the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The 
sample period is between 1986 and 2005. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
 Bond Spread 
 
Tariff Cut Definition : Abs (ΔTariff) > 3 × Median 
DIV4 
(1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 12.494*** 
 
21.764*** 
 
10.849*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV4 -0.062 
    
 
(0.52) 
    DIV4 * Tariff Cut -1.212**     
 (0.03)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.149*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG * Tariff Cut   -0.102   
   (0.16)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-0.589*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX * Tariff Cut  
 
 
 
-0.803* 
  
 
 
 
(0.07) 
Tariff Cut 0.790 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.123 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.58) 
Log (Asset) -3.654** 
 
-2.318** 
 
-2.498** 
 (0.04) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
Market-to-Book -0.439*** 
 
-0.294*** 
 
-0.480*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.916*** 
 
3.040*** 
 
2.780*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -1.693** 
 
-1.981*** 
 
-1.406* 
 (0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.09) 
Firm risk 2.631*** 
 
2.413*** 
 
2.263*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility 0.553 
 
0.562 
 
0.532 
 (0.21) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.26) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.164*** 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.128** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.04) 
Bond size 0.224*** 
 
0.216*** 
 
0.225*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.057*** 
 
0.055*** 
 
0.039*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes          Yes              Yes 
No. of Observations        1,414         1,414             1,414 
Adj. R2 0.599 
 
0.597 
 
0.562 
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Table 4.6C Reductions of Import Tariff Cuts 
‒ Definition of Tariff Cut: Abs (ΔTariff) > 2 × Median 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the effect of tariff rate cuts on the 
relationship between diversification and bond spreads. Tariff Cut is a dummy variable that equals one if 
an industry where the firm operates has experienced a large tariff reduction in the previous year t-1 that is 
larger than two times the median tariff rate reduction in that industry, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity 
of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV4 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 4-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the 
number of 4-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one 
minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 4-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. 
Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total asset – book value of 
equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash 
flows from operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized 
by total assets) for the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipments (net) to total assets. Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount 
of proceeds (in millions) received from the issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond 
issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. All regressions control for year and industry 
fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2005. 
The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 Tariff Cut Definition : Abs (ΔTariff) > 2 × Median 
   
DIV4 
(1) 
 
NUMSEG 
(2) 
 
SALESHINDEX 
(3) 
Intercept 25.489*** 
 
23.597*** 
 
11.297*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV4 -0.060 
    
 
(0.53) 
    DIV4 × Tariff Cut -0.769*     
 (0.07)     
NUMSEG 
  
-0.123*** 
  
   
(0.01) 
  NUMSEG × Tariff Cut   -0.177   
   (0.24)   
SALESHINDEX 
    
-0.641*** 
     
(0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Tariff Cut  
 
 
 
-0.804* 
  
 
 
 
(0.08) 
Tariff Cut 0.401 
 
0.402 
 
0.300 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.35) 
 
(0.38) 
Log (Asset) -3.605** 
 
-1.048*** 
 
-1.064*** 
 (0.04) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.445*** 
 
-0.459*** 
 
-0.323*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 2.868*** 
 
2.905*** 
 
3.007*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -1.834** 
 
-1.369* 
 
-1.640** 
 (0.02) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.04) 
Firm risk 2.585*** 
 
2.286*** 
 
2.463*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility 0.562 
 
0.592 
 
0.732* 
 (0.20) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.08) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.150*** 
 
-0.152*** 
 
-0.176*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Bond size 0.225*** 
 
0.230*** 
 
0.234*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.055*** 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.055*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes          Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations        1,414         1,414         1,414 
Adj. R2 0.596  0.600  0.598 
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Table 4.7A The Impact of Product Market Competition ‒ Coinsurance Channel: 
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Fitted HHI) 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the coinsurance hypothesis. The regressions are estimated separately for financially constrained 
(denote C) and less-constrained (denote L) firms. Financial constraints are measured based on: (i) the Size-and-Age Index, (ii) the Whited and Wu (2006) index, (iii) 
Total Pay-out, (iv) Investment-grade vs Speculative-grade rating. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus 
the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. COIN_CF is the cash-flow coinsurance measure, constructed following 
Duchin (2010). Competition (Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is in the lowest terciles of 
the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The other variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects 
whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2005. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Bond Spread 
 
Size-and-Age Index  Whited and Wu Index  Pay-out  Investment/Speculative 
[L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept 7.780*** 
 
13.064*** 
 
8.368*** 
 
8.824*** 
 
8.251*** 
 
8.723*** 
 
14.696*** 
 
13.567*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.01) 
COIN_CF × 100 -0.136*** 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.147*** 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.080* 
 
-0.119*** 
 
-0.097** 
 
-0.063 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.32) 
COIN_CF × 100 × Competition (Fitted HHI)  -0.030 
 
-0.216** 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.174** 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.138** 
 
0.129 
 
-0.247** 
(0.77) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.03) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.174 
 
0.116* 
 
-0.077 
 
0.023 
 
-0.142 
 
0.079 
 
-0.070 
 
0.108 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.15) 
Log (Asset) -0.306*** 
 
-0.640*** 
 
-0.199*** 
 
-0.421*** 
 
-0.326*** 
 
-0.374*** 
 
-0.691 
 
-0.564*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.81) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.254*** 
 
-0.196*** 
 
-0.137*** 
 
-0.574*** 
 
-0.335*** 
 
-0.225*** 
 
-0.226*** 
 
-0.223*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 1.354*** 
 
2.267*** 
 
1.670*** 
 
2.215*** 
 
1.065*** 
 
2.060*** 
 
-0.541** 
 
2.321*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -2.271*** 
 
-2.788*** 
 
-3.712*** 
 
-2.471*** 
 
-0.302 
 
-3.160*** 
 
0.675 
 
-3.582*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 9.726*** 
 
7.132*** 
 
4.262*** 
 
10.355*** 
 
4.523*** 
 
7.395*** 
 
0.727 
 
2.601*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.59) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.073 
 
-0.318*** 
 
-0.180 
 
-0.037 
 
0.091 
 
-0.248*** 
 
0.200 
 
-0.233* 
 
(0.62) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.58) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.08) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.006 
 
-0.325*** 
 
-0.144*** 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.115*** 
 
0.016 
 
-0.488*** 
 
(0.88) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.01) 
Bond size 0.122*** 
 
0.507*** 
 
0.124*** 
 
0.841*** 
 
0.090*** 
 
0.250*** 
 
0.044** 
 
0.410*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.045*** 
 
0.066*** 
 
0.063*** 
 
0.036*** 
 
0.027*** 
 
0.062*** 
 
0.048*** 
 
0.027*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects      Yes       Yes      Yes      Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes 
No. of Observations    2,360 
 
1,930 
 
  2,145 
 
  1,990 
 
  1,267 
 
  3,023 
 
     2,274 
 
    2,016 
Adj. R2 0.265 
 
0.549 
 
0.343 
 
0.594 
 
0.328 
 
0.560 
 
0.177 
 
0.450 
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Table 4.7B The Impact of Product Market Competition ‒ Coinsurance Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Compustat) 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the coinsurance hypothesis. The regressions are estimated separately for financially constrained 
(denote C) and less-constrained firms (denote L). Financial constraints are measured based on: (i) the Size-and-Age Index, (ii) the Whited and Wu (2006) index, (iii) 
Total Pay-out, (iv) Investment-grade vs Speculative-grade rating. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus 
the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. COIN_CF is the cash flow coinsurance measure, constructed following 
Duchin (2010). Competition (Compustat) is a dummy variable equal to one if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed based on Compustat data is in the lowest 
terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The other variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
Size-and-Age Index  Whited and Wu Index  Total Pay-out  Investment/Speculative 
[L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept 6.766*** 
 
10.958*** 
 
5.228*** 
 
11.253*** 
 
6.538*** 
 
9.972*** 
 
10.904*** 
 
7.496*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.85) 
 
(0.01) 
COIN_CF × 100 -0.146*** 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.162***  -0.030  -0.141***  -0.091**  -0.095**  -0.098 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.01)  (0.47)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.11) 
COIN_CF × 100 × Competition (Compustat )  0.044 
 
-0.198 
 
-0.071  -0.233*  0.184  -0.237**  0.118  -0.348** 
(0.72) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.55)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.04)  (0.26)  (0.04) 
Competition (Compustat) -0.083 
 
0.116 
 
-0.025  0.172**  -0.135  0.157***  -0.087  0.112 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.73)  (0.02)  (0.11)  (0.01)  (0.19)  (0.16) 
Log (Asset) -0.272*** 
 
-0.540*** 
 
-0.188***  -0.457***  -0.265***  -0.428***  -0.501  -0.488*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.86)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.231*** 
 
-0.200*** 
 
-0.141***  -0.791***  -0.149***  -0.215***  -0.228***  -0.276*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 1.366*** 
 
2.207*** 
 
1.633***  2.132***  0.876***  2.345***  -0.549**  2.588*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Profitability -2.126*** 
 
-2.334*** 
 
-3.604***  -1.534  -1.318**  -3.013***  0.689  -2.407*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.21)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 9.563*** 
 
3.541*** 
 
4.367***  3.033***  7.166***  2.884***  1.074  5.386*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.43)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.003 
 
-0.436*** 
 
-0.166  -0.198  0.334**  -0.313***  0.232*  -0.527*** 
 
(0.98) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.22)  (0.26)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.012 
 
-0.402*** 
 
-0.143***  -0.166***  -0.052  -0.196***  0.016  -0.359*** 
 
(0.75) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.63)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.128*** 
 
0.569*** 
 
0.128***  0.397***  0.111***  0.271***  0.046**  1.046*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.052*** 
 
0.081*** 
 
0.064***  0.046***  0.044***  0.080***  0.047***  0.022*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes      Yes       Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
No. of Observations      2,360 
 
  1,930 
 
  2,145 
 
  1,990 
 
  1,267 
 
  3,023 
 
    2,274 
 
    2,016 
Adj. R2 0.287 
 
0.523 
 
0.342 
 
0.578 
 
0.329 
 
0.507 
 
0.177 
 
0.416 
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Table 4.7C The Impact of Product Market Competition ‒ Coinsurance Channel: 
Regression Analysis based on Fitted HHI 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the coinsurance hypothesis. The regressions are estimated separately for financially constrained 
(denote C) and less-constrained firms (denote L). Financial constraints are measured based on: (i) the Size-and-Age Index, (ii) the Whited and Wu (2006) index, (iii) 
Total Pay-out, (iv) Investment-grade vs Speculative-grade rating. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus 
the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. COIN_CF is the cash flow coinsurance measure, constructed following 
Duchin (2010). Fitted HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 3-digit SIC code industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). The other variables are described in 
more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 
and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  
 
Bond Spread 
 
Size-and-Age Index  Whited and Wu Index  Pay-out  Investment/Speculative 
[L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept -6.620*** 
 
11.585*** 
 
5.315*** 
 
11.557*** 
 
6.431*** 
 
9.382*** 
 
14.599*** 
 
7.590*** 
 
(0.73) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
COIN_CF  × 100 -0.100 
 
-0.336** 
 
-0.192  -0.293**  0.040  -0.402***  0.050  -0.496*** 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.18)  (0.03)  (0.78)  (0.01)  (0.68)  (0.01) 
COIN_CF  × 100 × Fitted HHI  -1.318 
 
4.342* 
 
0.389  3.575*  -2.089  3.803**  -1.807  5.519** 
(0.50) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.85)  (0.08)  (0.30)  (0.03)  (0.30)  (0.03) 
Fitted HHI 1.700 
 
-1.748 
 
1.276  0.745  4.743***  -0.253  1.134  -0.011 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.30)  (0.52)  (0.01)  (0.80)  (0.289)  (0.99) 
Log (Asset) 0.356 
 
-0.543*** 
 
-0.195***  -0.466***  -0.273***  -0.388***  -0.691  -0.495*** 
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.81)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.318*** 
 
-0.304*** 
 
-0.136***  -0.774***  -0.125***  -0.309***  -0.231***  -0.270*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 1.251*** 
 
2.324*** 
 
1.670***  2.142***  0.882***  2.397***  -0.532**  2.613*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Profitability -0.810 
 
-0.761 
 
-3.681***  -1.901*  -1.602**  -2.849*  0.719  -2.456*** 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.01)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 10.071*** 
 
6.398*** 
 
4.302***  3.169***  7.529***  7.230***  1.049  5.407*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.447)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.193 
 
-0.489*** 
 
-0.159  -0.157  0.341**  -0.337***  0.220*  -0.502*** 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.24)  (0.37)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) 0.033 
 
-0.394*** 
 
-0.147***  -0.167***  -0.065  -0.224***  0.014  -0.364*** 
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.13)  (0.01)  (0.66)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.078*** 
 
0.467*** 
 
0.123***  0.393***  0.105***  0.281***  0.045**  1.057*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.029)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.068*** 
 
0.075*** 
 
0.064***  0.045***  0.042***  0.081***  0.177***  0.022*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects         Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes          Yes         Yes          Yes          Yes 
No. of Observations      2,360 
 
     1,930 
 
     2,145 
 
     1,990 
 
     1,267 
 
     3,023 
 
     2,274 
 
     2,016 
Adj. R2 0.256 
 
0.529 
 
0.343 
 
0.578 
 
0.334 
 
0.528 
 
0.177 
 
0.416 
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Table 4.7D The Impact of Product Market Competition ‒ Coinsurance Channel: 
Regression Analysis based on C4-Index (Compustat) 
This table provides coefficient estimates of regressions which examine the coinsurance hypothesis. The regressions are estimated separately for financially constrained 
(denote C) and less-constrained firms (denote L). Financial constraints are measured based on: (i) the Size-and-Age Index, (ii) the Whited and Wu (2006) index, (iii) 
Total Pay-out, (iv) Investment-grade vs Speculative-grade rating. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus 
the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. COIN_CF is the cash flow coinsurance measure, constructed following 
Duchin (2010). C4-Index (Compustat) is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry based on Compustat data. The other variables are 
described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
Size-and-Age Index  Whited and Wu Index  Pay-out  Investment/Speculative 
[L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C]  [L]  [C] 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept -6.301*** 
 
17.260*** 
 
5.200*** 
 
18.120*** 
 
6.427*** 
 
17.867*** 
 
4.635*** 
 
17.949*** 
 
(0.74) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
COIN_CF × 100 -0.240*** 
 
-0.247** 
 
-0.139  -0.340***  -0.002  -0.382***  -0.047  -0.390*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.11)  (0.01)  (0.98)  (0.01)  (0.52)  (0.01) 
COIN_CF  × 100 × C4-Index (Compustat) 0.252 
 
0.801 
 
-0.152  0.672*  -0.620  0.669*  0.011  0.928* 
(0.49) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.72)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.97)  (0.08) 
C4-Index (Compustat) 0.470 
 
-0.524* 
 
-0.032  -0.083  0.659**  -0.631***  0.539*  -0.655** 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.91)  (0.74)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.02) 
Log (Asset) 0.342 
 
-0.966*** 
 
-0.187***  -0.967***  -0.266***  -0.901***  -0.167***  -0.861*** 
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.314*** 
 
-0.239*** 
 
-0.140***  -0.423***  -0.143***  -0.284***  -0.211***  -0.350*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 1.230*** 
 
2.796*** 
 
1.631***  2.415***  0.904***  2.513***  -0.448*  2.509*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.09)  (0.01) 
Profitability -0.954 
 
4.032* 
 
-3.572***  2.925***  -1.477**  1.367  -0.192  2.658* 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.38)  (0.75)  (0.09) 
Firm risk 10.074*** 
 
2.326*** 
 
4.303***  2.557***  6.950***  2.802***  1.848  2.179*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.21)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.184 
 
-0.459*** 
 
-0.188  -0.212*  0.318*  -0.442***  0.194  -0.466*** 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.16)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.16)  (0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) 0.035 
 
-0.261*** 
 
-0.141***  -0.027  -0.047  -0.170***  0.014  -0.405*** 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.01)  (0.70)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.081*** 
 
0.435*** 
 
0.129***  0.352***  0.108***  0.244***  0.073***  0.413*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.067*** 
 
0.107*** 
 
0.064***  0.096***  0.044***  0.109***  0.034***  0.035*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects      Yes      Yes       Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
No. of Observations      2,360 
 
     1,930 
 
     2,145 
 
     1,990 
 
     1,267 
 
     3,023 
 
    2,274 
 
     2,016 
Adj. R2 0.257 
 
0.461 
 
0.342 
 
0.534 
 
0.330 
 
0.490 
 
0.170 
 
0.443 
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Table 4.8A The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ The Efficient Internal Capital Market Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Fitted HHI) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the efficient internal capital market hypothesis. We split 
the diversified firm sample into two subsamples. We first measure the efficiency of internal transfers, following Rajan 
et al. (2000). We assign a diversified firm into the inefficient (efficient) transfers subsample if the firm has a negative 
(positive) efficiency measure. We then compare the split subsamples separately with single-segment firms. The 
dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity 
of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC 
code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each 
segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Competition (Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is in the lowest terciles of the sample 
distribution, and zero otherwise. Asset is book value of total assets. Market-to-book is market value of the firm (total 
asset – book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by total asset. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total 
assets. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows 
from operations (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization, normalized by total assets) for 
the past five years prior to bond issuance. Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipments (net) to total assets. 
Bond maturity is the bond’s maturity in years. Bond size is total amount of proceeds (in millions) received from the 
issue. Rating is the numerical S&P credit rating of the bond issue, where smaller numbers mean higher credit quality. 
All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample 
period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(1) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(2) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(3) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(4) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(5) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(6) 
Intercept 12.818*** 
 
11.239*** 
 
13.806***  11.207***  10.082***  15.368*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.088 
 
0.034 
  
      
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.664) 
  
      
DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.200*  -0.478***         
 (0.06)  (0.01)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.114***  0.011     
     
(0.01)  (0.739)     
NUMSEG × Competition (Fitted HHI)     -0.032  -0.317***     
    (0.451)  (0.01)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.238*  -0.156 
      
   (0.06)  (0.325) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Fitted HHI)  
 
 
  
   0.026  -1.502*** 
 
 
 
  
   (0.905)  (0.01) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.160** 
 
0.076 
 
0.176**  0.391***  0.015  0.155** 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.272) 
 
(0.046)  (0.01)  (0.813)  (0.021) 
Log (Asset) -0.577*** 
 
-0.499*** 
 
-0.613***  -0.498***  -0.437***  -0.705*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.135*** 
 
-0.129*** 
 
-0.181***  -0.129***  -0.111***  -0.163*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 2.018*** 
 
1.937*** 
 
2.094***  1.943***  1.193***  2.014*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.058*** 
 
-4.097*** 
 
-3.261***  -4.122***  -4.535***  -3.572*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.131*** 
 
2.328*** 
 
2.489***  2.336***  2.778***  2.131*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.153 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.209**  -0.084  -0.055  -0.087 
 (0.13) 
 
(0.417) 
 
(0.032)  (0.458)  (0.64)  (0.452) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.059 
 
-0.078* 
 
-0.052  -0.075*  -0.103***  -0.011 
 (0.12) 
 
(0.078) 
 
(0.154)  (0.090)  (0.01)  (0.800) 
Bond size 0.195*** 
 
0.285*** 
 
0.200***  0.286***  0.213***  0.249*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.061*** 
 
0.065*** 
 
0.063***  0.066***  0.593***  0.069*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes     Yes 
No. of Observations   3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015 
Adj. R2 0.475  0.476  0.486  0.480  0.484  0.472 
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Table 4.8B The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ The Efficient Internal Capital Market Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Compustat) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the efficient internal capital market 
hypothesis. We split the diversified firm sample into two subsamples. We first measure the efficiency of 
internal transfers, following Rajan et al. (2000). We assign a diversified firm into the inefficient (efficient) 
transfers subsample if the firm has a negative (positive) efficiency measure. We then compare the split 
subsamples separately with single-segment firms. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the 
yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar 
maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more 
than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code 
segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares 
of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Competition (Compustat) is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed based on Compustat data is in 
the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The other variables are described in 
more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are 
not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(1) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(2) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(3) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(4) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(5) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(6) 
Intercept 13.059*** 
 
11.203*** 
 
10.048***  11.209***  10.079***  11.152*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.110* 
 
0.033 
  
      
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.66) 
  
      
DIV3 × Competition (Compustat) -0.093  -0.554***         
 (0.41)  (0.01)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.091***  -0.004     
     
(0.01)  (0.89)     
NUMSEG × Competition (Compustat)     0.004  -0.310***     
     (0.92)  (0.01)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.240*  -0.089 
      
   (0.06)  (0.55) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Compustat)  
 
 
  
   0.043  -1.375*** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.85)  (0.01) 
Competition (Compustat ) 0.119* 
 
0.156** 
 
0.109  0.440***  0.051  0.135** 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.22)  (0.01)  (0.39)  (0.03) 
Log (Asset) -0.586*** 
 
-0.497*** 
 
-0.423***  -0.498***  -0.437***  -0.492*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.134*** 
 
-0.128*** 
 
-0.158***  -0.130***  -0.111***  -0.132*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 2.022*** 
 
1.924*** 
 
2.026***  1.923***  1.933***  1.899*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.044*** 
 
-4.107*** 
 
-3.754***  -4.113***  -4.452***  -4.104*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.982*** 
 
2.281*** 
 
2.603***  2.289***  2.654***  2.299*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.189* 
 
-0.115 
 
-0.206**  -0.102  -0.079  -0.128 
 (0.07) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(0.03)  (0.37)  (0.51)  (0.27) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.057 
 
-0.080* 
 
-0.096***  -0.079*  -0.101***  -0.083* 
 (0.12) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.06) 
Bond size 0.194*** 
 
0.280*** 
 
0.222***  0.284*  0.213***  0.279*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.061*** 
 
0.065*** 
 
0.062***  0.065***  0.059***  0.065*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. of Observations   3,615    3,015   3,615   3,015   3,615   3,015 
Adj. R2 0.474  0.480  0.490  0.479  0.485  0.480 
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Table 4.8C The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ The Efficient Internal Capital Market Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Fitted HHI 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the efficient internal capital market hypothesis. 
We split the diversified firm sample into two subsamples. We first measure the efficiency of internal 
transfers, following Rajan et al. (2000). We assign a diversified firm into the inefficient (efficient) transfers 
subsample if the firm has a negative (positive) efficiency measure. We then compare the split subsamples 
separately with single-segment firms. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to 
maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, 
expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-
digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported 
in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales 
(at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Fitted HHI is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 3-
digit SIC code industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). The other variables are described in more 
detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(1) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(2) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(3) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(4) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(5) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(6) 
Intercept 14.121*** 
 
15.900*** 
 
10.363***  11.558***  10.098***  11.339*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.353*** 
 
-0.512*** 
  
      
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
  
      
DIV3 × Fitted HHI 2.761  5.416**         
 (0.12)  (0.02)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.068  -0.222**     
     
(0.11)  (0.01)     
NUMSEG × Fitted HHI     0.043  2.477**     
     (0.48)  (0.04)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.415  -1.357*** 
      
   (0.11)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Fitted HHI  
 
 
  
   0.444  16.084*** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.90)  (0.01) 
Fitted HHI -0.566 
 
-0.309 
 
1.638  -1.569  1.092  0.069 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.77) 
 
(0.21)  (0.40)  (0.26)  (0.95) 
Log (Asset) -0.631*** 
 
-0.727*** 
 
-0.452***  -0.519***  -0.433***  -0.502*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.138*** 
 
-0.180*** 
 
-0.185***  -0.134***  -0.152***  -0.128*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 2.053*** 
 
2.090*** 
 
1.956***  2.013***  2.060***  1.920*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -3.807*** 
 
-3.419*** 
 
-3.146***  -3.251***  -3.773***  -4.148*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.657*** 
 
2.123*** 
 
2.870***  2.655***  2.660***  2.337*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.193* 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.179**  -0.040  -0.160  -0.088 
 (0.07) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.04)  (0.71)  (0.11)  (0.43) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.055 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.040  -0.072*  -0.104***  -0.078* 
 (0.15) 
 
(0.68) 
 
(0.22)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (0.08) 
Bond size 0.198*** 
 
0.247*** 
 
0.213***  0.298***  0.223***  0.284*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.067*** 
 
0.066*** 
 
0.057***  0.065***  0.062***  0.065*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. of Observations   3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015 
Adj. R2 0.463  0.493  0.490  0.493  0.489  0.479 
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Table 4.8D The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ The Efficient Internal Capital Market Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on C4-Index (Compustat) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the efficient internal capital market hypothesis. 
We split the diversified firm sample into two subsamples. We first measure the efficiency of internal 
transfers, following Rajan et al. (2000). We assign a diversified firm into the inefficient (efficient) transfers 
subsample if the firm has a negative (positive) efficiency measure. We then compare the split subsamples 
separately with single-segment firms. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to 
maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, 
expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-
digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported 
in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales 
(at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. C4-Index (Compustat) is the sum of the market shares 
of the four largest firms in an industry based on Compustat data. The other variables are described in more 
detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the 
parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(1) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(2) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(3) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(4) 
 
Inefficient 
Transfers 
(5) 
 
Efficient 
Transfers 
(6) 
Intercept 10.308*** 
 
12.247*** 
 
10.142***  11.345***  10.216***  15.614*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.188** 
 
-0.315*** 
  
      
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
  
      
DIV3 × C4-Index (Compustat) 0.236  1.081**         
 (0.57)  (0.04)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.086**  -0.069     
     
(0.02)  (0.16)     
NUMSEG × C4-Index (Compustat)     -0.069  0.086     
     (0.72)  (0.74)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.289  -0.975*** 
      
   (0.12)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × C4-Index (Compustat)  
 
 
  
   -0.394  2.377** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.71)  (0.04) 
C4-Index (Compustat) -0.287 
 
-0.244 
 
-0.117  -0.197  -0.187  -0.239 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.75)  (0.64)  (0.42)  (0.33) 
Log (Asset) -0.438*** 
 
-0.546*** 
 
-0.426***  -0.498***  -0.436***  -0.712*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.108*** 
 
-0.148*** 
 
-0.156***  -0.146***  -0.109***  -0.182*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 1.966*** 
 
1.972*** 
 
2.029***  1.955***  1.963***  2.037*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.273*** 
 
-3.925*** 
 
-3.754***  -3.953***  -4.227***  -3.394*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.663*** 
 
2.208*** 
 
2.641***  2.356***  2.677***  2.127*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.170* 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.170*  -0.091  -0.187*  -0.084 
 (0.09) 
 
(0.79) 
 
(0.08)  (0.40)  (0.07)  (0.44) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.105*** 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.099***  -0.089**  -0.106***  -0.022 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.60) 
Bond size 0.228*** 
 
0.281*** 
 
0.224***  0.288***  0.230***  0.252*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.066*** 
 
0.062*** 
 
0.062***  0.064***  0.066***  0.067*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. of Observations   3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015    3,615    3,015 
Adj. R2 0.468  0.499  0.490  0.499  0.489  0.495 
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Table 4.9A The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ Multimarket Contact Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Fitted HHI) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the multimarket contacts hypothesis. MMC is 
the average number of industries shared by a diversified firm and its multimarket rivals. We split the 
sample of diversified firms with multimarket contacts into two subsamples. We assign a diversified firm 
into the high (low) MMC subsample if the number of multimarket contacts of the firm is above (equal to or 
below) the median value of MMC. We then compare the split subsamples separately with single-segment 
firms. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus 
the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero 
otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. 
SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over 
the firm’s total sales. Competition (Fitted HHI) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) is in the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero 
otherwise. The other variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 
and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
  
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC 
       (1)         (2)         (3)        (4)        (5)  (6) 
Intercept 10.736*** 
 
10.260*** 
 
10.592***  10.292***  9.908***  10.271*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.150* 
 
-0.067 
  
      
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.23) 
  
      
DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.195  -0.305***         
 (0.14)  (0.01)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.022  -0.049*     
     
(0.40)  (0.08)     
NUMSEG × Competition (Fitted HHI)     -0.063  -0.172***     
     (0.12)  (0.01)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.093  -0.378*** 
      
   (0.51)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Fitted HHI)  
 
 
  
   -0.315  -0.442** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.19)  (0.04) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.113** 
 
0.103 
 
0.137*  0.226**  0.062  0.042 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.08)  (0.04)  (0.25)  (0.48) 
Log (Asset) -0.467*** 
 
-0.450*** 
 
-0.457***  -0.450***  -0.422***  -0.447*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.196*** 
 
-0.163*** 
 
-0.169***  -0.112***  -0.195***  -0.158*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 1.905*** 
 
1.948*** 
 
1.937***  1.833***  1.894***  1.914*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -3.109*** 
 
-3.672*** 
 
-3.247***  -4.313***  -3.219***  -3.709*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 4.717*** 
 
2.543*** 
 
1.442***  2.628***  4.983***  2.630*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.168* 
 
-0.121 
 
-0.184*  -0.099  -0.228**  -0.142 
 (0.07) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.06)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.14) 
Log(bond maturity) 0.004 
 
-0.099*** 
 
-0.014  -0.110***  -0.022  -0.113*** 
 (0.91) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.70)  (0.01)  (0.55)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.208*** 
 
0.260*** 
 
0.224***  0.264***  0.216***  0.259*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.046*** 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.049***  0.073***  0.046***  0.068*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of Observations   2,670    3,890   2,670    3,890   2,670    3,890 
Adj. R2 0.525  0.494  0.531  0.454  0.539  0.487 
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Table 4.9B The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ Multimarket Contact Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Competition (Compustat) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the multimarket contacts hypothesis. MMC is 
the average number of industries shared by a diversified firm and its multimarket rivals. We split the sample 
of diversified firms with multimarket contacts into two subsamples. We assign a diversified firm into the 
high (low) MMC subsample if the number of multimarket contacts of the firm is above (equal to or below) 
the median value of MMC. We then compare the split subsamples separately with single-segment firms. The 
dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to 
maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the 
number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus 
the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. 
Competition (Compustat) is a dummy variable equal to one if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed 
based on Compustat data is in the lowest terciles of the sample distribution, and zero otherwise. The other 
variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects 
whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is 
reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept 11.154*** 
 
10.285*** 
 
11.182***  10.344***  11.210***  10.215*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.170* 
 
-0.044 
  
      
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.44) 
  
      
DIV3 × Competition (Compustat) 0.063  -0.401***         
 (0.70)  (0.01)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.046  -0.069***     
     
(0.11)  (0.01)     
NUMSEG × Competition (Compustat)     0.037  -0.189***     
     (0.47)  (0.01)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.156  -0.340*** 
      
   (0.32)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Competition (Compustat)  
 
 
  
   0.057  -0.683*** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.84)  (0.01) 
Competition (Compustat ) 0.202*** 
 
0.156** 
 
0.161*  0.292***  0.211***  0.092 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
Log (Asset) -0.472*** 
 
-0.449*** 
 
-0.473***  -0.447***  -0.476***  -0.444*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.149*** 
 
-0.158*** 
 
-0.148***  -0.160***  -0.147***  -0.160*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 2.045*** 
 
1.930*** 
 
2.040***  1.911***  2.058***  1.903*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.131*** 
 
-3.750*** 
 
-4.102***  -3.753***  -4.080***  -3.690*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.244*** 
 
2.592*** 
 
2.248***  2.596***  2.240***  2.615*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.288*** 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.290***  -0.129  -0.293***  -0.157 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.01)  (0.19)  (0.01)  (0.11) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.065 
 
-0.112*** 
 
-0.066  -0.112***  -0.063  -0.116*** 
 (0.13) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.12)  (0.01)  (0.147)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.233*** 
 
0.255*** 
 
0.237***  0.259***  0.235***  0.258*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.053*** 
 
0.067*** 
 
0.053***  0.067***  0.053***  0.067*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
No. of Observations   2,670    3,890   2,670    3,890   2,670    3,890 
Adj. R2 0.517  0.487  0.517  0.488  0.516  0.488 
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Table 4.9C The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ Multimarket Contact Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on Fitted HHI 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the multimarket contacts hypothesis. MMC is 
the average number of industries shared by a diversified firm and its multimarket rivals. We split the sample 
of diversified firms with multimarket contacts into two subsamples. We assign a diversified firm into the 
high (low) MMC subsample if the number of multimarket contacts of the firm is above (equal to or below) 
the median value of MMC. We then compare the split subsamples separately with single-segment firms. The 
dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to 
maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the 
number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment database. SALESHINDEX is one minus 
the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code level) over the firm’s total sales. Fitted HHI 
is Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 3-digit SIC code industry level from Hoberg and Phillips (2010a). The 
other variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-
value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and 
*, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept 11.282*** 
 
10.489*** 
 
11.246***  10.669***  11.291***  10.414*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.273* 
 
-0.424*** 
  
      
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.01) 
  
      
DIV3 × Fitted HHI 1.684  4.335***         
 (0.494)  (0.01)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.035  -0.258***     
     
(0.47)  (0.01)     
NUMSEG × Fitted HHI     -0.163  2.387***     
     (0.82)  (0.01)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.183  -1.134*** 
      
   (0.55)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × Fitted HHI  
 
 
  
   0.013  10.258** 
  
 
 
  
   (0.99)  (0.02) 
Fitted HHI -0.169 
 
0.051 
 
0.425  -2.041  0.298  0.456 
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.96) 
 
(0.77)  (0.23)  (0.77)  (0.64) 
Log (Asset) -0.475*** 
 
-0.456*** 
 
-0.475***  -0.454***  -0.480***  -0.452*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.142*** 
 
-0.152*** 
 
-0.141***  -0.153***  -0.140***  -0.154*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage 2.088*** 
 
1.960*** 
 
2.080***  1.940***  2.095***  1.926*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.198*** 
 
-3.836*** 
 
-4.161***  -3.840***  -4.144***  -3.776*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.311*** 
 
2.613*** 
 
2.324***  2.612***  2.322***  2.626*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.186* 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.196*  -0.094  -0.196*  -0.127 
 (0.09) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.07)  (0.33)  (0.07)  (0.19) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.075* 
 
-0.116*** 
 
-0.077*  -0.114***  -0.074*  -0.118*** 
 (0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.07)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.01) 
Bond size 0.227*** 
 
0.253*** 
 
0.232***  0.256***  0.233***  0.255*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.053*** 
 
0.068*** 
 
0.054***  0.067***  0.053***  0.067*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. of Observations   2,670    3,890    2,670    3,890    2,670    3,890 
Adj. R2 0.514  0.487  0.514  0.488  0.514  0.488 
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Table 4.9D The Impact of Product Market Competition 
‒ Multimarket Contact Channel:   
Regression Analysis based on C4-Index (Compustat) 
This table provides the results of regressions which examine the multimarket contacts hypothesis. MMC 
is the average number of industries shared by a diversified firm and its multimarket rivals. We split the 
sample of diversified firms with multimarket contacts into two subsamples. We assign a diversified firm 
into the high (low) MMC subsample if the number of multimarket contacts of the firm is above (equal to 
or below) median value of MMC. We then compare the split subsamples separately with single-segment 
firms. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the corporate bond 
minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage terms. 
DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise. NUMSEG is the number of 3-digit SIC code segments reported in Compustat Segment 
database. SALESHINDEX is one minus the sum of the squares of each segment sales (at 3-digit SIC code 
level) over the firm’s total sales. C4-Index (Compustat) is the sum of the market shares of the four largest 
firms in an industry based on Compustat data. The other variables are described in more detail in Table 
4.1. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for 
brevity. The sample period is between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Bond Spread 
 
DIV3  NUMSEG  SALESHINDEX 
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC  
High  
MMC  
Low  
MMC 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept 11.280*** 
 
9.994*** 
 
11.263***  9.244***  11.327***  9.924*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
DIV3 -0.111 
 
-0.271*** 
  
      
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.01) 
  
      
DIV3 × C4-Index (Compustat) -0.692  0.696*         
 (0.46)  (0.07)         
NUMSEG 
    
-0.010  -0.156***     
     
(0.82)  (0.01)     
NUMSEG × C4-Index (Compustat)     -0.333  0.291*     
     (0.27)  (0.08)     
SALESHINDEX 
     
   -0.053  -0.791*** 
      
   (0.83)  (0.01) 
SALESHINDEX × C4-Index (Compustat)  
 
 
  
   -1.269  1.588* 
  
 
 
  
   (0.48)  (0.08) 
C4-Index (Compustat) -0.345 
 
-0.288 
 
0.015  -0.536*  -0.335  -0.145 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.97)  (0.09)  (0.16)  (0.50) 
Log (Asset) -0.474*** 
 
-0.449*** 
 
-0.475***  -0.420***  -0.478***  -0.454*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.144*** 
 
0.000 
 
-0.143***  -0.009  -0.142***  0.008 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.99) 
 
(0.01)  (0.69)  (0.01)  (0.78) 
Leverage 2.062*** 
 
1.923*** 
 
2.061***  1.727***  2.075***  1.832*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability -4.135*** 
 
-3.629*** 
 
-4.106***  -2.939***  -4.085***  -3.441*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Firm risk 2.299*** 
 
2.604*** 
 
2.303***  1.649***  2.300***  2.105*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.214** 
 
-0.128 
 
-0.216**  -0.091  -0.218**  -0.146 
 (0.05) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.04)  (0.25)  (0.04)  (0.12) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.072* 
 
-0.099*** 
 
-0.073*  -0.053*  -0.070  -0.046 
 (0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.09)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.17) 
Bond size 0.234*** 
 
0.250*** 
 
0.237***  0.258***  0.237***  0.257*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Rating 0.053*** 
 
0.072*** 
 
0.054***  0.070***  0.054***  0.068*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects      Yes      Yes     Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes 
No. of Observations    2,670     3,890    2,670     3,890    2,670     3,890 
Adj. R2 0.515  0.457  0.515  0.510  0.514  0.469 
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Table 4.10 Robustness Tests 
‒ Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Estimation: First Stage 
This table provides the results from the probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable 
that equals one for diversified firms and zero otherwise. In Endogeneity (1), we include PNDIV and 
PSDIV to generate the instruments for diversification. PNDIV is the fraction of diversified firms 
(excluding sample firms) in the industry. PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for by 
diversified firms (excluding sample firms). In Endogeneity (2), PNDIV_Modified and PSDIV_Modified 
are computed in the same way as in Endogeneity (1), but only using diversified firms who have a leverage 
ratio less than 5% or at least “A-” S&P credit rating. The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as 
the yield to maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar 
maturity, expressed in percentage terms. Competition (Fitted HHI), Competition (Compustat), Fitted HHI 
and C4-Index (Compustat) are proxies for product market competition (definitions are described in Table 
4.1). The other variables are described in more detail in Table 4.1. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 1986 
and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are 
denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  Dummy Variable 
 
Endogeneity (1) 
 
Endogeneity (2) 
 
(1) 
 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept -2.387*** 
 
4.232***  3.860  3.734 
 
-1.456***  4.059*  -0.476  -2.521*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.07)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
 
(0.01)  (0.08)  (0.72)  (0.01) 
PNDIV 1.413*** 
 
1.316***  1.548***  1.427*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 PSDIV 0.515*** 
 
0.499***  0.391***  0.460*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 PNDIV_Modified 
   
 
 
 
  
1.722***  1.991***  1.793***  1.728*** 
    
 
 
 
  
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
PSDIV_Modified 
   
 
 
 
  
0.262**  0.152  0.212*  0.278** 
    
 
 
 
  
(0.04)  (0.24)  (0.09)  (0.03) 
Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.083* 
  
 
 
 
  
-0.126***  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.06) 
  
 
 
 
  
(0.01)  
 
 
 
 
 Competition (Compustat) 
  
-0.575***  
 
 
   
 -0.651***  
 
 
 
   
(0.01)  
 
 
   
 (0.01)  
 
 
 Fitted HHI 
   
 -3.183***  
   
 
 
 -2.643***  
 
    
 (0.01)  
   
 
 
 (0.01)  
 C4-Index (Compustat) 
   
 
 
 0.841*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 1.058*** 
    
 
 
 (0.01) 
  
 
 
 
 
 (0.01) 
Log (Asset) 0.166*** 
 
-0.140  -0.121  -0.127 
 
0.149***  -0.107  0.125*  0.204*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.26)  (0.33)  (0.31) 
 
(0.01)  (0.39)  (0.05)  (0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.223*** 
 
-0.198***  -0.217***  -0.207*** 
 
-0.309***  -0.263***  -0.276***  -0.261*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Leverage -0.761*** 
 
-0.784***  -0.865***  -0.814*** 
 
-0.694***  -0.719***  -0.832***  -0.780*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Profitability 0.212 
 
-0.429  0.037  -0.284 
 
0.175  -0.408  -0.039  -0.355 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.23)  (0.91)  (0.42) 
 
(0.62)  (0.25)  (0.91)  (0.31) 
Firm risk -1.758*** 
 
-2.091***  -2.725***  -2.520*** 
 
-1.937***  -1.951***  -2.551***  -1.946*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Tangibility -0.407*** 
 
-0.127  -0.375***  -0.311*** 
 
-0.433***  -0.139  -0.417***  -0.358*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.16)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.12)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.135*** 
 
-0.183***  -0.156***  -0.163*** 
 
-0.104***  -0.147***  -0.122***  -0.125*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Bond size -0.078*** 
 
-0.042**  -0.025  -0.039** 
 
-0.082***  -0.048***  -0.040**  -0.062*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.02)  (0.15)  (0.02) 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Rating -0.026*** 
 
-0.050***  -0.051***  -0.051*** 
 
-0.025***  -0.047***  -0.044***  -0.037*** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
No. of Observations   4,339     4,339   4,339   4,339      4,339  4,339    4,339    4,339 
Pseudo R2 0.208 
 
0.217  0.193  0.194 
 
0.142  0.164  0.126  0.136 
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Table 4.11A Robustness Tests   
‒ Instrumental Variable Estimation & Heckman’s Two-stage Estimation 
This table provides results from instrumental variables estimation and Heckman’s two-stage estimation to 
examine the effect of competition on the relationship between diversification and bond spreads (see text for more 
details). We include PNDIV and PSDIV to generate the instruments for diversification. PNDIV is the fraction of 
diversified firms (excluding sample firms) in the industry. PSDIV is the fraction of industry sales accounted for 
by diversified firms (excluding sample firms). The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to 
maturity of the corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed 
in percentage terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code 
industry, and zero otherwise. Competition (Fitted HHI), Competition (Compustat), Fitted HHI and C4-Index 
(Compustat) are proxies for product market competition. All firm- and bond-specific characteristics are defined 
in Table 4.1. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the probit estimates in Table 4.10. All regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is 
between 1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels 
are denoted with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
  Bond Spread 
 
Endogeneity (1) 
 
Instrumental variables estimation: 
second stage 
 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation:  
second stage 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Intercept 10.319*** 
 
19.310*** 
 
19.301*** 
 
18.596*** 
 
10.314*** 
 
19.333*** 
 
19.289*** 
 
18.585*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 -0.185 
 
-0.356** 
 
-0.955*** 
 
-0.787*** 
 
-0.188 
 
-0.365** 
 
-0.870*** 
 
-0.699*** 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.665*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.635*** 
   
 
  
 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
   
 
  Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.239** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.227** 
   
 
  
 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.04) 
   
 
  DIV3 × Competition (Compustat) 
  
-0.537** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.428* 
 
 
  
   
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.06) 
 
 
  Competition (Compustat) 
  
0.252** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.210** 
 
 
  
   
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
 
  DIV3 × Fitted HHI 
  
 
 
8.092** 
 
 
 
 
   
6.970** 
  
   
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.04) 
  Fitted HHI 
  
 
 
-5.206*** 
 
 
 
 
   
-4.736*** 
  
   
 
 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.01) 
  DIV3 × C4-Index (Compustat) 
  
 
 
 
 
1.959** 
 
 
   
 
 
1.511* 
   
 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 
   
 
 
(0.07) 
C4-Index (Compustat) 
  
 
 
 
 
-0.989** 
 
 
   
 
 
-0.721 
   
 
 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
 
   
 
 
(0.14) 
Log (Asset) -0.432*** 
 
-1.000*** 
 
-0.990*** 
 
-0.960*** 
 
-0.432*** 
 
-1.002*** 
 
-0.991*** 
 
-0.963*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Market-to-Book -0.135*** 
 
-0.304*** 
 
-0.226*** 
 
-0.204*** 
 
-0.133*** 
 
-0.298*** 
 
-0.221*** 
 
-0.198*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Leverage 1.973*** 
 
2.236*** 
 
2.320*** 
 
2.240*** 
 
1.973*** 
 
2.240*** 
 
2.319*** 
 
2.246*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Profitability -4.139*** 
 
-2.140*** 
 
-2.519*** 
 
-2.555*** 
 
-4.146*** 
 
-2.166*** 
 
-2.543*** 
 
-2.591*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.689*** 
 
3.403*** 
 
3.625*** 
 
3.537*** 
 
2.705*** 
 
3.460*** 
 
3.676*** 
 
3.592*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Tangibility -0.162 
 
-0.295*** 
 
-0.298*** 
 
-0.257*** 
 
-0.165* 
 
-0.306*** 
 
-0.313*** 
 
-0.266*** 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Log(bond maturity) -0.122*** 
 
-0.069** 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.073** 
 
-0.121*** 
 
-0.066** 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.070** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.03) 
Bond size 0.216*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
0.153*** 
 
0.155*** 
 
0.216*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
0.152*** 
 
0.154*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Rating 0.063*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
0.114*** 
 
0.063*** 
 
0.111*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
0.114*** 
  (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Lambda 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.051* 
 
-0.176*** 
 
-0.188*** 
 
-0.180*** 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year & Industry Fixed Effects    Yes     Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
No. of Observations   4,339    4,339   4,339   4,339   4,339   4,339   4,339   4,339 
Adj. R2 0.452 
 
0.433 
 
0.395 
 
0.423 
 
0.452 
 
0.438 
 
0.401 
 
0.428 
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Table 4.11B Robustness Tests ‒ Alternative Instruments 
‒ Instrumental Variable Estimation & Heckman’s Two-Stage Estimation 
This table provides results from instrumental variables estimation and Heckman’s two-stage estimation to 
examine the effect of competition on the relationship between diversification and bond spreads (see text for more 
details). We include PNDIV_Modified and PSDIV_Modified to generate the instruments for diversification. 
PNDIV_Modified is the fraction of diversified firms with a leverage ratio less than 5% or at least “A-” S&P 
credit rating (excluding sample firms) in the industry. PSDIV_Modified is the fraction of industry sales 
accounted for by diversified firms with a leverage ratio less than 5% or at least “A-” S&P credit rating 
(excluding sample firms). The dependent variable, bond spread, is defined as the yield to maturity of the 
corporate bond minus the yield to maturity of a Treasury security of similar maturity, expressed in percentage 
terms. DIV3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm operates in more than one 3-digit SIC code industry, and 
zero otherwise. Competition (Fitted HHI), Competition (Compustat), Fitted HHI and C4-Index (Compustat) are 
proxies for product market competition. All firm- and bond-specific characteristics are defined in Table 4.1. 
Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the probit estimates in Table 4.10. All regressions control for 
year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are not reported for brevity. The sample period is between 
1986 and 2010. The p-value is reported in the parentheses. The 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels are denoted 
with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  Bond Spread 
 
Endogeneity (2) 
 
Instrumental variables estimation: 
second stage 
 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation:  
second stage 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Intercept 9.963*** 
 
19.437*** 
 
17.497*** 
 
19.731*** 
 
9.946*** 
 
19.506*** 
 
17.487*** 
 
19.749*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
DIV3 0.029 
 
-0.464* 
 
-0.631** 
 
-0.791** 
 
0.027 
 
-0.479* 
 
-0.551** 
 
-0.691** 
 
(0.91) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.91) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.03) 
 
(0.04) 
DIV3 × Competition (Fitted HHI) -0.720*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.677*** 
   
 
  (0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
   
 
  Competition (Fitted HHI) 0.280** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.262** 
   
 
  
 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
   
 
  DIV3 × Competition (Compustat) 
  
-0.693** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.587** 
 
 
  
  
(0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
 
  Competition (Compustat) 
  
0.276** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.234* 
 
 
  
   
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.08) 
 
 
  DIV3 × Fitted HHI 
  
 
 
2.081** 
 
 
 
 
   
1.706* 
  
   
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.06) 
  Fitted HHI 
  
 
 
-1.181** 
 
 
 
 
   
-0.951* 
  
   
 
 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
   
(0.08) 
  DIV3 × C4-Index (Compustat) 
  
 
 
 
 
7.805* 
 
 
   
 
 
6.313 
   
 
 
 
 
(0.06) 
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(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
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-2.372*** 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Firm risk 2.752*** 
 
3.326*** 
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3.239*** 
 
2.780*** 
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2.694*** 
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(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
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-0.140*** 
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(0.01) 
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(0.01) 
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(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
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-0.186*** 
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0.415 
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0.439 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Limitations 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
This thesis explores the implications of corporate diversification. 
Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between the coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and the value of corporate cash holdings. We develop three 
hypotheses, based on financial constraints, the efficient internal capital market, and the 
agency problems. We find that the coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities reduces the value of cash for poorly governed firms and constrained firms, 
but increases the value of cash for firms with efficient internal capital markets. 
Chapter 3 examines how coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities 
affects merger outcomes. We find that coinsurance across divisional investment 
opportunities is negatively associated with acquirer announcement returns and post-
merger operating performance. We document a positive link between the effect of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the probability of firms 
initiating mergers when they are poorly-governed. Evidence suggests that coinsurance 
across divisional investment opportunities is closely associated with agency problems 
and thus can lead to value destruction in diversified firms. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of product market competition on the relationship 
between corporate diversification and the cost of debt financing. We develop three 
hypotheses based on the coinsurance effect, the efficient internal capital markets and the 
multimarket contacts in diversified firms. We find that the product market competition 
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increases the negative relationship between diversification and the cost of borrowing for 
firms that are financially constrained or make efficient cross-divisional transfers. 
Although intense competition may, in some cases, undermine the tacit collusion through 
the multimarket contacts in diversified firms, overall, the negative association between 
diversification and cost of debt financing is stronger in firms facing intense competition.  
5.2 Limitations 
5.2.1 Biases in Measurement Methodology 
5.2.1.1 Segment Comparability 
In the thesis, in order to compute the value of coinsurance across divisional 
investment opportunities and cash flows in a diversified firm, we need the data of 
investment opportunities and cash flows at the segment level. We employ the average 
Tobin’s Q and the average cash flows of single-segment firms in an industry to proxy 
for the investment opportunities and cash flows in a diversified firm’s segment.  
The methodology goes back to work of Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek 
(1995) who treat single-segment firms as benchmarks for conglomerate segments and 
document the “diversification discount” phenomenon, which stimulated a voluminous 
literature on the value consequences of diversification. Over the past two decades, this 
methodology has been widely used in a large body of research on diversification. 
However, the assumption underlying the methodology, that the firm characteristics, 
such as investment opportunities of single-segment firms and diversified firms are 
comparable, has been questioned by researchers. A number of subsequent papers 
suggest diversified firms tend to have lower Tobin’s Qs, a lower growth rate, a lower 
R&D investment, a greater profitability, and higher cash flows and returns (e.g., Lamont 
and Polk, 2001; Hyland and Diltz, 2002; Campa and Kedia, 2002). Therefore, using 
focused firms to represent segment characteristics of conglomerates is prone to selection 
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bias, and undermines the accuracy of the diversification-related measurements utilized 
in this thesis.  
5.2.1.2 Flaws in Segment Reporting Data 
As is the case with the majority of empirical papers in the literature on 
diversification, this thesis is based on the Compustat segment data. Nonetheless, 
Compustat segment reporting is also subject to several biases. First, under the FASB 
Accounting Standards, firms can report up to 10 business segments. Given that many 
conglomerates operate in more than 10 industries, the number of segments reported in 
Compustat are well below the true level of a firm’s diversification (Lichtenberg, 1991; 
Montgomery, 1994). Secondly, there is no clear-cut definition of “segment”; thus, a 
segment reported by a firm can be a mere gathering of multiple unrelated lines of 
business. This generates the question of whether the segments of different firms are 
comparable with each other (Davis and Duhaime, 1992). Thirdly, a good number of the 
segment changes reported by firms and recorded in Compustat are just reporting 
adjustments and do not reflect real changes in organizational forms (Denis et al., 1997; 
Hyland and Diltz, 2002). Fourthly, established proxies for segment investments 
(CAPEX/asset) and investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q) do not capture mergers and 
acquisition activities and their impacts, and they thus neglect a significant portion of the 
total investments made by conglomerates (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2008; Custódio, 
2014). Therefore, as argued by Villalonga (2004a), studies based on the Compustat file 
are susceptible to measurement errors in segment reporting, which can cause 
misrepresentations of segment-level data.  
5.2.1.3 Discretionary Segment Disclosure 
Moreover, the segment reporting problem is compounded by the fact that firms can 
intentionally reduce segment disclosure via aggregation of cross-divisional activities 
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with the proprietary cost motive or the agency cost motive. The former underscores the 
need to conceal from rivals information that can put the disclosing firms themselves in a 
disadvantageous position (Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005), and the latter 
underscores the conflict between shareholders and managers who want to hide poor 
performance of diversification strategies (Berger and Hann, 2007). Therefore, 
discretionary disclosure challenges the objectivity of segment-specific data documented 
in Compustat.  
Collectively, we acknowledge that the findings from our empirical tests are subject 
to the above-mentioned issues. Nonetheless, as the inter-segment activities and 
performance within diversified firms are not directly observable, we follow most 
researchers in the field and adopt this methodology and employ the Compustat segment 
data.  
5.2.1.4 Limitation of the G-index 
In this section, we discuss some limitations regarding the Gompers et al.’s (2003) 
G-index. First of all, the G-index, as a measurement of corporate governance, is 
constructed in a simple way. It is defined as the total number of a firm’s defensive 
provisions such as poison pills and staggered boards. One possible problem of such 
naively-formed governance index is that it may not actually capture the essence of 
complex governance mechanisms. Another problem is that G-index is constructed using 
anti-takeover provisions. It does not cover other important aspects of corporate 
governance such as board structure and shareholder ownership. As Larcker et al. (2007) 
argues, omitted aspects of corporate governance are likely to be correlated with the G-
index and thus the regression results based on G-index are open to doubt. In addition, 
the G-index data is static. It only provides data for every two years from 1990 to 2006, 
covering mostly larger firms. Therefore, our empirical findings based on the G-index 
may not be representative of the general population of U.S. companies.   
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5.2.1.5 Limitation of the Tobin’s Q Proxy 
In this thesis, we use Tobin’s Q - the market value of a firm’s assets to its 
replacement cost - as the proxy for investment opportunities (the incentive to invest). 
Although widely used in corporate finance, there are some limitations regarding the Q 
proxy.  
Firstly, the calculation of Tobin’s Q is often subject to measurement errors. For 
example, the book value of a firm’s assets does not necessarily equal its replacement 
cost. Historical costs of previous investments are recorded by accounting figures that 
are usually not inflation-adjusted. Also, accounting depreciation data may not reflect 
true economic depreciation. Similarly, it is difficult to obtain the market value of 
preferred equity and corporate debt. Debt prices are usually not directly observable 
since many debt securities are not traded in the public market. In addition, Tobin’s Q 
has also been used as a proxy for corporate performance, firm value and agency 
conflicts and hence it contains noisy information.  
Secondly, a firm’s real incentive to invest only equals Tobin’s Q under strict 
theoretical conditions. The Tobin’s (1969) Q-theory argues that a firm’s investment 
decisions depend on marginal Q - the management’s valuation of the expected marginal 
cash flows produced by an extra unit of capital. In empirical studies, researches use the 
observable (average) Tobin’s Q as an estimate of marginal Q because the latter is not 
directly observable. However, such common practice to equate marginal Q with Tobin’s 
Q relies on very restrictive assumptions of perfect market competition and constant 
returns-to-scale technology (Hayashi, 1982). As empirical evidence on the estimated 
sensitivity of investment to Q so far is mixed, some researchers have questioned the 
validity of these assumptions under which marginal Q equals (average) Tobin’s Q. For 
example, possible deviations from perfect competition and homogeneity technology 
include market power or decreasing returns to scale in production (Gomes, 2001).  
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Thirdly, there can be discrepancy between Tobin’s Q proxy (market valuation of 
capital) and the marginal Q (managers’ valuation of capital). One possible reason is that 
the market’s valuation of capital can deviate from managers’ valuation due to market 
inefficiencies. Another possible reason is that managers’ incentives for investment can 
diverge from those of shareholders. For instance, management’s empire building 
preference can lead to overinvestment decisions (Jensen, 1986). In addition, short-
termism may cause managers to boost short-term reported earnings at the price of long-
term firm value by underinvesting in hard-to-measure projects such as maintenance and 
training (Stein 1989).  
Therefore, our empirical findings based on Tobin’s Q are subject to the above-
mentioned limitations. We nonetheless choose to use this proxy because Tobin’s Q is 
still widely used, primarily due to lack of observable and model-free alternatives, in 
empirical studies of takeovers (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991; Dong et al., 2006) and 
corporate diversification (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Rajan et al., 2000; Duchin 2010).  
5.2.2 Heterogeneity across Industries 
Researchers have argued that diversification can be endogenous. Conglomerates are 
likely to be already discounted before diversification and diversifying decisions are 
influenced by industry characteristics (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b; 
Graham et al., 2002). In this thesis, we follow Campa and Kedia (2002), and address 
endogeneity by using instrumented variables, based on the industry attractiveness. The 
Campa and Kedia (2002) model has been adopted by almost every subsequent empirical 
paper in the literature on diversification.  
However, as documented and argued by Santalo and Becerra (2008), diversification 
does not affect firms similarly or randomly across industries. Instead, diversified firms 
can perform poorly in some industries, but perform better in some others. For instance, 
conglomerate can outperform focused firms in industries where soft information is 
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important,
18
 or where firms are vertically integrated. Therefore, Santalo and Becerra 
(2008) question the instrumental variable specification developed by Campa and Kedia 
(2002). If industry heterogeneity moderates the “diversification-performance” 
relationship, industry attractiveness will be correlated to both a firm’s diversifying 
decision and the firm value. This implies that the instrument for diversification, which is 
based on industry attractiveness, may not serve as a good instrument. According to 
Santalo and Becerra (2008), conglomerates are more likely to outperform in sectors 
dominated by diversified firm, thus, the instrumented variables computed from the 
model in Campa and Kedia (2002) can lead to an upward bias in the valuation of 
diversified firms. This critique highlights the need to enhance the modelling of 
diversification decisions, as well as the need to investigate the industry characteristics 
that determine whether diversified firms thrive or struggle.  
5.3 Future work  
This thesis could be extended in a number of ways.  
First, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 we document a negative value consequence of 
coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. Evidence supports the dark side 
of the internal capital markets associated with agency problems. The theoretical models 
on the dark side of the internal capital markets are founded on the bargaining powers 
among the stakeholders inside the firm. Researchers have argued that cross-
subsidization results from the bargaining powers of division managers against each 
other and the CEO (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al., 2000). This stresses the 
importance of understanding how bargaining powers of division managers can influence 
resource allocation, which is not yet covered in this thesis. Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2007) underline the importance of examining firms from inside in order to grasp the 
                                                 
18
 Soft information is the information that cannot be correctly conveyed to outsiders (e.g., Stein 2002; 
Faure-Grimaud et al. 2003). 
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effect of managerial power and connections on resource allocations. Thus, the 
interaction between coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities and the 
bargaining power of division managers should trigger interesting questions. For 
example, if internal resources are shifted away from a promising segment to another 
with poor investment opportunities because the latter has a powerful manager who 
exercises influence in favour of his/her division, the transfers are obviously inefficient. 
On the other hand, if the same manager draws resources when his/her division has better 
opportunities, his/her bargaining powers in fact result in efficient transfers and mitigate 
the negative impact of coinsurance across divisional investment opportunities. 
Secondly, the role of multimarket contacts in diversification is an under-explored 
area, where empirical evidence is scarce. Yu and Cannella Jr. (2013) highlight the rising 
awareness of the need to link multimarket contacts research with the diversification 
study. In Chapter 4, we provide evidence that multimarket contacts undermine the tacit 
collusions in diversified firms when product market competition intensifies. It can be 
extended in a number of ways. For example, we can study the impact of the multimarket 
contacts on the diversification discount. If diversified firms can silently collude and 
drive out single-segment firms, we should expect a diversification premium in 
industries where it is easier to establish multimarket contacts and facilitates tacit 
collusion. The diversification premium should be discounted in industries where tacit 
collusion is difficult to sustain. This could offer another explanation for the 
diversification discount debate.  
Thirdly, given the limitations of Compustat segment data, one extension is to test 
the diversification effects, using different data sources and underlying benchmarks. For 
example, Villalonga (2004a) employs the US business establishments database (BITS) 
from the Census Bureau and links it to Compustat for a more accurate identification of 
conglomerate segments. She documents a diversification premium based on the data 
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from BITS. Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Schoar (2002) and Bens et al. (2011) use 
the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) from the Census Bureau to identify 
segments at a plant-level in manufacturing sectors. Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) utilize a 
text-based analysis to redefine industry relatedness based on products’ similarity. 
Researchers have also started adopting unique manually-collected data to examine the 
internal capital markets of conglomerates (e.g., Glaser et al., 2013; Duchin et al., 2016). 
As noted by Maksimovic and Phillips (2013), the difficulty in directly observing 
segment-level activities within firms highlights the importance of addressing biases in 
data and valuation methodology in recent literature. The uncertainty about when the 
selection of alternative data sources and benchmarks would produce different results, 
and the merits and drawbacks of alternative data sources are still open questions.  
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